Abstract. Direct protest actions by Indigenous peoples in Canada have rarely yielded the specific gains that were targeted. In the aftermath of conflict, Canadian governments have typically proven to be intransigent. An exception to this general tendency is the Anishinabek occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park, which began in 1995. In 2007, the government of Ontario agreed to return the parkland to the First Nation, making it an unusually successful instance of direct action. It is argued here that this outcome can best be explained by drawing on the “symbolic politics” theory of intergroup conflict. The Ipperwash inquiry, acting as a post-conflict truth commission, generated a micro-narrative shared by both groups, which altered the political incentive structure and enabled the outlier accommodative outcome.

Résumé. Les actions de protestation directe par les peuples autochtones du Canada ont rarement donné les résultats recherchés. Au lendemain d'un conflit, les gouvernements canadiens se sont généralement montrés intransigeants. L'occupation du Parc provincial d'Ipperwash par les Anishinabek, qui débuta en 1995, représente toutefois une exception à cette tendance générale. Le gouvernement ontarien a accepté, en 2007, de retourner les territoires du parc à cette première nation, ce qui en fait un des rares cas où l'action directe a porté fruit. L'article soutient que c'est en s'appuyant sur la théorie de la politique symbolique des conflits intergroupes qu'il est possible d'expliquer ce résultat. Agissant comme une commission de vérité et de réconciliation, la Commission d'enquête sur Ipperwash a généré un récit commun, partagé par les deux groupes. En changeant la structure d'incitatifs politiques, ce récit explique l'étonnant résultat d'accommodement qui en est ressorti.

Abstract. In this article we re-establish the relevance of linguistic diversity by highlighting that French is a minority language spoken by a growing number of non-white and non-Christian minority groups, including Muslims. These groups are often characterized in contemporary Canada as essentially non-modern, traditional and opposed to secularism—characterizations that were used historically to depict French ethnic minorities as essentially Catholic, traditional and non-modern. Utilizing a historically grounded case study of the evolution of French language education rights in Alberta, the study reveals how “Franco-Albertans” are a linguistic minority comprised of other minorities. We also show the contradictions inherent in dichotomous representations of “secularism” when it comes to “Western” and “non-Western” societies, or “Christian” and “Muslim” groups. We argue that in expanding the discipline's focus to deal with a wider range of “groups,” analysts need to attend to how “multiple minorities” may take analytically relevant forms, and be wary of evolutionary and dichotomous constructions of diverse “others.”

Résumé. Dans cet article, nous redonnons une place importante à la question linguistique comme dimension politique fondamentale au Canada, et au français comme langue minoritaire parlée par un nombre croissant de groupes minoritaires non blancs et non chrétiens, y compris les musulmans. Ces groupes, ce qui n'est pas selon nous sans intérêt, sont souvent globalement décrits aujourd'hui comme étant non modernes, traditionnels et opposés au sécularisme dans un discours qui n'est pas sans évoquer la façon dont les Canadiens français furent historiquement décrits comme une société strictement catholique et prémoderne. Dans ce cas-ci, le Canada francophone est étudié à travers le prisme de la francophonie albertaine, elle-même composée de plusieurs minorités. Nous nous concentrons en particulier sur les droits scolaires en Alberta et un lien est aussi établi entre cette situation et la description souvent dichotomique par rapport au sécularisme de la société canadienne entre les groupes «occidentaux» et «non occidentaux» ou encore entre les groupes «chrétiens» d'un côté, et de l'autre, les groupes de la diversité multiculturelle canadienne, notamment les musulmans francophones. La thèse de cet article est qu'en élargissant le champ d'investigation de la discipline de façon à inclure un éventail de groupes plus grand, les analystes doivent être vigilants quant à l'articulation complexe du concept de «minorités multiples» de façon à éviter les constructions trop évolutionnistes et dichotomiques des divers «autres».

The COVID-19 pandemic has seen opponents of public health mandates deploy a range of populist and anti-elite arguments. The 2021 Canadian federal election was an exceptional “pandemic election” in which the COVID-19 health crisis took centre stage. But the election campaign also saw the populist People's Party of Canada (PPC) rise to prominence by opposing pandemic-related public health restrictions. While the party failed to win a seat, it did manage to triple its vote share (1.6 per cent to 4.9 per cent). It is unclear, however, what factors led to the rise in support for the PPC. To explore this issue, we draw on an original post-election survey (n = 18,950) and focus on populist attitudes and opposition to COVID-19-related public health restrictions. Results from regression models and structural equation models (SEMs) indicate that opposition to public health restrictions was a much stronger factor than populism in shaping support for the PPC.

There is now an extensive literature on bureaucratic organization in general, and on governmental bureaucracies in particular. Recently there has been a tendency to view social power as being distributed through a set of counter-bureaucracies, each of which is a development within a particular institutional order. Modern corporations, the trade unions, the departments of state, the armed services, the church, and so forth are all bureaucratically organized. In other words they have an intensive division of labour, a hierarchical system of command and co-ordination, and an emphasis in recruitment on expert qualifications. Consequently, as bureaucratic organization pervades the entire social structure, we enter the age of the “managerial society,” the “organization man,” and “government by expert.” Hence bureaucracy takes on its true meaning of rule by officials.

While much of contemporary sociology in the fields of industrial relations and business and public administration is given over to improving the techniques of bureaucratic control, less attention is paid to the relationship of the various bureaucracies to one another within the total system of power. In this paper I have brought together data on the careers and social backgrounds of the top men—the élite—of the Canadian federal public service. The ordering of these data has been guided by models of governmental bureaucracy in relation to other institutional structures. Limitation of space precludes a full exposition here of these models, but a brief outline is necessary to give some meaning to the empirical materials that follow. The significant variables in these models are rationalization, rivalry, and openness.

Extending recent social science work using the concept of “scene” into politics, this paper investigates connections between cultural variation and political variation across Canadian localities. First, we introduce the notion of “scene.” Then, using a national database of local amenities (with some 1800 categories and 1.6 million data points), we show that key dimensions of cultural meaning account for significant differences in voting patterns in recent Canadian elections. In particular, electoral districts with scenes that suggest themes of self-expression are associated with support for left-leaning parties, while scenes that support locality and corporateness are associated with the right. We conclude with suggestions for pursuing hypotheses about potential mechanisms driving these associations.

Abstract. In recent years, the question of authorization for the use of force for humanitarian purposes has become more contentious than ever. Participants on both sides of the debate, namely those rejecting any exception to the requirement for UN authorization and the proponents of surpassing this in cases of exceptional humanitarian emergencies, do not seem to have reached any consensus. This article examines these opposing arguments, their legal interpretations, and tests the theoretical assumptions against state practice through a review of the record of humanitarian interventions since the 1990s. The final purpose is to assess two of the most promising alternatives for authorization: the UN and regional organizations. This analysis suggests some implications of the debate for the perception of the UN role in authorizing interventions, in addition to determining the need for alternative mechanisms to authorize interventions for humanitarian purposes.

Résumé. Dans les dernières années, la question de l'autorisation du recours à la force dans des missions à but humanitaire est devenu un sujet particulièrement contesté de l'actualité. Les participants aux deux côtés du débat, ceux qui rejettent toute exception à l'autorisation préalable des Nations Unies et ceux qui proposent de court-circuiter l'ONU dans des situations humanitaires d'une urgence exceptionnelle seulement, ne semblent pas pourvoir atteindre de consensus. Cet article examime ces deux vues opposées et leurs interprétations juridiques et met leurs hypothèses théoriques à l'épreuve de la pratique en considérant les missions humanitaires entreprises depuis 1990. Le but ultime consiste à évaluer deux des alternatives d'autorisation les plus prometteuses : celle des Nations Unies et celle d'organisations régionales. Cette analyse suggère certaines implications du débat quant à la perception du rôle des Nations Unies dans le processus d'autorisation des interventions et révèle, d'autre part, le besoin de mécanismes nouveaux pour autoriser ces missions humanitaires.

Previous research has argued that while economic voting is quite consistently found to be an important mechanism in the rest of Canada, it is rather weak in Quebec. Guérin and Nadeau (1998) have demonstrated that whether or not citizens in Quebec vote economically depends on the party system. Following their lead, we expect that the presence of a dominant regionalist party in Quebec after 1993 (the Bloc Québécois) inhibited Quebeckers from voting economically. However, our results do not offer evidence for this hypothesis. Furthermore, we find only weak evidence of economic voting being moderated by voters’ attitudes towards Quebec independence. Our study hence suggests that the impact of economic accountability in Canada is not hindered by a strong regional party or by the salience of the issue of Quebec independence. The economic vote, it seems, is more stable and general than it is regularly argued to be.

We have already considered the election of a single candidate to represent a constituency. Now we turn to the problem of choosing the group of representatives who will best reflect the political opinions held throughout a country or constituency. The desirability of proportional representation, ceteris paribus, we take to be self-evident; a change in the electoral system that makes the legislative bodies more truly reflect the citizens' opinions will certainly be desirable, provided the party system and the system of cabinet government remain as effective after the change as they had been before. Of course, the source of difficulty, the opponents of proportional representation would add, is that when proportional representation is introduced other things do not remain the same: instead a degeneration of the party and cabinet system sets in.

These “dynamic changes” include alterations in party structure, a heightening or lessening of the political interest of the voters, alterations in the type of persons who stand for Parliament, new problems of cabinet formation, and increased or lesser control by the electorate over the course of government. And we readily concede that these are the aspects of the problem that it is most important to investigate to decide whether proportional representation would, in practice, do good or harm. The present paper will make no reference to them, and is not, indeed, much concerned to answer the broad question of whether proportional representation would, in any particular circumstances, be a good thing or a bad thing. A proper scientific procedure permits the treatment in isolation of particular aspects of each wider problem; and our concern is with the “statics” of the problem. (We only consider one or two small dynamic changes which are intimately connected with the course of the argument.)

While prior studies have applied schema theory to belief systems in the mass public, it has yet to be used to assess attitudes held by elites in society. This article uses schema theory to suggest that justices of the Supreme Court of Canada employ an information processing model when deciding search and seizure cases. Specifically, it implies that the justices have a schema, or an organized set of attitudes, that are triggered by the factual and legal circumstances in particular search and seizure cases. The belief that justices would use such a heuristic device makes sense, given that they are expected to resolve disputes in a quick and efficient manner as well as maintain consistency in the law. The study uses factor analysis to provide evidence that there is an underlying structure to the attitudes that Canadian justices use in these cases (1984–1994). It adds to the prior research in this area, because it moves schema theory beyond the study of mass belief systems, and it represents a unique way of assessing the judicial decision-making process of Canadian justices since the adoption in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The first systematic correlation of socio-demographic factors and party preference in Canadian federal elections was made by Escott Reid in 1933. No expansion or even replication followed until the mid-1950s when John Meisel, using data obtained by sample survey of individuals, continued the enquiry begun by Reid on the basis of aggregate statistics. Since then – especially after 1960 – many data have been collected and some studies made on the links between party preference and factors such as religion, language, region, social class, and age. But these studies, even for the variables that have received most attention – religion, region, and class, for example – give us findings which remain scattered over time and space, like building materials on different construction sites. We need an overall view of the relationship between socio-demographic factors and party preference – if only to facilitate the interpretation of more refined but narrowly focussed studies; and we need such a view to extend over more than one or two elections.

Over the past few years there has been an increase in scholarly attention to the politics, the theorization and the logic of difference as a site of contestation; as a cultural value, as a measure of liberalism's capacity for tolerance and inclusion, and as a subject of state action for protection. The debate has been joined by two contributors to this JOURNAL: Avigail Eisenberg in 1994 and Katherine Fierlbeck in 1996. Their thinking is fairly representative of the important debate about the political significance of difference, especially in view of Aboriginal rights and contemporary treaties in Canada, and deserves closer scrutiny.

Under what circumstances do central and local party actors engage in gatekeeping to influence the outcomes of local nomination races? In this article, I develop a theory of gatekeeping in Canadian parties by synthesizing past work on candidate selection with a multi-method field study of New Brunswick provincial nominations (2017–2018). I present evidence in favour of this theory from participant-observation of 25 nominating conventions, 93 elite interviews, and an original dataset of major party nominations for the 2018 New Brunswick election. The theory and evidence show how gatekeeping by central party actors helps explain how nominations can go uncontested, even in competitive and safe seats. The theory also generates several testable claims for future studies of candidate selection in other places, time periods and levels of government in Canada.

Abstract. The growing interest in the relation between language and politics brings new assumptions and theoretical frameworks to the study of politics. This study presents a simple empirical test of a major assumption of the critical discourse analysis school: that power is a major factor in political discourse. It examines whether the discourse of Israeli members of parliament (Knesset) represents a view of the world through the prism of power or whether parliament members refer to the experience of similar democracies. We demonstrate that power is a strong and significant factor in Israeli legislative discourse through time and across issues while relevance plays no role.

Résumé. L'intérêt grandissant que suscite le lien entre langage et politique, génère de nouvelles hypothèses et de nouvelles théories de l'étude du politique. Cette étude propose de tester l'une des principales hypothèses de l'analyse critique de discours, à savoir que le pouvoir serait un facteur essentiel du discours politique. Le discours des membres du parlement israélien (la Knesset) est analysé afin de déterminer s'il reflète une vision du monde à travers le prisme du pouvoir, ou si au contraire les membres du parlements se réfèrent plutôt à l'expérience d'autres démocraties sous différents angles, en particulier celui de la similaritê de leur travail parlementaire. Cette étude démontre que le pouvoir constitue un facteur important et significatif du discours législatif israélien, à la fois sur la longue durée et concernant une variété de sujets, alors que le facteur de la pertinence ne joue aucun rôle.

The literature on activism characterizes the recent transformations of activism as part of a process towards the “personalization of politics”. For structural or cultural reasons, committed citizens appear to be developing a new relationship to politics, seeking personal satisfaction in their engagement. We propose an alternative interpretation, and characterize this transformation as “do-it-yourself” (DIY) politics. Based on the protests against shale gas development in Quebec, we show that the DIY politics is the “logical” (in the sense of rational) result of citizens developing the means to compensate for the lack of institutional opportunities in the context of developments that potentially threaten their lives and livelihoods. Hence, rather than a quest for personal fulfillment, DIY politics must be understood as a more prosaic and contingent reaction to a specific situation, an individual and collective response to a situation experienced and perceived as problematic. In the conflict surrounding shale gas development in Quebec, which serves as our case study, we show that 1) the initial impulse to mobilize may be accurately interpreted as moving from the “territory of the self” (“territoire du moi”) to the “territory of the us” (“territoire du nous”), and that 2) it is the double failure of institutional representation that underpins civic engagement: the failure of institutional representation and the lack of representation by collective actors already in place.

It has been suggested that recall questions are unreliable measures of change in party identification. Data reported in this article confirm that 50 per cent of respondents in the 1974-1980 Canadian National Election Study three-wave panel had inconsistent patterns of recall. This finding urges caution in analysis; more importantly, such inconsistency raises questions about how to interpret recall behaviour in the light of party identification theory. The available evidence and unclear theory seem to point toward the possibility that at least one-half of the national sample lacked a meaningful federal party identification.

Commentators on Malthus's population theory have generally based their remarks upon the Essay, particularly upon his observation that “population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious checks” which are resolvable into “moral restraint, vice, and misery.” They have overlooked important passages in the Essay, having to do with the circumstances on which depend the increase and the availability of subsistence, and, therefore, the growth of population. They have overlooked his extended consideration of the question of population in the Principles where his primary concern was the increase of the supplies on which population growth depends. They have, therefore, missed his total population theory, and the manner in which it developed.

It is our purpose, in this essay, to discover the whole of Malthus's population theory, and to indicate, in some measure, the views of earlier and contemporary writers regarding elements of which this theory is composed. In section I we discuss Malthus's theory of economic progress and the “effectual demand” for labour, as it relates to the population question. While this discussion is based upon the Principles much more than upon the Essay and other writings, it is evident, as we state in the conclusion, that Malthus's theory of demand probably evolved out of his consideration of the population question. In section II, we examine Malthus's treatment of industrialization, in which he apparently found a workable solution to both the problem of economic progress and the question of population.

We can read in the literature that women more often than men are candidates in constituencies where defeat is expected. This study examines whether this belief is accurate. The population examined includes male and female candidates for the Québec Liberal party and the Parti Québécois during the 1976, 1981, 1985 and 1989 elections. Three different formulas were applied to the 958 electoral situations, from which one global difficulty index was devised. Using a log-linear model, the relation between the variables “sex of candidate” and “constituency's level of difficulty” (high, average or low) was compared. Results have shown that between 1976 and 1989, women were not more likely than men to run in constituencies where there was no hope that they would win. It must be noted though, that in 1981, fewer women than men ran for the Parti Québécois in constituencies where victory seemed highly probable. However, when only new candidacies are considered, party affiliation becomes the most significant variable. In conclusion, it is noted that political parties will have to collaborate if more women are to become members of the National Assembly.

Abstract. We consider the impact of changing Canadian national party finance laws that banned trade union donations on the relationship between the New Democratic party (NDP) and organized labour. Although the changed laws have required a restructuring of the relationship between the two actors, we find evidence of a continued commitment to co-operation. We conclude that accounts that stress the ideological affinity between the NDP and labour explain the preservation of the relationship better than political economy or rational exchange models.

Résumé. Nous considérons les changements apportés aux lois canadiennes sur le financement des partis politiques, lois qui ont banni les donations des syndicats, dans la perspective de leur incidence sur la relation entre le Nouveau Parti démocratique (NPD) et les syndicats. Malgré le fait que les nouvelles lois ont nécessité une restructuration de la relation entre les deux acteurs, nous avons découvert la présence d'un engagement continu envers la coopération. Nous concluons que les interprétations qui mettent l'accent sur l'affinité idéologique entre le NPD et les syndicats expliquent mieux le maintien de cette relation que l'économie politique ou les modèles d'échange rationnel.