American political theorist Michael Walzer is a prominent provocative thinker on the morality of warfare. His landmark study, Just and Unjust Wars, remains a modem classic. But we might ask: given that this oft–cited work first appeared in 1977, what, if any, relevance does it have for us today? Consider, for instance, Walzer's controversial account of jus ad bellum, a term traditionally referring to the justice of resorting to war.

Abstract. In recent years, several prominent political scientists have argued that quantitative and qualitative methodologies should be seen as united by a single logic of scientific inference. Just exactly how this reconciliation of quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches should be effected in practice, however, remains highly contentious. For all its promise, the project of uniting quantitative and qualitative methods in political science has thus reached something of an impasse. Participants on both sides of the quantitative/qualitative debate are convinced that this methodological divide should eventually be transcended, but few have abandoned the conviction that their preferred approach sets the standard by which progress in this endeavor should be judged. Evidently, we still lack consensus on precisely where the distinctive strengths of each methodological approach lie, and how these strengths can be combined effectively in systematic investigations of the political world. In this essay, we argue that a satisfactory synthesis of quantitative and qualitative methods for making causal inferences in comparative politics depends upon the resolution of a prior theoretical problem at the stage of research design: establishing a typology of political regimes and accounting for the mechanisms of their reproduction and diffusion over time and space.

Résumé. Ces dernières années, plusieurs politologues éminents ont soutenu qu'il faudrait considérer les méthodologies quantitative et qualitative comme étant unies par une même logique de déduction scientifique. Comment réaliser cette réconciliation des approches quantitative et qualitative dans la pratique demeure cependant un sujet hautement contesté. Tout prometteur qu'il soit, le projet d'unifier les méthodes quantitative et qualitative en science politique se retrouve en fait dans une impasse. Les participants des deux côtés du débat quantitatif/qualitatif sont persuadés qu'il faudra un jour transcender cette fracture méthodologique, mais ils sont peu nombreux à avoir abandonné la conviction que l'approche qu'ils privilégient établit la norme qui permettra d'évaluer les progrès accomplis. Il est évident qu'il n'y a pas encore de consensus quant aux forces respectives précises de chaque méthode, ni sur la manière de les combiner efficacement pour procéder à des études systématiques du monde politique. Dans cet article, nous avançons qu'une synthèse satisfaisante des méthodes quantitative et qualitative pour arriver à des déductions causales en politique comparée exige qu'on s'emploie à résoudre d'abord un problème théorique à l'étape de la conception de la recherche, à savoir l'établissement d'une typologie des régimes politiques et l'inventaire des mécanismes de leur reproduction et de leur diffusion dans l'espace et dans le temps.

This article explores ways of improving Canada's constitutional reform process by systematically comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional rounds during three phases: agenda-setting, elite negotiation and ratification. The objective is to draw lessons from these experiences for future attempts to achieve formal constitutional change. The author argues that both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown processes were seriously flawed, but in rather contrasting ways. The Meech Lake process was too closed, narrowly representative and tightly controlled by government elites. The Charlottetown process was poorly managed. It lacked focus, economy and coherence in agenda-setting and selection of items for negotiation, and integration and unified leadership in its elite bargaining structures and processes. The consultative referendum used in the Charlottetown process operated successfully, but still needed organizational fine-tuning and more effective meshing with established ratification procedures. What is required is a more finely balanced and closely integrated “blended” process of parallel elite and citizen-based consultative and participatory structures operating in all phases of the constitutional process. Within this framework, the author offers a comprehensive list of proposals for addressing and overcoming the shortcomings of earlier constitutional reform efforts.

This article considers connections between the ideological orientations of the Reform party of Canada and its proposals for reform of political representation. Particular attention is devoted to its advocacy of direct democracy, new models of representative behaviour and constitutional reform as means of democratizing Canadian politics. These proposals are discussed in relation to Reform's account of collusion between special interests, parties and interventionist governments in our federal system. Reform's preference for market-based over political decision-making is identified as a key foundation of their explanation and remedies for the crisis in Canadian democracy. A review of Reform's blending of older populist critiques with modern neo-conservative perspectives on this problem clarifies the party's distinctiveness and appeal. The Reform agenda emerges as one aiming to contract not just the power of special interests, but also the scope of democratic decision-making in public life.

The impact of the local candidate in Canadian federal elections has received scant theoretical or empirical attention. Voting in Canada is usually accounted for in terms of party identification, party leader attraction, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Possible local candidate influence on electoral outcomes is rarely considered systematically. An observer of British elections placed the average influence of the local candidate at about 10 per cent of the total vote. Morris Davis, in a study of a Halifax two-member constituency, states that the local candidate is responsible for at least 6 per cent of the vote

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of social relations or social capital for voting turnout at three levels of Canadian government, paying particular attention to social contexts, socio-demographics and socio-economic forces. The data source is the Public Use Microdata File from the National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participation, administered by Statistics Canada (2001). Results provide support for social capital theory. Those who donate to charities and/or volunteer have a stronger propensity to vote than their counterparts. Two other measures of social capital, social networks and participation in religious activities, are also related to turnout. However, their effects are comparatively modest. Among the social bases of social capital, community rootedness is an important predictor of turnout. Civic engagement or attentiveness to current affairs also significantly increases voter turnout at all levels of Canadian government. Finally, standard socio-economic and demographic predictors of political participation do show independent effects on turnout. However, with the exception of age, these predictors are not as consistent or as strong as social capital measures in explaining turnout. Theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed.

Abstract. We investigate the nature of civic community and social capital in Alberta. We find a civic community with high levels of interpersonal trust and civic participation, that values formal political equality and direct participation, yet expresses high levels of alienation from and low levels of confidence in its governments. While exogenous variables contribute to a strong civic community, only endogenous variables can account for the comparatively higher levels of participation and trust. Using a model developed by John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, we discover a virtuous circle between trust and participation, with its roots in the agrarian, populist past of the province. Economic and social changes have helped sustain this pattern, as have politicians bent on using it to defend Alberta's exceptionalism.

Résumé. Nous examinons la nature de la communauté civique et du capital social en Alberta. Nous y trouvons une communauté civique riche en confiance interpersonnelle et en participation civique et trés attachée à la fois à l'égalité politique formelle et à la participation directe. Cette communauté exprime cependant un profond sentiment d'aliénation et de méfiance à l'égard de ses gouvernements. Alors que des variables exogènes contribuent au développement d'une communauté civique vigoureuse, seules les variables endogènes peuvent expliquer les niveaux relativement élevés de participation et de confiance. En nous servant du modèle développé par John Brehm et Wendy Rahn, nous avons découvert une relation circulaire “ vertueuse ” entre la confiance et la participation, ayant des racines dans le passé agraire et populiste de la province. Les changements économiques et sociaux ont aidé à promouvoir ce modèle comme le font aussi les politiciens enclins à défendre l'exceptionalisme albertain.

With the rise of the new managerialism in the 1980s, public policy makers have increased their use of management consulting knowledge in reforming their bureaucracies. To describe this situation, some have coined the term « consultocracy,» assuming that the emergence of managerialism created a growing demand for business management expertise in government circles that has allowed consultants to penetrate the state and become powerful actors in the process of administrative reform. This article asks how it has been possible for consultants to become (or not) influential players in the process of bureaucratic reform. The analysis shows that because of historical and institutional reasons, Britain has been more likely than France to give rise to a «consultocracy.»

Native Indian leaders in Canada have embraced the European-Western doctrine of sovereignty as the political-legal instrumentality for achieving their version of “the good society.” This article analyzes the appropriateness and feasibility of sovereign statehood for Canada's Indians. Indian aspirations to sovereign statehood run aground on at least two counts: key ideas contained in the European-Western doctrine of sovereignty are incompatible with core values comprising traditional Indian culture: also, the Canadian government is implacably opposed to relinquishing its sovereignty over Indians. This study explores alternative models of self-determination for Canada's Indians and concludes that stateless nationhood offers the best basis on which Indians may be able to negotiate internal self-determination.

In 301 A.D. the Emperor Diocletian, with whom were associated his three co-rulers, promulgated an edict which fixed for the whole Roman Empire maximum prices for commodities, freight rates, and wages. According to the evidence available, and it is certain that the whole edict has not been recovered, price “ceilings” for over 900 commodities, 130 different grades of labour, and a considerable number of freight rates, were fixed and severe punishment promised to all “black market” operators who dared to buy or sell above the maximum. So elaborate a scheme of price control was not tried again until 1,600 years had passed. The reasons that led to this drastic interference in the economic life of the Empire and the success it attained, or rather did not attain, in regulating prices, provide a study for the historian which is well worth while.

The Chaos of the Third Century. In order to understand the circumstances that led to the issuing of this edict, it is necessary to envisage the appalling state of affairs which marked the third century of the Christian era. Utter anarchy engulfed the Roman world; emperors and pretenders to the imperial throne struggled for the great prizes of power. Armies marched and remarched over every province, plundering the wretched inhabitants. In 193 the Empire was put up for sale by auction by the Praetorians, the imperial guards, and bought by Didius Julianus. It is interesting to note that he enjoyed his bargain for exactly sixty-six days. Such cynical disregard for the glory of the imperial purple was too much even for those days and he was murdered. As each claimant reached the goal of his ambition, the first thing he had to do was to pay the soldiery that backed him. The imperial treasury was looted and empty, and the enormous sums necessary to satisfy the army could only be met by piling tax on tax, by confiscating the wealth of opponents and, worst of all, by debasing a currency that already was fast approaching the point when it was next to worthless. In 260, there came the last and most shocking degradation when the Emperor Valerian, who was trying to defend the eastern frontier, was captured by the Persians and held for six years in captivity until his death. The Empire was clearly breaking up in misery and confusion, bankruptcy and anarchy.

Many provinces have enacted substantial reforms of their social assistance regime in the 1990s. However, we know surprisingly little about the ideas that underlie welfare reform in Canada. In particular, few empirical studies have directly examined the ideas of policy actors. This article presents a retrospective case study of a major policy initiative, namely Saskatchewan's Building Independence (BI), and examines its alignment with three paradigms of social assistance. Data come primarily from interviews with policy actors. This study concludes that the policy ideas informing BI align closely with the activation paradigm but also share some similarities with the entitlement and workfare paradigms. The significance of this finding is then discussed in light of three issues: 1) Aboriginal people, 2) the perspective of social assistance clients, and 3) “Third Way” ideology. This article concludes with a research agenda on ideas and policy change.

Abstract. This article provides an account of institutional transformation, the scope of which is greater than incremental adaptation but less than paradigmatic change. It highlights the role in institutional change of an institution's mechanism of reproduction, the competing discourses of its supporters and critics, the strategic actions of responsible policy makers, and the context of institutional bombardment. It argues that non-paradigmatic institutional transformation is likely in mature institutions based on a utilitarian logic, when actors internal to the institution mount a cognitive and normative discourse for institutional adaptation that is more compelling to authoritative policy makers and the relevant political community than that of critics demanding more radical reform. The success of this discursive exercise is in part determined by the context within which the debate over reform unfolds. Authoritative political actors also play a crucial role in the scope of institutional transformation by virtue of their political strategies and belief in the institution's system-wide functionality.

Résumé. Cet article décrit une transformation institutionnelle qui se situe entre l'adaptation progressive et le changement paradigmatique. La discussion met en lumière le rôle que jouent, dans les transformations institutionnelles, les mécanismes de reproduction de l'institution, les discours concurrents de ses défenseurs et de ses critiques, les actions stratégiques des décideurs publics et les conditions auxquelles fait face une institution assiégée. L'argument avancé est que ce modèle de transformation intermédiaire a tendance à se matérialiser dans les institutions bien établies, conformément à une logique utilitaire, lorsque des agents internes présentent des arguments cognitifs et normatifs en faveur d'une réforme, qui ont plus de poids auprès des décideurs et acteurs politiques que les arguments des critiques prônant une réforme plus radicale. Le succès du discours des acteurs internes dépend, en partie, du contexte dans lequel le débat se déroule. En plus, les décideurs politiques jouent un rôle essentiel dans l'envergure du processus de transformation en vertu des stratégies politiques qu'ils poursuivent et de leur confiance dans l'utilité globale de l'institution.

In this article I use new archival and elite interview data to improve our knowledge of how the Canadian Multiculturalism Act came into existence. I show why some Canadians began to seek such an act, why political parties promised an act and how this act was created. The evidence in this article will also correct claims that scholars often make about this act and the policy of multiculturalism that it contains. This evidence also improves our knowledge of why the policy of multiculturalism in this legislation does what few scholars would expect. This is because scholars often claim that policies of multiculturalism are used to “repudiate” and remove understandings of a country. But my evidence helps to show why the policy of multiculturalism in this act promotes understandings of a country. Scholars also claim that policies of multiculturalism can be divisive if they are unaccompanied by nation-building policies. But my evidence helps to show why the policy of multiculturalism in this legislation was designed to be a nation-building policy.

In 2015, the Canadian House of Commons passed a new code of conduct governing non-criminal sexual harassment between members of Parliament becoming the first of its kind in any Westminster system in the world. Using a feminist institutional and violence-against-women-in-politics approach, we assess how the code challenges, legitimizes and upholds traditionally gendered norms and institutionalized sexism within Canada's parliamentary system including parliamentary privilege, party cohesion and party discipline. Despite its novelty, we argue this code fails to enact positive gender-friendly institutional change and may do more harm than good in its efforts to curb sexual harassment.

This article evaluates whether municipal amalgamations in the Canadian province of Ontario met the provincial government's objectives of employing fewer politicians while maintaining councillors' accessibility to citizens. On the basis of a survey of residents and interviews with community leaders and councillors, the article concludes that in the amalgamations studied, the provincial government achieved its objectives.

Cultural theory (CT) has been widely used to explain variations in risk perception but has rarely been tested in Canada. This contribution represents the most thorough attempt to adapt CT to the Canadian context. Study results suggest that respondents’ commitment to egalitarianism was strongly correlated with risks from technology, while respondents’ commitment to hierarchism was strongly correlated with risks from criminal or unsafe behaviours. Respondents’ commitment to individualism was also correlated with risks from criminal and unsafe behaviours but differed from hierarchism in that individualism was not correlated with risk perceptions from prostitution and marijuana use. Respondents’ commitments to fatalism were strongly correlated with risk perception of vaccines. These conclusions are reinforced by results from a survey question that tests the extent to which such cultural predispositions map onto the myths of nature hypothesized by CT and by a survey experiment that tests how cultural commitments predict perceived risks from a controversial pipeline.

Abstract. In this paper we examine the length of political tenure in Canadian federally elected parliamentary governments since 1867. Using annual data on tenure length, we categorize the distribution of governing tenures in terms of a hazard function: the probability that an election will arise in each year, given that an election has not yet been called. Structuring the election call as an optimal stopping rule, we test whether that distribution responds predictably to characteristics of the political and/or economic environment. The results of using the continuous Cox and Gompertz models together with the discrete semi-parametric proportional hazard model suggest that governing parties in Canada do engage in election timing and that the only economic policy measure that is used consistently in conjunction with election timing is fiscal expenditure.

Résumé. Dans cet ouvrage, nous examinons la durée d'un régime parlementaire canadien depuis la Confédération de 1867. Nous utilisons des données annuelles et nous représentons la distribution de durée de vie d'un gouvernement par une fonction de hazard, c'est-a-dire, la probabilité qu'une élection soit déclenchée durant une année spécifique étant donné qu'elle ne l'a pas encore été jusqu'à présent. Nous modélisons un déclenchement d'élection par une règle d'arrêt optimal el nous testons si la distribution dépend des caractéristiques de l'environnement politique et économique tel que prédit selon la théorie. Nous résultats basés les modèles de hazard proportionnel continu de type Cox et Gompertz et discret semi-paramétrique révèlent que les partis fédéraux au pouvoir au Canada choisissent le moment opportun pour déclencher une élection. De plus, les dépenses fiscales sont la seule variable de politique économique qui y soit systématiquement relié.

Abstract. While there is an extensive literature on the causes of dissensus on appellate courts in the US, few empirical studies exist of the causes of dissent in Canadian Supreme Court. The current study seeks to close that gap in the literature, proposing and then testing what we call a Canadian model of dissent. We find that the likelihood of dissent is strongly related to four broad factors that appear to exert independent influence on whether the Court is consensual or divided: political conflict, institutional structure, legal ambiguity in the law and variations in the leadership style of the chief justice.

Résumé. Les causes de dissension dans les cours d'appel aux États-Unis font l'objet de nombreux articles et publications, mais il existe très peu d'études empiriques sur les causes de dissidence à la Cour suprême du Canada. La présente étude vise à combler cette lacune en proposant, un modèle canadien de dissension, puis en le mettant à l'épreuve. Nous avons constaté que le risque de dissension est fortement lié à quatre facteurs genéraux qui semblent exercer une influence indépendante, que la Cour soit en accord ou divisée. Ces facteurs sont le conflit politique, la structure institutionnelle, la présence d'une ambiguité juridique dans la loi et le style de direction du juge en chef.

I Was asked to write a paper about “Keynes in Cambridge,” to supplement two other papers about his work as a public servant and as an economist. I am glad to do this, but let me explain at the beginning the limits of my qualifications. I worked under him as an undergraduate for two years, 1928 to 1930, and I saw something of him on three later visits to Cambridge in 1931,1934, and 1936. I saw him again in the United States several times during the war when he was representing the Government of the United Kingdom in financial discussions. From all this you will gather that I cannot claim for a moment to have been an intimate friend. Nevertheless I understand I am supposed to write in a rather more personal vein than those who are reading the other papers.

Let me begin by talking, about Keynes as a teacher. During the years in which I happened to work under him, 1928 to 1930, his thinking on monetary theory was changing. These were the transition years between his traditional quantity-theory-of-money approach, in his Tract on Monetary Reform published in 1923, and his novel savings-and-investment approach, in his Treatise on Money published in 1930. He put forward his new ideas in a series of eight lectures—one a week for one term. Obviously the lectures had to be highly condensed and, despite the pleasantness and clearness with which they were delivered, I doubt that many undergraduates got very much out of them. However, they were not primarily intended for undergraduates; Keynes was trying out his new ideas on anyone who cared to listen, and there was always a group of his fellow dons at his lectures, as well as some graduate students who were still rather rare in Cambridge.

When it comes to buying military aircraft, what leads states to prefer one supplier over the other? This paper explores this question from the perspective of international relations theory. First we use social network analysis to map out fighter jet transfers during and after the Cold War and examine the extent to which historical structures of international hierarchy shape contemporary supplier-receiver relationships. Next, we use a basic probit model to analyse the origins of fighter jets in the world's air forces today to evaluate the effect of interstate orders of super-ordination and sub-ordination on sourcing patterns. All things being equal, the more a state is embedded in US security and economic hierarchy, the more it is likely to buy American-made fighter jets.