In 1968, the Tredegar Estate made an agreement with Mrs. Evans, aged 76, whereby Mrs. Evans was allowed to live in a cottage rent and rates free for life, the agreement calling her interest a tenancy at will. Mrs. Evans's husband had worked for the Tredegar Estate all his life and Mr. and Mrs. Evans had always occupied the cottage rent and rates free. In 1965, Mr. Evans had died and the object of the agreement clearly was to provide a home for the remaining years of Mrs. Evans's life. Some two years later, the Tredegar Estate conveyed the cottage, in fee simple, to Mr. and Mrs. Binions, the conveyance being expressly subject to the 1968 agreement in Mrs. Evans's favour. Indeed, Mr. and Mrs. Binions paid a lower price for the cottage because of the agreement. In 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Binions gave notice to quit to Mrs. Evans, then aged 79, and subsequently issued a plaint for possession in the Newport (Mon.) County Court. Not surprisingly, the action for possession failed in both the county court and the Court of Appeal.

There are but a few days—of who shall say what importance—between the Julian and Gregorian calendars, considered as schemes for the interpretation of recurrent movements in our solar system. And yet, from the point of view of each, the other seems somewhat out in respect of the characterisation of nearly every year, month, week and individual day. The gap between the legal theories of John Austin and Professor Hart—between their models of the legal universe—is somewhat more than this. Its demonstration provides the foundation for Professor Hart's new book. But there may here be some analogy to what divides the concept of law, as elucidated by Professor Hart in terms of rules, from the concept of law as a system of action constructed by the writer in earlier numbers of this Journal. If Professor Hart now reveals himself as conceptual pragmatist as well as linguistic philosopher the writer's gratitude to Professor Hart in the latter capacity is only tinged with regret that he does not display greater boldness in the former.

There is a memorable line at the end of the film classic, Casablanca. It is spoken by the Prefect of Police, Captain Renaud, to his men just after Rick (Humphrey Bogart) has shot Colonel Strasser. He says: “Colonel Strasser has been shot. Round up the usual suspects.” That rule or principle of action—of rounding up the usual suspects—writ large, captures the essence of the South African security system. The system may fairly be described as an elaborate mechanism designed to empower the security authorities to round up, or otherwise dispose of or deal with, suspects of their choice. The technique of empowerment is the conferment of statutory discretion upon some official or body to limit, suspend or terminate the basic liberties of any citizen or group of citizens. This discretion is usually couched in subjective terms.

Whatever may be the correct analysis of a company director's status, it is generally accepted that his duties, whether fiduciary or common law, are owed to the company. The reasons why this is considered appropriate, and indeed commercially desirable, are manifold. From the conceptual point of view probably the most important is to do with the doctrine of corporate personality. Directors, as directors, owe their duties to their corporate principal and no one else. Of course logically the fact that one owes a duty to another does not prevent that duty being owed to a third party. The simple rule, that directors as directors owe their duties to the company, is reflected in a number of other rules, such as the so called rule in Foss v. Harbottle. In recent years the courts have been prepared to lift the corporate veil and disregard the fictional independent entity where justice so requires.

Should the Home Office be liable for damage done by Borstal boys “escaping” from an “open” Borstal? On the other side of the Channel the liability of the state in the case of the near-equivalent “institution publique d'éducation surveillée” has been settled in two exceptionally interesting judgments of the Conseil d'Etat, Thouzellier, 3 February 1956, Rec. 49, and Trouillet, 9 March 1966, Rec. 201, the grounds of which repay study. In England a county court judge had held in 1951 that there was liability (Greenwell v. Prison Commissioners, 101 L.J. 486): the judgment was widely noticed and not appealed against. Now, eighteen years later, in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1008 the Home Office, that compulsive defender of prerogative and atavistic privilege, seek to establish as a matter of law that they cannot be liable, however gross the dereliction of duty by the Borstal officers.