Arguments are generated in an ad hoc way about the continuation of the monarchy. Such media-led arguments are no substitute for a rational analysis of constitutional issues, although of course public opinion has an important part to play in the future of any constitutional institution. At present there is not even a basic framework against which any such reasoned analysis could begin. While a case against the British monarchy has been constructed by several people, the silence of constitutional lawyers on the central issue of monarchy or republic is surprising, for what is that issue if not one concerning a central part of the constitution, and, indeed, a very pervasive one? The author,a constitutional lawyer, examines the constitutional arguments and implications about the alternatives of monarchy or republic in the United Kingdom and attempts to make clear which matters would require decision if the United Kingdom were to opt for republicanism. He demonstrates that a change to a British republic would require the resolution of many interrelated issues. Even the answer to the apparently simple question of principle of whether a monarchy or a republic is preferred may turn on the type of republic which was on offer. Conversion to a republic would involve wide and deep changes to much of the constitution because of the legal peculiarities of the ancient British monarchy. These are not insoluble difficulties, but they do mean that the abolition of the monarchy would be an intellectually challenging exercise.

The Law Commission’s proposal for an offence of “corporate killing” (modelled on the common law crimeof gross negligence manslaughter) is criticised for vagueness and imprecison, for not comprehending serious non-fatal injuries, and for failing to recognise that in the absence of clear rules of attribution, any criminal liability imposed on an organisation can only be for failing to prevent something happening. It is suggested that offences (patterned on those of causing death by dangerous, or by careless and drunken driving) of causing death or serious injury by breaking (statutory) regulations would be a much better way of holding businesses and similar bodies as well as individuals liable for death and serious injuries that would not have occurred if those regulations had been obeyed.

ON 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice handed down its decision in the three parallel proceedings involving the Marshall Islands (as applicant) and India, Pakistan and the UK (as respondents): Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India). The Marshall Islands claimed that the respondent states had failed to meet their obligation to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in good faith, either under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (claim against the UK) and/or customary law (against all three respondents). All three respondents formulated objections to jurisdiction and admissibility. In all three cases, they objected that a “dispute” did not exist between them and the applicant. The Court, by a narrow majority (extremely narrow in the case against the UK: by the casting vote of the President), declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that no dispute existed between the parties.

Contemporary liberal accounts of free expression are almost exclusively preoccupied with the permissible exercises of state power. Influenced by this framing, free expression guarantees under the ECHR, as well as the US and German Constitutions, focus on protecting a private sphere from state interference: what happens within that sphere is only of peripheral concern. This approach is deeply unsatisfactory, especially given the significant threats emanating from private social media platforms that shape the conditions under which individuals may express themselves online. The article argues that we should take private platforms seriously as a source of significant threats, without abandoning the distinction between private actors and the state. Private platforms that are generally open to the public should have obligations to uphold free speech in their contractual relationship to users under certain conditions: if they are structurally dominant, make arbitrary decisions or significantly impact a user's societal participation.