Dyslexia is a specific difficulty in learning how to use written notation, not attributable to generally low intellectual performance, emotional difficulties, or external factors. While its existence as a condition in its own right had been suspected for over a century, it is only much more recently that relatively definite tests for its existence have been developed. Even now, no one test can conclusively show its presence or absence. Local education authorities must provide for the special educational needs of children under their care, though it is settled law that the authorities cannot themselves be sued for breach of those duties (X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire C.C. [1995] 2 A.C. 633). However, X contains strong dicta that where the plaintiff can demonstrate negligence by particular members of staff, such as educational psychologists, then those members of staff will be personally liable, and the authority will be vicariously liable. Phelps v. Hillingdon L.B.C. [1999] 1 W.L.R. 500 raises the question whether this is actually so. The Court of Appeal, reversing Garland J., have now held that there is no such liability. The court heard that even if (contrary to their view) the plaintiff in the case could establish professional negligence by an educational psychologist through failure to diagnose her dyslexia, and that this negligence caused her appreciable harm, none the less she had no cause of action.

THE image of King Canute trying to hold back the tide is a popular one used to critique attempts by national courts to restrain the publication of private information in the face of a global and online media. The truth, or at least the allegation, will out. The issue is certainly not a new one. The futility of an injunction in England and Wales, given extensive publication out of the jurisdiction, played a key role in the Spycatcher litigation in the late 1980s. Such futility is a feature of confidentiality or secrecy: the tide of information cannot be held back in an information age. In PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26, the Supreme Court, endorsing an approach developed by the High Court in several earlier authorities, distinguished between protecting confidentiality and preventing intrusion as twin rationales for the tort of misuse of private information. The intrusion of a pending media storm in the jurisdiction, repeating allegations already widely available, was a further misuse of private information and could usefully be restrained in England and Wales. Even where confidentiality had already been lost, privacy injunctions could continue to play a useful role as a defence against the significant additional intrusion, at least where it could be practicably restrained, and the pending media storm that would accompany a lifting of the injunction represented one such case.

The Law Commission’s proposal for an offence of “corporate killing” (modelled on the common law crimeof gross negligence manslaughter) is criticised for vagueness and imprecison, for not comprehending serious non-fatal injuries, and for failing to recognise that in the absence of clear rules of attribution, any criminal liability imposed on an organisation can only be for failing to prevent something happening. It is suggested that offences (patterned on those of causing death by dangerous, or by careless and drunken driving) of causing death or serious injury by breaking (statutory) regulations would be a much better way of holding businesses and similar bodies as well as individuals liable for death and serious injuries that would not have occurred if those regulations had been obeyed.

AT common law, in cases where the substantive claim is governed by foreign law, questions of procedure are nonetheless governed by the lex fori. In the context of damages, although the existence of damage is a question for the lex causae, its quantification and assessment is determined according to the law of the forum (Boys v Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356). The distinction between substance and procedure is preserved by Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (“Rome II”) which provides, with certain exceptions, that Rome II “shall not apply to evidence and procedure”. That rule is, however, qualified by Article 15, which requires the law applicable under the Regulation (i.e. “the law applicable to non-contractual obligations”) to govern, inter alia, “the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed” (Article 15(c)). The decision of the Court of Appeal in Wall v Mutuelle De Poitiers Assurances [2014] EWCA Civ 138; [2014] 3 All E.R. 340 concerns the definition of “procedure” in Article 1(3) and the meaning of “applicable law” in Article 15(c). It raises the important question of how far Rome II has encroached on the traditional view of national procedural autonomy in the conflict of laws.

Although those sentenced to life imprisonment have no right to release, a life sentence rarely involves imprisonment for the remainder of a convicted offender's natural life. Life prisoners may hope for early release on the so-called “life-licence”, whereby they remain liable to be recalled to prison for the rest of their lives.

Coke said of the Statute of Treasons 1351: “this Act is to be understood of a king in possession of the crown and kingdom,” and “the other [king] that hath right and is out of possession is not within this Act.” In other words, treason can be committed solely against the monarch in possession, and, conversely, breach of allegiance to the monarch in possession is treason. This doctrine is repeated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and elaboration, by the later writers, for example, Hale, Hawkins, Foster, Bacon and East, and it appears in the modern books. Only Blackstone expresses a doubt: he thinks the law does not go further than to excuse obedience to a king de facto without commanding opposition to a king de jure who is out of possession.