We argue for an example of “core cognition” based on Diamond and Carey's (1986) work on expertise and recognition, which is not made use of in The Origin of Concepts. This mechanism for perceptual learning seems to have all the necessary characteristics in that it is innate, domain-specific (requires stimulus sets possessing a certain structure), and demonstrably affects categorisation in a way that strongly suggests it will influence concept formation as well.

Proposing a change to the view on psychoactive drug use in non-addicts touches a sensitive issue because of its potential implications to addiction prevention, therapeutic practice, and drug policy. Commentators raised nine questions that ranged from clarifications, suggested extensions of the model to supporting data previously not regarded, to assumptions on the implications of the model. Here, we take up the suggestions of the commentators to expand the model to behavioral addictions, discuss additional instrumentalization goals, and review the evidence from laboratory animal studies on drug instrumentalization. We consider further the role of sociocultural factors and individual development in the establishment in drug instrumentalization and addiction. Finally, we clarify which implications we think this model may have. We conclude that drug instrumentalization theory can be further applied to other behaviors but will require a sensitive debate when used for drug and addiction policy that directly affects prevention and treatment.

While the idea that being wrong can be strategically advantageous in the context of social strategy is sound, the idea that there is a “self” to be deceived might not be. The modular view of the mind finesses this difficulty and is useful – perhaps necessary – for discussing the phenomena currently grouped under the term “self-deception.”

Spontaneous inferences are unconscious, automatic, and apparently ubiquitous. Research has documented their variety (particularly in the social domain) and impact on memory and judgment. They are good candidates for Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) “intuitive beliefs.” Forming spontaneous inferences is highly context sensitive, varying with the perceiver's conscious and unconscious goals, and implicit and explicit theories about the domain in question.

Jones & Love (J&L) contend that the Bayesian approach should integrate process constraints with abstract computational analysis. We agree, but argue that the fundamentalist/enlightened dichotomy is a false one: Enlightened research is deeply intertwined with – and to a large extent is impossible without – the basic, fundamental work upon which it is based.

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.

Having evolved to escape detection of deception completely, self-deception must respond to social conditions registering different probabilities of detection. To be adaptive, it must have a mechanism to keep truthful information temporarily from the self during deception and retrieve it after deception. The memory system may serve this mechanism and provides a paradigm in which to conduct research on self-deception.

Rather than worrying about Bayesian Fundamentalists, I suggest that our real concern should be with Mechanistic Fundamentalists; that is, those who believe that concrete, but frequently untestable mechanisms, should be at the heart of all cognitive theories.

Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.

Carey leaves unaddressed an important evolutionary puzzle: In the absence of a numeral list, how could a concept of natural number ever have arisen in the first place? Here we suggest that the initial development of natural number must have bootstrapped on a material culture scaffold of some sort, and illustrate how this might have occurred using strings of beads.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that reasoning is social and argumentative, and that this explains many apparently irrational judgment phenomena. We look at the relationship between interpersonal and intrapersonal argumentation and discuss parallels and differences from the perspective of query theory, a memory-based model of constructive preferences. We suggest an important goal is to integrate models across inference and preference.

Describing a cognitive system at a mechanistic level requires an engineering task analysis. This involves identifying the task and developing models of possible solutions. Evolutionary psychology and Bayesian modeling make complimentary contributions: Evolutionary psychology suggests the types of tasks that human brains were designed to solve, while Bayesian modeling provides a rigorous description of possible computational solutions to such problems.

Carey proposes a theory of conceptual development that specifies innate conceptual representations that get learning started. Those representations are the output of innate domain-specific input analyzers. I contend that innate core cognition about agency is itself a gradual construction and that the role of Quinian bootstrapping needs elaboration to account for the development of intuitive theories of psychology.

Reason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist position we are asked to reject by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is defined in attenuated and self-contradictory ways.

Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) propose that self-deception has evolved to facilitate the deception of others. However, they ignore the subjective moral costs of deception and the crucial issue of credibility in self-deceptive speech. A self-signaling interpretation can account for the ritualistic quality of some self-deceptive affirmations and for the often-noted gap between what self-deceivers say and what they truly believe.

Mercier & Sperber (M&S) argue for their argumentative theory in terms of communicative abilities. Insights can be gained by extending the discussion beyond human reasoning to rodent and robot navigation. The selection of arguments and conclusions that are mutually reinforcing can be cast as a form of abductive reasoning that I argue underlies the construction of cognitive maps in navigation tasks.

By systematically biasing our beliefs, self-deception can endanger our ability to successfully convey our messages. It can also lead lies to degenerate into more severe damages in relationships. Accordingly, I suggest that the biases reviewed in the target article do not aim at self-deception but instead are the by-products of several other mechanisms: our natural tendency to self-enhance, the confirmation bias inherent in reasoning, and the lack of access to our unconscious minds.

The empirical research on the psychology of argumentation suggests that people are prone to fallacies and suboptimal performance in generating, comprehending, and evaluating arguments. Reasoning and argumentation are interrelated skills that use many of the same cognitive processes. The processes we use to convince others are also used to convince ourselves. Argumentation would be ineffective if we couldn't reason for ourselves.