We suggest that the framework proposed by Vigil is useful in laboratory contexts but might come up short for in vivo social interactions. Emotions result from cost-benefits trade-offs but are not solely generated at the individual level to establish emotional social spheres. In organizational contexts, emotion expression can be a constitutive part of a professional activity, and observed sex differences might vanish.

Those who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.

Hoerl & McCormack claim that the temporal updating system only represents the world as present. This generates puzzles regarding the phenomenology of temporal experience. We argue that recent models of reinforcement learning suggest that temporal updating must have a minimal temporal structure; and we suggest that this helps to clarify what it means to experience the world as temporally structured.

the heuristics-and-biases approach requires a clear separation of normative and descriptive models. normative models cannot be justified by intuition, or by consensus. the lack of consensus on normative theory is a problem for prescriptive approaches. one solution to the prescriptive problem is to argue contingently: if you are concerned about consequences, here is a way to make them better.

The radical empiricist theory of the Quartz & Sejnowski target article would result in a brain that could not act. The attempt to bolster this position with computational arguments is misleading and often just wrong. Fortunately, other efforts are making progress in linking neural and cognitive development.

The Schyns et al. target article demonstrates that different classifications entail different representations, implying “flexible space learning.” We argue that flexibility is required even at the within-category level.

Four issues that build on the ideas offered by Tomasello et al. are discussed: the developmental course of shared intentionality and its relation to other developing abilities and experiences, and the conceptualization of three key features of the process: motivation, plans and the development of planning, and culture.

“Psychological relativity” means that “an observation is a relationship between the observer and the event observed.” It implies a profound distinction between “the internal first-person as opposed to the external third-person perspective.” That distinction, followed through, turns Lehar's discourse inside-out. This commentary elaborates the notion of “psychological relativity,” shows that whereas there is already a natural science of perceptual report, there cannot also be a science of perception per se, and draws out some implications for our understanding of phenomenal consciousness.

Animals detect and acquire resources through a sequence of shape changes. This process is tightly coupled to the sensory and mechanical ecology of the animal. Building physical models allow us to prescind from modeling these aspects of the environment, which may not yet be described or suitably abstracted. The significance of this hybrid of physical modeling and experimentation to the acquisition of scientific knowledge is discussed.

Shanker & King's (S&K's) dynamic systems approach converges with developments in social anthropological studies of communication which were long ago anticipated in the writings of Volosinov and Schutz. Following a review of these writings, this commentary suggests that a dynamic systems approach should distinguish communion from communication. It concludes with a remark on the evolutionary implications of the approach.

The basic concepts of motor control formulated in our target article were derived from specific experiments, a fact which is disregarded in Dalenoort's comments. A purely academic approach to motor control may not result in a clearer understanding of control concepts.

In perception science, an alternative to focusing on individual sensory systems is to describe the environment to be perceived. We focus on the emergent dynamics of human-environment interactions as an important category of the environment to be perceived. We argue that information about such dynamics is available in subtle patterns of movement variability that, of necessity, stimulate multiple sensory systems.

Humor and social dilemmas are two disparate areas that have been linked to emotions. However, they tend to have been studied apart from considerations of emotion and emotional expression. We provide an overview of how such areas might be illuminated by Vigil's socio-relational framework, and how capacity and trustworthiness are communicated in humor and social dilemmas.

Missing from Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) unique and valuable effort to relate cognitive development to neural constructivism is an examination of the global emergent properties of adding new neural circuits. Such emergent properties can be studied with computational models. Modeling with generative connectionist networks shows that synaptogenic mechanisms can account for progressive increases in children's representational power.

Although Norris, McQueen & Cutler have provided convincing evidence that there is no need for contributions from the lexicon to phonetic processing, their simplification of the communication between levels comes at a cost to the processes themselves. Although their arrangement may ultimately prove correct, its validity is not due to a successful application of Occam's razor.

One example of proxy failure is current antisexist and antiracist policies. One of the most popular proxy in them is the number of representatives of marginalized groups – women and nonwhite people – in power structures. Here I show that such measures do not lead to combating sexism and racism, which flourish despite their application.

Andrews et al. argue for adaptationism in cognitive research. However, the problem of evolvability brings into question the number of genes required for the evolution of cognitive mechanisms. Are there enough? Also, greater consideration should be given to alternative vicarious selection processes, which may produce cognitive mechanisms. Finally, identifying constraints with optimality arguments is more difficult than the authors think.

Using the example of the difficulties which emerge when trying to model complex behaviors – such as emotional expression – that result from stochastic interactions between different components, we argue that biorobotics may well describe one possible evolution of certain features of a biological system, but cannot pretend to be a simulation of the whole behavior of the system.

Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) emphasize the importance of viewing language as activity. In this commentary I push further their claim by highlighting how constructions, rather than words, are the appropriate unit of analysis. In addition, I suggest how a discussion of indexicality paves the way for a better understanding of how language provides a powerful tool for children's construction of mind.

depue & morrone-strupinsky (d&m-s) present a thorough case for the role of “reward” brain circuits in affiliative bonding. integration of information in the nucleus accumbens shell (na), the role of dopamine in this processing, and opioid (primarily via mu receptors) control of these circuits are the primary elements of the model. although the overall picture is quite compelling, the description leans excessively in the view of dopamine systems as “reward” circuits.