The target article argues for the modularity of language interpretive processes without the usual criterion that a module be informationally encapsulated. It is the encapsulation criterion, however, that gives modularity most of its testability. Without the criterion of encapsulation, testing whether relatively automatic comprehension processes use their own unique resource is a very tricky matter.

Despite denials in the target article, the Distancing-Embracing model appeals to compensatory ideas in explaining the appeal of artworks that elicit negative affect. The model also appeals to the deflationary effects of psychological distancing. Having pointed to the famous rejection in the 1960s of the view that aesthetic experience involves psychological distancing, I suggest that “distance” functions here as a weak metaphor that cannot sustain the explanatory burden the theory demands of it.

John Bowlby's use of evolutionary theory as a cornerstone of his attachment theory was innovative in its day and remains useful. Del Giudice's target article extends Belsky et al.'s and Chisholm's efforts to integrate attachment theory with more current thinking about evolution, ecology, and neuroscience. His analysis would be strengthened by (1) using computer simulation to clarify and simulate the effects of early environmental stress, (2) incorporating information about non-stress related sources of individual differences, (3) considering the possibility of adaptive behavior without specific evolutionary adaptations, and (4) considering whether the attachment construct is critical to his analysis.

Cowan assumes a unitary capacity-limited attentional focus. We argue that two main problems need to be solved before this assumption can complement theoretical knowledge about human cognition. First, it needs to be clarified what exactly the nature of the elements (chunks) within the attentional focus is. Second, an elaborated process model needs to be developed and testable assumptions about the proposed capacity limitation need to be formulated.

In this commentary, we highlight a difficulty for metric navigation arising from recent data with grid and place cells: the integration of piecemeal representations of space in environments with repeated boundaries. Put simply, it is unclear how place and grid cells might provide a global representation of distance when their fields appear to represent repeated boundaries within an environment. One implication of this is that the capacity for spatial inferences may be limited.

This commentary deals with the nonconformity of academics and the ethos of social science. Academics in all fields deviate from majority norms in politics and religion, and this deviance may be essential to the academic mind and to academic norms. The Enlightenment legacy inspires both methods and subject matter in academic work, and severing ties with it may be impossible.

In the fearful ape hypothesis, Grossmann argues that heightened fearfulness increases human-unique cooperation. We suggest that this conclusion, however, may be premature. In particular, we question Grossmann's singling out of fear as the affective trait that enhances cooperative care. Additionally, we problematize the extent to which heightened fearfulness in humans, and its association with human-unique cooperation, are supported empirically.

We extend Benenson et al.'s hypothesis from the individual level to the societal level. Because women have highly limited reproductive rates, societies have generally prioritized female survival and regarded males as expendable. We describe various lines of evidence that are consistent with this hypothesis, and we offer additional predictions about differential attitudes toward male versus female endangerment.

Andrews et al.'s analysis suffers from a series of conceptual confusions they inherit from Gould's work. Their proposal that adaptations can be distinguished from exaptations essentially by specific design criteria fails because exaptations are often maintained and secondarily adapted by natural selection and therefore, over evolutionary time, can come to have similar levels of design specificity to adaptations.

Chow's monograph exhibits four prototypical symptoms of psychology's enduring scientific crisis: (a) it equates empirical science with statistical analysis; (b) it settles for qualitative rather than quantitative theories; (c) it ignores the role of ecological validity in the generalizability of theories; and (d) it puts rigid adherence to arbitrary but documentable rules over critical thinking about the meaning of results.

According to the view that humans are conscious automata, the experience of conscious will is illusory. Epistemic theories of causation, however, make room for causal will, planned behavior, and moral action.

We elaborate on the role of individual differences in the processing mechanisms outlined by the Distancing-Embracing model. The role of openness is apparent in appreciating meaning-making art that elicits interest, feeling moved, and mixed emotions. The influence of sensation seeking is likely to manifest in thrill-chasing art that draws on the arousing interplay of positive and negative emotions.

Within the Hebbian paradigm the mechanism for integrating cell assemblies oscillating with different frequencies remains unclear. We hypothesize that such an integration may occur in cortical “interaction foci” that unite synchronously oscillated assemblies through hard-wired connections, synthesizing the information from various functional systems of the brain.

Various annoyingly incorrect statements of Stoffregen & Bardy are corrected, for example, that perception researchers commonly use the term “absolute motion” to denote motion without any frame of reference, confuse earth-relative and gravity-relative motion, err with respect to the frame of reference implied by their subject is motion responses, believe in sense specific motion percepts, and do not investigate sensory interactions at neurophysiological levels. In addition, much of the target article seems to concern metaphysics rather than empirical science.

Jackendoff's scenario of the evolution of language is a major contribution towards a more rigorous theory of the origins of language, because it is theoretically constrained by a testable theory of modern language. However, the theoretical constraints from evolutionary theory are not really recognized in his work. We hope that Jackendoff's lead will be followed by intensive cooperation between linguistic theorists and evolutionary modellers.

Ronan Reilly's connectionist simulation both strengthens and advances the theoretical model presented in my 1991 target article, “Language, Tools, and Brain: The Ontogeny and Phylogeny of Hierarchically Organized Sequential Behavior.” Reilly has tested the whole ontogenetic model with a single simulation study explicitly planned for this purpose. His methodology has established that the various components of the theoretical model imply and are compatible with one another. It has also indicated how learning can actualize a pre-established ontogenetic sequence of combining lingusitic symbols and objects. His simulation suggests that the acquisition of linguistic speech may be facilitated by experience with object manipulation, but not vice versa. This hypothesis can and should be empirically tested through research on behavioral development in the two domains. Finally, Reilly has simulated brain architecture, as well as neural learning. His simulation therefore shows how the development of language and object manipulation can result from an interaction between preprogrammed neural architecture (analogous to network architecture) and experience (analogous to the network's training cycles).

Polygyny does not necessarily entail sexual selection of men. All factors that affect the operational sex ratio must be considered. Data from contemporary hunter-gatherers indicate higher mortality rates in men than in women, and lost female reproductive time. If sexual selection did occur in ancestral hunter-gatherers, it was probably men selecting women and not women selecting men.

I identify a number of problematic aspects of Christiansen & Chater's (C&C's) contribution. These include their suggestion that subjacency and binding reflect non-domain-specific mechanisms; that proto-language is a “cultural product”; and that non-adaptationism requires overly rich innate structures, and is incompatible with acceptable evolutionary processes. It shows that a fully UG (Universal Grammar)-free version of the authors' neo-adaptationism would be incoherent.