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The received view of framing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Paul Weirich*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 [email protected]://philosophy.missouri.edu/people/weirich

Abstract

The received view of framing has multiple interpretations. I flesh out an interpretation that is more open-minded about framing effects than the extensionality principle that Bermúdez formulates. My interpretation attends to the difference between preferences held all things considered and preferences held putting aside some considerations. It also makes room for decision principles that handle cases without a complete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Weirich, P. (2021). Rational choice using imprecise probabilities and utilities. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar