There is at present considerable discussion regarding questions with respect to “the freedom of the seas.” These questions, so often vaguely referred to, should presumably be understood to relate to the exercise of belligerent rights on the sea and to embrace such matters as a possible codification of international law touching this subject, proper compliance with rules heretofore generally accepted if not always strictly observed, the desirability of amendments to such rules, and the formulation of principles to meet new problems that have grown out of the recent conflict. In the light of events in connection with the war the present situation with regard to the disposition of such questions through international agreement unhappily appears more difficult than that which confronted the delegates who assembled in conference at London in 1908 on the invitation of the British Government to reach an understanding among the nations represented relative to the rules of international law concerning the laws of naval warfare, and formulated the so-called London Declaration signed February 26, 1909.

The flight crew of flight IR655 was properly certificated and qualified for the scheduled international passenger flight in accordance with existing regulations. There was no indication that the flight crew may not have been physically or psychologically fit.

The treatment of civilian alien enemies, either in the national jurisdiction of a belligerent or in occupied territory, presents questions of public international law as well as of municipal law and administration. It appears that in some of the United Nations in the present war the problem of internment of such persons has become less acute as the tide of battle has turned against the Axis. In Great Britain, for example, the number of aliens of enemy nationality interned under the Royal Prerogative, and whose release had not been authorized, was only 6,123 at the beginning of 1944 as compared with 17,940 at the beginning of 1941.

In 1805 Napoleon was confronted by the naval power of England, on the one hand, and by the vast military strength of Austria, Russia, and presently Prussia, on the other. The armies of the Continental states he had often defeated, but after every defeat these armies had been reorganized and augmented with the help of English gold. The source of that gold had to be destroyed. A military defeat of the British would accomplish that end and probably decide the issue of the war. Napoleon’s first idea was, therefore, to invade England. That dream was shattered by the English naval victory at Trafalgar, October 21, 1805.