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The Seizure of the Danish Fleet, 1807: The Background

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Carl J. Kulsrud
Carl J. Kulsrud*
Affiliation:
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
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Extract

In 1805 Napoleon was confronted by the naval power of England, on the one hand, and by the vast military strength of Austria, Russia, and presently Prussia, on the other. The armies of the Continental states he had often defeated, but after every defeat these armies had been reorganized and augmented with the help of English gold. The source of that gold had to be destroyed. A military defeat of the British would accomplish that end and probably decide the issue of the war. Napoleon’s first idea was, therefore, to invade England. That dream was shattered by the English naval victory at Trafalgar, October 21, 1805.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 1938 , pp. 280 - 311
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1938

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References

1 I Cf. Heckscher, E. F., The Continental System (1922), p. 81.Google Scholar

2 Fortescue, SirJohn, W., History of the British Army (1899–1930), Vol. VI, p. 72, note.Google Scholar

3 a Mahan, Captain, A. T., Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution (1894), Vol. II, p. 277 Google Scholar.

4 Hershey, A. S.,The Essentials of International Public Law(1930), p. 238, note 12.Google Scholar

5 Lawrence, T. J., Principles of International Law (1915), p. 127.Google Scholar

6 Fenwick, C. G.,International Law(1924), p. 161. Google Scholar

7 Hershey, op. cit., p. 243, points out that the doctrine of intervention was probably first set forth by Kant in his Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795).

8 The Prince, Ch. 21.

9 Grotius, Hugo, De lure Belli ac Pads (Kelsey ed., 1925), Bk. II, Ch. 2, Art. 10. See also ibid., Bk. III, Ch. 17, Art. 3.

10 Vattel, Emmerich, The Law of Nations (1787), Bk. III, Ch. VII, sec. 122.

11 Cf. letters of Major von Schuler, the Prussian representative at St. Petersburg, to the King of Prussia, Oct.13, 14, 1807, quoted in Hassel, J. P., Geechichte der Preueeiachen Politik (1881); in the same connection see the letter of Comte de Stedingk, the Swedish Minister at St. Petersburg, to his King, Oct. 10, 1807, in M&moires Poethumee du Feld-Mareschal Comte de Stedingk (Clason, ed.).

12 The Writings of George Washington (Ford, ed.), Vol. XIV.

13 Stowell, E. C., Intervention in International Law(1921), p. 406.Google Scholar

14 Cf. the Straits Convention of 1923, the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, and the Hay Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. In 1879 the United States deemed it advisable to protest against the exclusive claims to the Strait of Magellan, and the treaty which Chile and Argentina signed in 1881 guaranteed the free navigation of that strait to the ships of all nations.

15 The line of demarcation of 1795, by which Prussia secured the neutrality of the German Princes north of the River Main, had also served as a guarantee against the invasion of Danish territory.

16 Cf. the correspondence between Lord Howick, British Foreign Secretary, and the British representatives at St. Petersburg, Charles Stuart and the Marquis of Douglas, in Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. X (1808).

17 Ekegard, E., Studier i Svensk Handelspolitik under den Tidigare Frihedstiden (1924), passim; S., Clason,“Våtrt Hundradaårsminne: Krisen 1808-1809,” in Historisk Tidsskrift (1909), p. 801 Google Scholar.

18 Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France, Vol. 13 (Denmark), the instructions to Marquis de Verac, 1775, and to Baron In House, 1769; ibid., Vol. 9 (Russia), the instructions to Durand, 1772, and to De Juligné 1775.

19 For the current ideas and policy of employing the Danish navy to close the Baltic to the ships of belligerents, which at that time meant the ships of England, cf. the letter of Napoleon to Marshal Bernadotte, Aug. 2, 1807 (Correspondance de Napoleon, Vol. I er Vol. XV), instructing him to complain to the Danish Government that it had failed to prevent the violation of a sea that to Denmark ought to be as sacred as her own territory. See also Napoleon’s letter to Talleyrand, of the same date (loc. cit.).

The Armed Neutrality Convention of 1780 had declared the Baltic to be a closed sea, and this stipulation reappeared in Art. 10 of the Dano-Swedish Treaty of March 27, 1794, for which see Danske Traktater, 1757–1800 (Udenrigsministeriets Udg., 1882). In an interview with Joachim Bernstorff, Aug. 5, 1807, the French Minister to Denmark held that the Baltic was a closed sea. The situation had changed, and Bernstorff felt constrained to argue that “the principle, Maris Baltici Clausi, was nowise a priori a clear and allowable principle.” Not all the states bordering on the Baltic were at that time neutral. See Sörenson, C. Th., Den Politiske Krise i 1807 (1887), pp. 20–23. For the Swedish attitude see Grade, Anders, Sverige och Tilsit-Alliansen, 1807-1810 (1913), p. 136. The Russian view is stated in a letter of M. de Romanoff to the Swedish Ambassador to Russia, de Stedingk, Sept. 24, 1807, which is included in A lemoires Posthumes de Stedingk. Perhaps the Countess Schimmelmann made the most pertinent observation: “Cette Baltique fermee me a fait rire; le grand belt est oblié, et Nelson a dit justement qu’il eut passé certament malgré les canons des deux côtes avec un certain vent qu’il connaisait, que les anglais n’ont pas oblie.” Letter to Countess Stolberg, Feb. 10, 1810, in Bobé, Louis, Efterladte Papirer fra den Reventlowske Farniliekreds (1895–1922), p. 20.

20 Martens, G. F., Le Recueil des trains des puissances et états de l’Europe (2d ed.), Vol. III,p. 177. Google Scholar

21 Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 149.

22 The London Chronicle, Sept. 29, 1807. For Canning’s summary of this phase of Danish policy, see Hansard, Parl. Debates, Vol. X, p. 269.

23 For statistics on the composition of the Danish army and an explanation of its inadequacy for the task of guarding the frontier see Raeder, J. V., Danmarks Krigs-og Politiske Historie fra Krigens Udbrud 1807 til Freden til.jönkjöping den 20de December 1809 (1845), Vol. I, pp. 1–5 Google Scholar. Raeder concludes that resistance to French aggression was hopeless, and adds: “If, therefore, the status of neutrality is to have any significance, it must be defended; but, as explained above, such defense requires altogether different strength on land and sea than that which Denmark developed in the years from 1805 to 1807.”

24 In 1803 it was expected that Napoleon would order his armies to march into Holstein.

Cf. Holm,Danmark-Norges Udenriske Historie (1895), Vol. II, p. 45 ff. The Danish reply to the Russian proposal of cooperation between Denmark, Russia, and Prussia for the purpose of protecting northern Germany and Denmark against French aggression is given in Holm, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 46 ff. See also Medde,lelser Ira Krigsarkiverne (issued by Danish Generalstaben, 1883–1896), Vol. I, p. 402 ff. This work is hereinafter cited as Krigsarkiv.

25 For notes on the precarious position of Denmark and the various attempts to induce her to join in the war against Napoleon cf. the letter of Haugwitz to the Duke of Brunswick, Sept. 9, 1806, in Baileu, P., Preussen and Frankreich, Vol. II; a letter of Frederick William III to Alexander I, Nov. 30, 1806, and a letter of the latter to the former, Dec. 1, 1806, in Baileu, Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelm III mit Kaiser Alexander I; Hardenberg’s Memorial to the King of Prussia and the Tsar, April 7, 1807, in Ranke, L. v., Fitrst Hardenberg, Vol. III. The Convention of Bartenstein between Russia and Prussia provided for concerted action among the Great Powers for the purpose of inducing Denmark to become a party to the Convention and to aid in the execution of its provisions. Cf. the correspondence between Lord Howick and Benjamin Garlike, the English Minister to Denmark, during November and December, 1803, in Hansard, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

26 Ranke, Furst Hardenberg, Vol. III, p. 256.

27 Bedrow, G. G., Chronik des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (1805-1837), Vol. I, p. 575. Google Scholar

28 se Parl. Debates, Vol. X, Feb. 3, 1808.

29 The Annual Register (1803), p. 287.

30 Alexander told the King that he had been duped by the caresses of Napoleon, and “queles francois ne borneraient pas là leur occupations; que le raison que les poussait à fermer aux Anglais le continent les porterait plus loin que le Hanovre, et les conduirait jusqu’au Dané-mark, afire de s’emparer du Sund, qu’alors les Anglais bloqueraient la Baltique comme ils bloquaient l’Elbe et le Weser, et fermeraient la dernier issue restée au commerce du continent.” See Thiers, A., Le Consu/at et l’Empire (1845), Vol. IV, p. 445.

31 Blucher to Ewald, Nov. 6, 1806, in Krigsarkiv., Vol. II, p. 200.

32 Krigsarkiv., Vol. II, p. 200.

33 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 202, the message of Ewald to Bliicher, Nov. 6, 1806.

34 “The Prince Regent of Denmark to Prince Christian August, Nov. 21, 1806, in Krigsarkiv., Vol. II.

35 Garlike to Lord Howick, Nov. 11, 1806, in PaH. Debates, Vol. X.

36 & Raeder, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 13–14, gives the Danish losses as four killed and thirteen wounded. Seven horses were killed and one cannon was lost.

37 Raeder states: “General Murat modtog General v. Ewald saare uvendig, Ja! truede endog med at lade ham fiisilere og vidste ham saa meget Overmod og stolthed som muligt.”

38 Raeder reports the story in considerable detail. Canning’s account (Parl. Debates, Vol. X) was substantially correct: “Ewald was conveyed to the headquarters of the French general, where, in place of being treated with the distinction to be expected from an officer of a friendly power, he met with no very flattering reception; and was sent back, after his horse had been stolen and his pockets robbed, under every species of injury which a licentious soldiery could inflict.” Cf.Garlike’s letter to Howick, Nov. 11, 1806, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

39 General Berthier to the Prince Regent, Nov. 10, 1806, and General Bernard to the Prince, Nov. 8, 10, 1806, in Krigsarkiv., Vol. IL See also the account of the interview of Liliencrone with Bernadotte, ibid., Vol. II, p. 188 ff.

40 Berthier to the Prince Regent, Nov. 10, 1806, loc. cit. Cf. Garlike’s letter to Howick, Nov. 15, 1806, Parl. Debates, Vol. X. Napoleon said that four or five thousand men would be sufficient for policing the country. Letter to Talleyrand, Nov. 21, 1806, in Correspondance de Napoleon 1.”, Vol. XV.

41 Krigsarkiv., Vol. II, p. 288; Parl. Debates, Vol. X, p. 252 ff.

42 The Prince Regent to Berger, Nov. 21, 1806, Krigsarkiv., Vol. II.

43 Napoleon to Mortier, Nov. 16, 1806, loc. cit. Letter 11,268 (Cor. Napoleon), directed Mortier to occupy Hamelin.

44 Cf. the notes exchanged by the Danish Ambassador in London and Lord Howick, March 9, 11, 1806, in Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

45 a Wegner to Ewald, Nov. 17, in Krigsarkiv., Vol. II. See also Wegner’s memorials of the two following days, loc. cit.

46 Garlike to Howick, Nov. 24, 1806, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

47 The Prince Regent to Berger, Nov. 19, 1806, Krigsarchiv., Vol. II.

48 Ibid., Berger to Ewald, Nov. 24, 1806. See also the letter of Leschly to Major Flindt,of the same date, loc. cit.

49 Ibid., Ewald to the Prince Regent, 5:00 a. m., Nov. 25.

50 Ibid. Ewald wrote: “At precisely a quarter after six I received the enclosed letter from Major General Berger. May it please Your Royal Highness to be merciful to me. At this moment I feel that the first report of Berger and now his last have made me appear a fool. I cannot now undo what has been done and recall the march of the soldiers. The dark night is before me. With those who are with me I shall remain at Segeberg.”

51 The Prince Regent to Ewald, Nov. 25, loc. cit. To Captain Haffner he wrote: “Dersom de (the French) med magt vil indtraenge og ingen Protest vil imodtage, maa Magt imodsaettes med Magt: N. B., dog vig for Overmagten.” Krigsarkiv., Vol. II.

52 The Prince Regent to Ewald, Nov. 26, loc. cit. Cf. his letter to Berger of the same date.

53 Cf. Holm, Danmark-Norges Udenriske Historie, Vol. II, p. 106 ff.

54 Ibid.

55 On Nov. 29, 1806, Garlike wrote to Lord Howick (Parl. Debates, Vol. X): “Mr. Pierrepont (Swedish Minister in London) will have informed your lordships of the very unfavorable impression (which the retreat made) upon the King of Sweden and of the strong measures of precaution which that monarch has judged it proper to adopt against the new danger that would result to his own interests and to those of his allies.” Cf. ibid., for the letters of Howick to Garlike of Dec. 3, 1806, and Jan. 22, 1807.

56 Rist, J. G., Lebenserinnerungen (1880-1888), Pt. I, pp. 413-416. Google Scholar

57 Garlike to Howick, Nov. 29, 1806, loc. cit.

58 Garlike to Howick, Nov. 29, 1806, loc. cit.: “Every account transmitted within these few days to Copenhagen, except those received by the government, increases our apprehension that the attack is not far off.” Garlike added that the Danish Government believed an attack might occur, and that precautions were being taken to defend the Islands, but the government acted with the greatest secrecy and did not acknowledge the need of help from foreign nations.

59 Letter of Dec. 9, 1806, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

60 Quoted in Holm, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 108.

61 Westlake, John, International Law (1910), Vol. I, p. 315.

62 Holm,op. cit., Vol. II, p. 108.

63 Howick to Garlike, Dec. 3, 1806, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

64 Bobé,Efterladte Papirer fra den Reventlowske Familiekreds, entries for August and September, 1807; Parl. Debates, Vol. X, letters of Garlike to Howick of Nov. 14, 24, 29, 1806, and Jan. 12, 1807.

65 Howick to Garlike, Dec. 3, 1806, loc. cit.

66 Garlike wrote to Howick on Jan. 7 that if the Danish fleet were in as high astate of efficiency as was being represented, “It may still be hoped that every effort of France will fail against the Danish Islands.”

67 Canning believed that Denmark did not intend to use the fleet in self-defense. Parl. Debates, Vol. X, pp. 274, 280. During the siege of Copenhagen the fleet took no active part in the defense of the city.

68 Cf. Raeder, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 6.

69 Garlike to Howick, Nov. 24, 1806, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

70 Ibid., Dec. 28.

71 See also Howick’s dispatch of Dec. 9, loc.cit.

72 Garlike’s dispatch of Dec. 28, 1806, loc.cit.

73 That was especially true after Trafalgar.

74 Cf. Nathanson,Danmarks Handel, Skibsfart, Penge–og Finantsvaesen fra 1730 til 1830 (1832), Vol. I, p. 102; Bugge et al., Den Norske SjOfarts Historie (1931), p. 528 ff; Amneus, La Ville de Kristiania, son Commerce et son Industrie (1900), p. 50.

75 Odhner,Sveriges Politiska Historia under Konung Gustaf III’s Regerung (1885), Vol. II, pp. 121-122; Reumert, The Commercial Geographic Importance of the Situation of Copenhagen (1926), pp. 29–30.

76 Raeder,op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 7, 25.

77 Cf. the interpretation given by Heckscher, op. cit., p. 25 ff.

78 In his note to Lord Howick, March 9, 1807, Rist, the Danish Minister, contended that Danish vessels had the unquestionable right to engage in the coastal trade of France and her allies. To this contention Howick replied, March 17: “The coastal trade of the enemy in time of peace is carried on by his own navigation. Even the other branches of the trade referred to, viz., from Holland to France, to Spain, and the hostile portsin the Mediter ranean, in time of peace, chiefly pass by the navigation of those countries respectively.” When neutral navigation was enlisted to carry on this trade, it served “to rescue the commerce of the enemy from the distress to which it is reduced by the superiority of the British navy, to assist his resources, and to prevent Great Britain from bringing him to reasonable terms of peace.” Both notes are found in Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

79 Lindvald, A., “Danmark-Norges Handel-og Skibafart, 1800–1807,”inDansk Historisk Tidsskrift(1815–1817); Heckscher,op.cit.,pp. 309–311.

80 Danske Traktater efter 1800 (Copenhagen, 1871).

81 Lindvald, loc. cit., pp. 403–408. “Fra 1806 kom selv den störste Samvittighedsfuld til kort. Sökrigen antog stedse voldsonunere Former og Overgrebet mod den neutrale Handel blev stadigere Here.” From June 14 to Nov. 3, 1806, sixty-eight Danish ships were seized. In 1807 the number was greater. Ibid., p. 408.

82 Presently there were to be no neutral carriers in Europe. Thenceforth the controversy was between England and America.

83 Parl. Debates, Vol. X, p. 282.

84 Anderson, F. M., The Constitutions and Documents Illustrative of the History of France (1904), p. 386 Google Scholar. Howick’s interpretation was made in a note to Rist, March 17, 1807, Parl. Debates, Vol. X. Cf. Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. 40.

85 Rist to Howick, March 9, 1807, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

86 Howick to Rist, March 17, 1807, loc. cit. See note 78supra.

87 Ibid. Howick stated:“No intention of resistance (to the French decree) has appeared in any public document, or any steps taken by the Danish government; whilst, on the other hand, it has observed a conduct not apparently calculated to enforce the respect due to the rights of a neutral nation.”

88 Parl. Debates, Vol. X, Canning’s speech of Feb. 8, 1808.

89 Seeibid., the note of Howick to Rist, March 17, 1807, andcf. Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 26: “There was now hardly a vessel of which the cargo, ship’s papers, crew,or destination did not reveal some irregularity.”

90 Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 27.

91 The master of a Danish corvette, The Fyllp, on his return to Copenhagen on July 19 said that while he was at anchor off Portsmouth he was told by Admiral Gambier to hurry home unless he wished to be detained there by order of the English Government. (Ibid., p. 39.) Raeder also refers to a report in the Berling Avis for July 10, suggesting that an expedition to the Sound was being prepared.

92 Raeder,op. cit., I, p. 37, quotes this letter both in Danish and in its original English.

93 The Treaty of Tilsit was signed on July 8; the orders for the sailing of the expedition were issued not later than July 19, and the first English vessels appeared before Kronborg August 1. The intervening time was too short for the government to have been guided by the information it had received from Tilsit.On the question of how the information about the negotiations at Tilsit reached England see Rose, J. H., “Canning and Denmark” in Napoleonic Studies (1904).

Of the Tilsit treaty Kircheisen, in his Napoleon, Ein Lebensbild (1927), p. 78, asserts: “Die Hauptbestimmung dieses Friedensvertrages, von dessen Inhalt spider durch Verrat gegen Zahlung von 20 Millionen Marken von den russischen Diensten stehenden Graf en d’Antraigues Kenntnis erhielt, konnten fiir England sehr verhangnisvoll werden.”

94 Cf. Heckscher, op. cit., p. 304.

95 See Canning’s statement in the House of Commons, July 31, 1807, Parl. Debates, Vol. X.

96 See extracts from the dispatches of Charles Stuart, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Lord Howick, Nov. 19, 28, Dec. 1, 18, 1806, and Jan. 2, 14, 1807 (Pad. De-bates, Vol. X), wherein he states:“I must not conceal from your lordship that the apparent silence of His Majesty’s government, respecting a military diversion on the coast of France, has not produced a favorable effect upon the opinion either of the ministry or the public of this country.”See also Lord Howick’s dispatch to Stuart, Jan. 13, explaining why assistance was not sent, and the messages of Marquis Douglas to Howick of Jan. 26, Feb. 8, 14, 15, 20, March 9, 26, 1807. All these dispatches point out that Russia felt that she was abandoned by her allies.

97 Parl. Debates, Vol. X, General Budberg’s answer to the remonstrance of Lord Gower on the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit.

98 Ibid., the debates on the expedition to Copenhagen of Feb. 3, 1808. That Russia would abandon her allies is indicated especially in the dispatch which Douglas sent to Howick, April 27, 1807. At other times Canning reverted to the significance of the Battle of Friedland. On one occasion he declared that since the victory of Friedland had laid all Continental states prostrate at his feet all the efforts of Bonaparte would be turned against the power and resources of the British Empire. He developed this idea in detail. Parl. Debates, Vol. X, pp. 254, 267, 355, 358, 1186, 1205.

99 Correspondattee de Napoleon, Vol. XV.

100 Ibid.

101 Holm,Danmark-Norges Udenriske Historie, Vol. II, p. 78.

102 Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 6 ff. See also Sörenson,Den Politiske Krise i 1807, p. 4:“For of that both the Crown Prince and Foreign Secretary Bernstorff, who was directing the Department of Foreign Affairs under the King in Copenhagen, together with the country’s whole enlightened population, were certain, that a war with England would be the greatest misfortune that could befall the United Kingdoms.”

103 One such act was the termination of the convention which gave the English postal connections over Husum and Töning. Christian Bernstorff wrote to his brother Joachim, Aug. 12:“A war with England must be a war of destruction for us, but every concession to the demands of England will inevitably result in a rupture with France.” Sorenson, op. cit., p. 38.

104 Bobéop. cit., Vol. VI, Wendt to C. D. F. Reventlow, Aug. 8, 1807.

105 Such as those to South America, Constantinople, and Egypt.

106 Cf. Joachim Bemstorff’s letter to his brother, Aug. 13, 1807, in Sorenson, op. cit., p. 35.

107 Describing his meeting with Jackson, Christian Bernstorff wrote to his brother, Aug. 7:

“I shall especially endeavor to gain time, and, if possible, to conduct the negotiations in such a manner that the actual consummation of the act of violence with which we are threatened may be delayed, at least until it is known whether the English Government will accept the Russian mediation and thereby prepare the way for a general peace.” Sörenson, op. cit., p. 33.

108 For these and other details see Rose, J. H., “Canning and Denmark,” in Napoleonic Studies.

109 Joachim Bernstorff to Chr. Bernstorff, Aug. 3, in Sörenson, op. cit., p. 24.

110 Ibid“This was a pretense that he was not displeased to have Taylor see through;for the meeting of the Council of State, and the dinner…were not postponed.”

111 Ibid., pp. 20–27, passim.

112 Ibid., p. 31, Chr. Bernstorff to J. Bernstorff, Aug. 7. J. H. Rose, in“Canning and Denmark,”writes:“Due to Canning’s memorandum of July 29, in which he emphasized the fact that the possession of the Danish fleet was the main object of Jackson’s mission to Denmark, and that without the fleet no concessions on the part of Denmark could be considered of any value, Jackson put the question of the fleet in the forefront of his negotiations and relegated the Anglo-Danish alliance to the background.”This statement rests on evidence directly contrary to the reports given of the interview by Bernstorff, who analyzed the position of the English Government with amazing correctness, and added that England desired an alliance with Denmark and some security, perhaps some islands. He wrote to his brother (loc. cit.):“Thus the English Government sees itself forced into the necessity of asking Denmark either to join England in a close alliance and enter upon negotiations for the adoption of measures necessary for the safety and welfare of [our] country, or to give England some tangible pledge [Pant] toward her security.”Jackson, he said, had not had opportunity to declare what“Panten”was to be. It might be one of the Islands, even Zealand.

113 Sörenson,op. cit., p. 32, Chr. Bemstorff to Joachim, Aug. 7:“I shall in the meantime indicate to him [Jackson] that it is not the intention of the Crown Prince to enter upon political negotiations with him.”

114 Ibid., p. 32. See note 112, supra.

115 Sörenson,op. cit., p. 34, the Prince Regent to Chr. Bernstorff, Aug. 8:“Er (Jackson) sagte ziemlich deutlich class wir entweder uns allierten mussten oder auch Krieg haben konnten. Ich erwiederte, dass ich als Prinz und General nicht anhoren konnte, und erwies ihn an Ihnen, damit er nailer intisste rich expliciren.”

116 See Bemstorff’s summary of his interview with Jackson on Aug. 9, Sörenson, op. cit., p. 40.

117 Büllow, Joh.,Memoirer og Breve udg. of Julius Clauson og P. Fr. Rist. Vol. III i Breve til Joh. Billow til Sanderumsgaard (1906), p. 98.

118 Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 55.

119 Sörenson,op. cit., p. 56.

120 Ibid., p. 56. Raeder, op. cit., p. 111, says that the operations began between four and five o’clock in the morning.

121 Chr. Bernstorff to Joachim (Sörenson, op. cit., p. 41):“Our condition would become most deplorable if the French Government should make use of the English attack as a pretext to occupy Holstein arbitrarily.”

122 This interpretation seems justified by the events and by contemporary accounts of them. See Bülow, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 97:“In attendance upon the Prince there is only Adjutant General Bulow. They carry nothing with them except what they wear and a little linen, which a hussar could have carried under his arm.”

123 Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 10. The Prince Regent arrived at Copenhagen at noon, Aug. 11, and departed at midnight. Practically the whole machinery of government was moved to Kolding.

124 “It is indeed remarkable how much the Crown Prince accomplished in this short time. He had clearly in mind everything that needed to be done, even to the minutest details.” Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 11.Cf. the letter of the Prince Regent to Chr. Bernstorff, Aug. 13, 1807, Sörenson, op. cit.

125 Castenschj old to the Prince Regent, dispatches of Aug. 26 and 27, 1807, Krigsarkiv., Vol. III.

126 Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 73 ff., characterizes Peymann and the other Danish officers.

127 The Prince Regent’s instructions to Peymann were vague:“You will therefore take over the defenses upon land and sea, taking such precautions as you may deem necessary…As soon as hostilities begin, condemn all British property. On the other hand, refrain from being the aggressor. Begin at once to provision the fortresses of Copenhagen and Kronborg. Major General Biellefelt and Commander Bielle will serve under you, and one of them will take command when you are not present.FREDERICK, K. P.”Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 44. Not a word was said about the fleet.

128 For papers and discussions bearing upon the fleet, see Raeder, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 220–222, 225, 227, 243, 246, 251, 262; for an explanation of why the fleet could not be destroyed see ibid., pp. 256–257. On Aug. 18 the Prince Regent sent Lieut. Steffens to Peymann with instructions to burn the fleet. Steffens was captured, and his message was destroyed by Amptmann Treschow. Of this fact the Prince was informed at once, but he made no further attempts to communicate with Peymann about the fleet. SeeKrigsarkiv., Vol. III, for the instructions to Steffens and Steffens’ letter of Aug. 20, the Prince’s acknowledgment of two messages from Copenhagen, Aug. 26, and his letter to Peymann, Aug. 28.

129 On the feasibility of sending reinforcements to Zealand see Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 20, and also the letter of the Prince Regent to Wegner, Aug. 28, and Liliencrone’s letter of Sept. 5. Further discussion is found in Raeder, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 378–384, and in Parl. Debates, Vol. X, p. 279 ff.

130 Castenschj old to the Prince Regent, Aug. 23,Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 96.

131 Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 15, note. It is perhaps worth noting that the Danish Minister remained in London, whereon Sept. 24 he held a conference with Canning.Ibid., p. 34.

132 Ibid., p. 16.

133 Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 20.

134 Ibid., p. 57.

135 Ibid., p. 24.

136 Ibid., p. 30:“In a word, I think I have discovered that at the very time when they were talking about French assistance they were apprehensive of the moment when this assistance should appear in Danish territory.”

137 Bernstorff instructed Dreyer, the Danish Minister in Paris, to prevail upon the French to mass troops at the English Channel as a threat of invasion, to send flat-bottomed boats from Holland to Denmark, and to hold an army corps near Holstein until the season would permit them to be used.Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 24.

138 Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 92.

139 Fortescue, SirJohn, W., A History of the British Army (1899–1930), Vol. VI, p. 72 Google Scholar.

140 Krigsarlciv., Vol. III, p. 11.

141 Through Dreyer the French Government was informed, Sept. 11, that the defeat of Castenschjold did not discourage the Danish Government, which now would send several battalions to Zealand.Ibid., pp. 26–27.

142 Cf. Raeder, op. Cit., I, pp. 275–278. The silence of the Prince was the cause of much anxiety in Copenhagen, particularly among the men who had carried the burden of defending the capital.

143 For a detailed account of the campaign at Copenhagen and the court-martial of Peymann and others, see Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 73–483; for the correspondence and military instructions seeKrigsarkiv., Vol. III, passim; for the articles of capitulation see The Annual Register, 1807, p. 695. The Journal of the Army under Lord Cathcart (ibid., p. 698 ff.), is a formal daily record of the incident. Much contemporary material is found in BobéEfterladtePapirer fra den Reventlowske Familiekreds, andin Büllow, op. cit., III,passim.

144 See a letter of the Countess Stolberg to Count C. D. F. Reventlow, Sept. 21, 1807, in Bobé, op. cit., Vol. III.

145 The reference here is to the campaign as such and not to the policy that prompted it.

146 Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 278–279, and elsewhere, comments favorably upon this phase of the campaign.

147 The Countess Schimmelmann to the CountessStolberg, Sept. 27, 1808, in Bobé,op. cit., Vol. V. Cf. note 144 supra.

148 The Countess Stolberg to C. D. F. Reventlow, July 20, 1809, in Bobé,op. cit., Vol. V.

149 Büllow, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 177.

150 Prince Christian August to the Prince Regent, Sept. 22, 1807,Krigsarkiv., Vol. III.

151 The Prince Regent to Prince Chr. August, Oct. 6, 1807,loc. cit.

152 Fouché, J., Mémoires (1825), Vol. I, p. 220, and see p. 146.

153 Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 278;Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 34 ff.

154 Raeder,op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 278;Krigsarkiv., Vol. III, p. 34

155 The Countess Schimmelmann believed that Denmark was fighting in the wrong camp, and many of her countrymen agreed with her that the country should be on the side of England. See especially her letter of July 20, 1809, to the Countess P. S. Reventlow, in Boéop. cit., Vol. V. Of the attitude of King George III and his government toward the expedition Jacobi wrote from London, Oct. 20, 1807:“Rien n’a pu y faire consentir ce monarque que la réflexion fondée, ce me semble, que dans le cours de cette guerre révolutionaire touter les lois des nations ayant été foulés aux pieds par l’ennemi commun, it foudrait se résoudre à des actes de vigueur extraordinaire ou s’exposer au reproche d’avoir negligé les moyens usites de defénse de soi-memes.”Hassel, J. Paul, Geschichte der Preussischen Politik(1881), p. 105.

156 Gjerset, Knut, History of the Norwegian People (1915), Vol. II, p. 387.Cf. Sörenson,op. cit., p. 3 ff.; Raeder,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 6 ff. Kircheisen, Vandal and others hold a similar view. See Azuni, M. D. A., Maritime Law of Europe (English tr., 1806), Vol. II, pp. 21–63, for his discussion of the undefined state of the laws of neutrality.

157 This point is developed by Anders Grade in hisSverige och Tilsit Alliansen(1807–1810), p. 136.

158 Kircheisen, Napoleon I, Vol. II, p. 79 (Eng. tr., p. 412).

159 Jacobi’s letter to the Prussian King, Oct. 26, 1807,loc. cit., contains the observation:

“Le expédition contre le Danémark, ou plutot contre is fiotte danoise, ne me parait justifi-able, je l’avoué, que sur le princip de la défense de soi-meme.”On the same day the Swedish Minister at St. Petersburg, Marshal Stedingk, wrote to his sovereign:“Il faut avouer que l’enterprise Anglois sur Copenhague est contre tout droit des gene, et que elle ne peut se justifier que par la necessite; mail cette necessite n’est que trop reelle …” Stedingk, Ménoires, Vol. II. See alsoibid., his letters of Sept. 5, 18, 24, and Hassel,op. cit., the letter of Von Scholer, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, to his King, Oct. 13, 1807.

160 Parl. Debates, Vol. X, debates of Feb. 3, 1808.

161 Vandal, Albert, Napoleon et Alexandre Ier, L’alliance rune sous be premier empire(1891–1896), Vol. I, p. 167; Kircheisen, op. cit., p. 79.

162 But see a letter of Count Kotchoubey to the Duke of Richelieu, Sept. 2,1807 (O. S.), inAbhandlungen der Russ. Hist. Gesellschaft, 1887. Alexander I, in a letter to Gustavus IV, Sept. 27 (Grade, op. cit., p. 108), expressed sympathy for Denmark without showing hostility toward England, and as an indication of Russia’s good intentions toward England pointed to the fact that Russian harbors were not closed to English shipping. As late as Oct. 30 he referred to the advantage of an understanding with England (ibid.).

163 In contrast to his letters to Gustavus IV, cf. Alexander I’s letter to Napoleon, Nov. 15, 1807, in Tatischeff, Serge, Alexandre I et Napoleon, p. 232.

164 Grade,op. cit., pp. 125–126:“But the main consideration was not the time when Lord Gower and his suite were dismissed from the Russian capital, but rather the time when the Russian decision was announced to the Government in London, and in that respect the Russian cabinet cannot impute to itself the merit of having anticipated the terms [of the Treaty of Tilsit].”

165 Kircheisen,op. cit., Vol. II, p. 79.

166 Clason, Sam, “Vårt Hundradattrsminne: Krisen 1808–1809,” in Svensk Hist. Tidsskrift (1909), pp. 9-17; Grade,op. cit., Chaps. V-VI; Clason,“Gustaf IV och General Moore,”Svensk Hist. Tidsskrift(1912), pp. 2-12.

167 Raeder, Danmarks Krigs og Politiska Historic, Vol. I, pp. 485–486.