Alan Sykes’ editorial comment, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, provides a multi-layered analysis of the defense of “necessity” in international investment disputes. Sykes’ main proposition is that the obligation to compensate investors for government measures prejudicing their investments during economic emergencies mitigates the risk of moral hazard and incentivizes States to “select the least expensive way to protect their interests (the optimal policy instrument).” Otherwise, he contends, “actors will take risks that imperil them to an excessive degree if they can save themselves by imposing costs on others.” Sykes nonetheless argues that payment of the compensation could be deferred in light of the emergency, and not be subject to market interest rates.

The negotiators and drafters of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization(WTO), which includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947(GATT) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade(TBT), as well as other subagreements dealing with domestic regulation, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS), did not do a great job of doctrinal integration among the different documents that comprise the WTO Agreement. To be fair, at the end of the Uruguay Round, the hour was late and they may have felt that the basic ideas were sufficiently clear that it could all be sorted out in litigation. But in several contexts, including within the original GATT, the text of which dates from 1947, they covered the same ground in multiple places, without stating clearly how the different norms relate to one another,and without articulating plausible reasons for different treatment. For example, why is different language used for national treatment in three different places within Article III of GATT, and why is that language different from the language that appearsto have the same purpose in the TBT Agreement or in the SPS Agreement?

Scholars have argued that Senate-approved treaties are becoming increasingly irrelevant in the United States, because their role can be fulfilled by their close but less politically costly cousin, the congressional-executive agreement. This study demonstrates that treaties are more durable than congressional-executive agreements, supporting the view that there are qualitative differences between the two instruments. Abandoning the treaty may therefore lead to unintended consequences by decreasing the tools that the executive has available to design optimal agreements.

Zachary Mollengarden and Noam Zamir want to take back to basics the principle associated with the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Monetary Gold) judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Their “categorical” and mostly doctrinal claim, underpinned by policy concern about “the tensions between the bilateral presuppositions of the Statute and the increasingly multilateral nature of international affairs and international disputes” is “that the Monetary Gold principle is irreconcilable with the ICJ Statute's jurisdictional architecture.” The tension between bilateralism and community interests often provides an attractive analytical perspective, and points raised by the authors might be relevant in calibrating certain aspects of the principle. But its wholesale critique, while skillfully put, is ultimately unpersuasive. Careful consideration of basic instruments and issues is commendable but an exclusive focus that does not engage with the broader international legal process will miss its unmistakable and widespread endorsement of the Monetary Gold principle. Even the concern about the multilateral context ultimately counts against rather than in favor of their argument. Multilateral sensitivities can already be articulated within the four corners of Monetary Gold, and Mauritius/Maldives, delivered just as the ink was drying on the first draft of this essay, is a perfectly timed example for that.

The limited use of dispute settlement mechanisms under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement explains the recent upsurge in requests for advisory opinions on issues specific to climate change to international courts, namely the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, it is still unclear how these courts will answer the questions posed, and in particular whether they will coordinate or compete with each other. As the requesting states and bodies are well aware of this uncertainty, requesting an advisory opinion from three courts simultaneously was an ingenious (not ingenuous) strategy to clarify states’ obligations to mitigate or adapt to climate change through the international judiciary. This essay assesses how the parallel jurisdiction of courts in these cases presents an opportunity to enhance states’ obligations concerning climate change through requesting concurrent views on the same rules and obligations. It considers the potential for contradictory views between courts on the same obligations. Finally, the essay analyzes the extent to which these courts may compete or cooperate in their approach to the resolution of these issues.

Japan's attempt to include the Province of Jehol within the boundaries of so-called Manchukuo, if successful, is likely to be followed by serious consequences to China and to other nations as well. The southern boundary of Jehol coincides very nearly with the line of the Great Wall. Japan's action at Shanhaikuan and subsequent to the seizure of that place would seem to indicate her desire to make the Great Wall the boundary between Manchukuo and China. Even if Japan should evacuate Shanhaikuan, she will undoubtedly attempt to hold the passes between there and Kupeikou, which is at the southwestern comer of Jehol Province.