This article investigates the Taveta Road phenomenon, whereby women garment informal traders occupy a whole street in the central business district in Nairobi, Kenya. It also discusses the implications for urban planning of the presence of women informal traders in the central business district. The article demonstrates that the ability of these traders to move from the margins into the heart of the city is based on their ability to cross borders, organize collectively, and develop entrepreneurial skills that make use of social networks, group agency, and personal initiative. It also illustrates that over time, their gradual encroachment has led to an acceptance of their presence and their integration into the urban economy. These developments—which are referred to as “subaltern urbanism” or “solidarity entrepreneurialism”—have far-reaching implications in terms of the traders’ relationship with the city, state laws, and the national economy.

This article furthers our understanding of how state and citizens interact to produce local institutions and examines the effects of these processes. It brings critical institutional theory into engagement with ideas about everyday governance to analyze how hybrid arrangements are formed through bricolage. Such a perspective helps us to understand governance arrangements as both negotiated and structured, benefiting some and disadvantaging others. To explore these points the article tracks the evolution of the Sungusungu, a hybrid pastoralist security institution in the Usangu Plains, Tanzania. It also considers the wider implications of such hybrid arrangements for livelihoods, social inclusion, distributive justice, and citizenship.

This article explores the prevalence of high-level political and bureaucratic corruption in postindependence Uganda, with particular focus on the narrow interests it serves and its impact on development and service delivery. It argues that high-level political corruption endures largely because it is situated within the framework of “neo”-patron-clientelism and skewed power relations. The article shows how institutions have not been able to effectively engage the inner-circle ruling elite due to a skewed power structure that serves narrow political interests. Grand bureaucratic and petty forms of corruption are equally extensive and challenging, though only the former have been affected by “zero tolerance” policies. The article concludes, however, that through its interplay of inclusion and exclusion, political corruption has generated contestations which undermine it and challenge the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime.

This article seeks to examine the sanctions imposed on Eritrea by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) based on Eritrea’s alleged involvement in Somalia and its border dispute with Djibouti. It argues that the UNSC’s failure to sanction the parties for reneging on their commitment to implement the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s verdict on the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia casts doubt on the morality of the sanctions. It also argues that the decision may have been driven by political motives. These sanctions will hurt the people of Eritrea and the Eritrean nation, and indeed, there is a real risk that the outcome of the sanctions could be the collapse of the Eritrean state.

In January 2012 a broad spectrum of popular groups staged an unprecedented protest against the removal of what has been termed a “subsidy” on fuel prices by the Nigerian government. The participation of tailors in this national political event suggests that self-employed artisans were prepared to transcend their narrow nonpolitical agenda to promote their interests and demands for decent social and economic conditions. Interviews with participating organization representatives in Lagos indicate the supportive role of alliances with labor unions and organized informal workers at large. We see current global developments in the textile industry as conducive to this outcome.

This article examines processes of economic inclusion in divided societies, with a focus on both religious and formal–informal divides. Drawing on recent fieldwork in the northern Nigerian cities of Kano and Kaduna, the article challenges the assumption that identity-based informal organization intensifies violent social divisions, and that taxation and linkages with the state foster more stable and inclusive governance. A range of informal sector activities provides insights into escalating religious conflict and uneven patterns of formal inclusion in interreligious relations. Attention is focused on the relative role of informal institutions and formal interventions such as taxation in diffusing or exacerbating conflict at the grassroots level.

The election of Barack Obama as the first African-descended president of the United States in 2008 was greeted with euphoria in the U.S. and around the world, including Africa. Little, however, changed in the substance of U.S.–Africa relations. This underscores the limits of the symbolic politics of race and presidential personalities in the face of the structural imperatives of U.S. power and foreign policy in which African interests remain marginal and subordinate to U.S. interests. The article explores the structural contexts of foreign policy-making in the United States and what might be expected from the second Obama administration.

Obama’s rise to the U.S. presidency in 2008 gave many supporters of Africa the false hope that U.S. policy toward Africa would become more progressive. When such a shift failed to transpire, advocates argued that the major economic crisis in the U.S. monopolized the president’s attention and that his second term would create new opportunities for the continent. These claims failed to take into account the deep-rooted U.S. interests that dominate Africa policy with or without Obama. In addition, most of the Africa advocates have ignored the influence of the new breed of African Americans who staff key positions in the Department of State and whose priority is their own careers rather than a just policy toward the continent. Finally, most African leaders have not advocated for African interests and instead have pursued their particularistic agendas, leaving Africa vulnerable. Given this context, it is unlikely that Obama’s second term will introduce an Africa-friendly policy.

While Africans are generally satisfied that a person of African descent was reelected to the White House following a campaign in which vicious and racist attacks were made against him, the U.S. Africa policy under President Barack Obama will continue to be guided by the strategic interests of the United States, which are not necessarily compatible with the popular aspirations for democracy, peace, and prosperity in Africa. Obama’s policy in the Great Lakes region provides an excellent illustration of this point. Since Rwanda and Uganda are Washington’s allies in the “war against terror” in Darfur and Somalia, respectively, the Obama administration has done little to stop Kigali and Kampala from destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and looting its natural resources, either directly or through proxies. Rwanda and Uganda have even been included in an international oversight mechanism that is supposed to guide governance and security sector reforms in the DRC, but whose real objective is to facilitate Western access to the enormous natural wealth of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.