Responsibility for the overall inadequacy of this history rests with the compiler, and it is a statement of fact, not an excuse for a mediocre document, to say that the disappointingly numerous gaps in it are at least partly attributable to the surpassing reticence and modesty of the men who were Martinsyde: Helmuth Paul Martin and George Harris Handasyde. They sought no publicity and did not even advertise their products in the early years of their partnership. Indeed, one of several mysteries about the firm is what it subsisted on in the pre-1914 period, for its products did not seem to sell in significant numbers.

It is always an honour to be invited to give a lecture, and particularly a memorial lecture to a man so outstanding in his own field.

I knew Roy Chadwick and liked him. I admired, too, his working ability and his professionalism. He was a natural born designer, and I need not list here his attainments and successes since these were very adequately dealt with by Rogerson in the First Memorial Lecture to him.

I thought long about the subject of my talk this evening and finally decided that, at my time of life, it might be appropriate if I were to give a sketch of my accumulated experience, and experiences, over more than fifty active years—divided between marine diesel engines and automobile and aviation engines.

Everyone here will realise that I have to treat a vast subject in a short period of time, and those who are already familiar with it will be aware that I shall have to make a number of assertions, each of which really deserves separate treatment in its own right. I shall arrange the lecture as follows. I shall begin by clarifying the basic assumptions on which I intend to proceed. Next, I shall look at the state of the laws of aerial warfare at the end of the Second World War. Finally, I shall make a few observations on the present state of the law. As time is limited I shall devote more attention to the principles according to which, in my view, this subject should be broached than to detailed rules.

A submersible is defined as a neutrally buoyant submarine which relies largely on the buoyancy of the hull rather than gas or liquid filled floats at ambient water pressure. 29 different kinds of submersible have been built in USA and 15 in other countries. One has been built in England. Half of these do not go below 2000 ft and one third do not go below 1000 ft. The minimum safe weight for a vehicle is 5 tons at 1000 ft and 10 tons at 20 000 ft. A useful research or light work vehicle must be twice the minimum weight, and a heavy work vehicle in the 30-100 ton range.

High utilisation factor can only be obtained with special handling and support equipment, underwater navigation aids, high manoeuvrability, and a reserve of speed, life support, payload, and endurance. Principle applications of submersibles are in scientific research, geological mapping, prospecting, the oil industry, dredging, pipe-laying, and search and salvage.

I Feel honoured to be asked to lecture here at my old university about the early days of British aeronautical research. I intend to mention only people and investigations relating to times that are more than fifty years ago, apart from incidental references which appear to be relevant. My first emphasis will be on persons, then conditions of work and later on some of the historic results relating to this early period, some of which have been neglected or forgotten in the intermediate period.

The design of aircraft subjected to kinetic heating is the same as any other structural problem. First, the loading condition must be determined, then the structure has to be designed to withstand that condition and finally the design must be confirmed by test. This lecture follows this pattern and does so in the same order.

The source of the energy that is transferred to the structure is the aerodynamic boundary layer and a study of the boundary layer forms the main part of the lecture. During the past few years a large amount of work has been done and the Society is proposing to issue Data Sheets this year to replace those issued in 1955. The same work forms the basis from which the present proposed values of heat transfer coefficients are obtained.

The purpose of this paper is:

• 1. To describe the technical content of the ELDO-PAS Programme;

• 2. To give an outline of the management procedures used by the ELDO Secretariat.

The presently approved ELDO programmes are:

• (a) The Initial Programme as described by the ELDO Convention aiming at the development of the threestage Europa I Launcher.

• (b) The Supplementary Programme approved by ELDO Member State Ministers in July 1966 to give ELDO the capability of placing significant payloads in geo-stationary orbits.

The theme of this lecture on Helicopter All-Weather Operation is a discussion of the equipment requirements for the helicopter in the transport role.

I have to say at the outset and possibly somewhat provocatively, that I believe that there are no real problem areas left, as far as the equipment means are concerned, between us and the realisation of a good all-weather capability in a transport helicopter. By this I mean that virtually all the basic work has been done in the main fields of guidance and control. Much of the equipment is already produced or in an advanced stage of development and most of that outstanding has already been defined and the feasibility of meeting the requirements examined. Thus, I believe, all that is required is a determination to achieve all-weather operation and to set in hand the processes of procuring the equipment. This means that the requirement has to be firmly stated and the price paid to meet it. It is idle to think that an all-weather capability can be achieved without an adequate equipment standard. However, it is reasonable to expect that its achievement should cost no more in the transport helicopter than for an equivalent standard in the transport aeroplane.

In a world in which Engineering, Technology and Science play an increasingly dominant role, the prosperity of Britain with its limited natural resources depends more than ever before on the skill of its population. The proper education, training and optimum utilisation of its manpower is therefore vital. There is strong evidence for anxiety as to the recruitment, supply and use of scientists, technologists and engineers who create the knowledge and organise the human effort required for its successful exploitation in industry and commerce upon which our whole economy depends. These three highly skilled professional groups are interlinked and interdependent.

A serious aircraft noise problem exists today primarily for one simple reason—aeroplanes make too much noise. The problem could be solved just as simply by getting rid of the aeroplanes, but aircraft have proved to be useful and, in most cases, even profitable investments. In the past few years, air transportation has become so widely used that it is now considered essential to the economic and social welfare of the citizen, as well as to the national defence of the United States, so some other solution must be found, one which assures the orderly development of air commerce, but which also recognises the rights of people on the ground who are adversely affected by the undesirable social by–products of this rapidly advancing technology.

Considerable effort has been extended over the past years in adapting the matrix displacement method to the specific problems of thin shells under membrane and bending action and developing suitable elements of varying sophistication. Some of the difficulties arising in the process of idealisation were reviewed in ref. 1. For example, simple considerations show that a representation of a shell by polyhedron surfaces may lead to serious errors, especially in the presence of pronounced bending and so-called boundary-layer effects. For this and other reasons it appears imperative to allow for the curvature of the shell. Much ingenuity has been shown in evolving elements for shells of specific geometry.

The seven year life of the Ministry of Aviation was a time of dramatic change, not only in engine technology, but also in defence and procurement policy, in industrial organisation and in the public image of the aircraft industry. The rapid increase in the cost of developing and producing new aircraft and weapon systems made development management and cost control issues of the greatest importance and much effort was devoted to devising improved management procedures. In summarising the technological achievements of the period, attention is particularly drawn to changes in engine noise characteristics, in selling price and in the growth of overhaul life and reliability. The nature of engine development is examined in some detail and it is pointed out that the development content of engine programmes is normally much greater than that of airframe programmes. The high development effort and expenditure demanded by aero engines is explained and justified. Attention is drawn to the relationship between development cost and (a) manufacturing cost, (b) the magnitude of technical advance.

Some of the problems encountered in the search for an effective system of cost estimation and control are indicated.

The Air Ambulance of New South Wales came into operation on Good Friday 1967. Less than sixteen months later as I write it has carried 2348 patients in 807 flights. Four hundred and eleven of these patients have been emergencies and it is highly probable that most of them would not have survived a long distance road journey. With few exceptions all patients have been sent in by country doctors for specialist treatment in the metropolitan area.

Introduced as an Air Arm to the excellent road ambulance service it was intended to avoid the road journeys for distances of more than 175 miles. In the first year it saved that service 932 760 road miles. The time that patients would have spent on the road was 16 201 hours, this was reduced by air to 3 094 hours.

It is hardly necessary to add what this means to a sick or injured person. Although deeply unconscious and in a state of shock patients have been transported without their condition deteriorating.

We are now developing two large, new aeroplanes in the Boeing Commercial Airplane Division. The 747 —(Fig. 1) is subsonic and is in the initial production stage. First deliveries are planned for the autumn of 1969. The other is the SST prototype—(Fig. 2) which is to fly in 1972, if all goes well, with production deliveries projected for the mid-seventies. Both aeroplanes are challenges in many ways—in a technical sense—from a production standpoint—from a financial standpoint—and from an overall resource standpoint.

The function of any guidance system selected for the Europa rocket is to generate steering demands in such a way that—

1. (a) the trajectory flown results in a minimum consumption of fuel and

2. (b) the required orbital velocity and height at injection are achieved with the maximum accuracy.

If a system can be devised which enables these two aims to be realised, useful payload will not be sacrificed to place a satellite in its desired orbit.

I am most conscious of the honour of being invited to give the Sixth Handley Page Memorial Lecture, particularly in view of the renown of the previous speakers. Since these lectures are jointly sponsored by the Royal Aeronautical Society and the Cranfield Society, I am especially delighted at being the first ex-student of Cranfield who has been invited to present this paper.

The terms “cost-effectiveness” and to a lesser degree “cost-benefit” analysis have become familiar words in the technical and national press, the former usually in relation to defence projects—the latter in relation to social projects, such as transport, power generation and building. Indeed, at the time of the last General Election the political correspondent of a national newspaper wrote, “Mr. Heath and Mr. Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, vied with each other in stressing the importance of cost-effectiveness, which used to be known as getting value for money”.

The apparently simple concept of “value for money” raises three important issues:

(i) how is “value” of defence and social projects quantified?

(ii) what is the “money” involved, i.e. what are all the relevant costs? and

(iii) what are the information and decision processes that are used in attempting to obtain “value for money“?