The first and the most important consequence of the principles established above is that only the general will can direct the forces of the State according to the end of its institution, which is the common good: for while the opposition of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary, it is the agreement of these same interests that made it possible. What these different interests have in common is what forms the social bond, and if there were not some point on which all interests agree, no society could exist. Now, it is solely in terms of this common interest that society should be governed.

This study seeks to establish an understanding of what is a special relationship, its dynamics, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. The theoretical understanding is being tested through the examination of Indonesia–Malaysia relations, which in turn serves to foster better appreciation of the special relationship.

The existing literature has revealed that a special relationship between two states emerges when two sources of closeness coexist in their relations — that of the two states’ common identities and shared strategic interests. The two states concerned identify positively with each other owing to their two sources of closeness which result in them sharing an understanding that their relationship is closer than their other bilateral ties. Yet, certain conditions need to be in place before two states bound by their common identities could share common strategic interests.

As indicated in Chapter 2, while the common identities of the United States and Great Britain gave rise to their similar strategic understandings, they, however, did not see each other as a strategic partner up until the late nineteenth century. The steady growing of American power since 1850s, which eventually matched with Britain's existing power, produced their mutual need for strategic cooperation.

The Anglo-American special relationship subsequently began to emerge; thereafter, the two states rely on each other for survival. They forge strategic partnerships between them to preserve their similar vision of international order, which is rooted in the English concepts of liberty. Likewise, despite the shared values of the United States and Israel render both similarily prefer a Middle East that is compatible with the interests of Western democracy, the United States did not recognize its mutual strategic dependence with Israel up until 1967 when Israel had demonstrated its capacity by decisively defeating its Arab foes in the Six-Day War. Henceforth, the United States forges a special relationship with Israel. The two states work closely with each other to fashion a strategic landscape in the Middle East which both similarly prefer.

In other words, this study has revealed the relationship between identities and power in the creation of the common strategic interests of two states sharing common identities, which subsequently gives rise to their special relationship.

This chapter reveals the double-edged effects of the Indonesia–Malaysia special relationship. By the mid-1980s, a solid foundation had been established in Indonesia's and Malaysia's domestic politics as well as in their regional affairs. The unmistakable political supremacy of the indigenous people over the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as ASEAN's proven ability to function as a shield for its member states, revealed that the Malay world had taken root in archipelagic Southeast Asia. In other words, the strategic cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia — forming the Malay world — was well established. Indonesia's and Malaysia's respective nationhoods too had become entrenched. Consequently, the two states each began to venture into a new stage of economic development that would transform their respective economy and national identity.

By the late 1980s, the transformation of Indonesia's and Malaysia's economies had ushered in an era of high economic growth in the two states. With their new found economic might, Indonesia and Malaysia were looking beyond ASEAN, striving to expand the space for their respective survival. Indonesia and Malaysia competed with each other amidst their endeavours to expand their respective influence abroad. The competition was enhanced by the mismatch of expectation between them; and mutually reinforced with their respective assertion of their superiority over the culturally similar counterpart.

The intertwined three sources of conflicts were also embedded in the territorial disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and the issue of Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia. The three sources of conflicts reinforced one another. Anti-Malaysia sentiments emerged in Indonesian society as a result — which were the substantial conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Because of the war avoidance norms that existed in the Indonesia– Malaysia special relationship, the substantial conflicts between them had not been able to turn into violent ones. The absence of power imbalance in the Indonesia–Malaysia special relationship means that the relationship remains as a security regime, not a security community. Indonesia–Malaysia relations are fundamentally competitive. The two states continue to understand each other in egoistic terms. War between them is unlikely, yet it remains possible.

THE SOLID PRESENCE OF THE MALAY WORLD AND THE NEW STAGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By the mid-1980s, it was evident that a solid foundation had been established in Indonesia's and Malaysia's domestic politics as well as in the regional affairs of ASEAN.

This chapter explains the dynamics of a special relationship and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. The first section of this chapter reveals the double-edged effects of a special relationship. A special relationship produces substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts between the two states involved. This section explains that the intertwined three sources of conflict in a special relationship — power competition between the two states involved; their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart; and the mismatch of expectation between them — breed and enhance the negative identifications between the two states involved, which lead them to understand each other in egoistic terms. In other words, the two states share conflictual intersubjective understandings, despite having special ties with each other.

The second section of this chapter explains that a special relationship constitutes a security regime. A security regime refers to the war avoidance norms around which expectations of the states involved converge. Each of the states observes the norms in the belief that others will reciprocate. This section reveals that the war avoidance norms in a special relationship that come with the emergence of the relationship are produced by the two sources of closeness of the two states involved — common identities and shared strategic interests. As both states in a special relationship observe their shared war avoidance norms, the substantial conflicts between them, therefore, will not easily turn into violent ones. Finally, this section points out that a special relationship — as a security regime — serves as the foundation for the two states to transform into a pluralistic security community. Yet, one element needs to be in place, without which the transformation could not take place.

The chapter's final section reveals that the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. It points out that two states in a special relationship start to share an understanding of collective-self, namely, they constitute a pluralistic security community, when one of them has become overwhelmingly powerful.

THE DOUBLE-EDGED EFFECTS OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

As explained in Chapter 2, two states’ common identities give birth to their similar strategic understandings.

This chapter explains that a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia had emerged shortly after the fall of the Sukarno regime.

Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia had been effectively defeated by Malaysia, in which the Anglo–Malaysian military alliance was the backbone of its security. The power owned by Malaysia had accordingly succeeded in halting Indonesia's tendency to launch military attacks on Malaysia. Indonesia began to share the same understanding held by Malaysia that power balance existed between the two states, which meant a basis of order had emerged between them. Indonesia and Malaysia began to coexist peacefully.

Meanwhile, the presence of power balance between Indonesia and Malaysia also meant that both states possessed the necessary amount of power that shaped their similar strategic understandings rooted in common identities into their common strategic interests. Since then, Indonesia and Malaysia needed each other to form the Malay world in archipelagic Southeast Asia — a shield that protected their existence as states built around the Malay way of life. Two sources of closeness — common identities and shared strategic interests — henceforth, coexisted in Indonesia–Malaysia relations. A special relationship, therefore, had emerged between Indonesia and Malaysia.

The two sources of closeness in Indonesia–Malaysia relations generated their mutual aspiration for peace, which were strong enough to give rise to the war avoidance norms shared by the two states. In other words, the Indonesia–Malaysia special relationship constituted a security regime between them.

Upon the establishment of their special relationship, Indonesia and Malaysia worked together to create a friendly regional climate of Southeast Asia, which essentially reflected the Malay way of life. Together they moved to establish ASEAN so as to forge a friendly order of Southeast Asia through regional cooperation. The creation of ASEAN was an expression of the Indonesia–Malaysia special relationship. ASEAN's essence as a security regime, in the meantime, was created and sustained by the special relationship.

While Indonesia and Malaysia identified intimately with each other because of their special ties, their egoistic understanding of one another, nonetheless, persisted. The reordering of the strategic landscape in Southeast Asia, which took place in the late 1960s, revealed such basic qualities of Indonesia–Malaysia relations. In order to respond to the changing strategic environment, Indonesia and Malaysia sought for each other's cooperation, aiming to create an autonomous Southeast Asia that ensured their basic security.

This chapter explains that a special relationship did not exist between the Sukarno-led Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia were bound by their common identities rooted in the Malay way of life. Because of them sharing common identities, both states shared similar strategic understanding of the regional order of archipelagic Southeast Asia. However, Malaya did not possess the necessary amount of power that would engender Indonesia's recognition of its strategic reliance on Malaya; whereas the amount of power owned by Indonesia had surpassed a level that produced Malaya's strategic dependence on Indonesia. Besides, Indonesia did not immediately realize its mutual strategic dependence with Malaysia, during the period when Malaya had expanded into Malaysia. In short, the similar strategic understanding of Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia had not been shaped into their common strategic interests by the power owned by Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia. Indonesia aimed for its strategic preponderance over Malaya/Malaysia; whereas Malaya/ Malaysia desired for its mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia.

Two sources of closeness — common identities and common strategic interests — did not coexist in the relationship between Malaya/Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia. In other words, there was no special relationship between the two states.

The three sources of conflict that were embedded in the ties between Malaya/Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia — Indonesia's assertion of its dominance over Malaya/Malaysia and Malaya/Malaysia's attempt to balance against Indonesia's aim for regional dominance; the two states’ drive to emphasize the superiority of their respective nationhood over that of their culturally similar counterpart; the mismatch of expectation between them — were mutually reinforcing one another. The two states plunged into armed conflicts as a result.

INDONESIA–MALAYSIA COMMON IDENTITIES —THE MALAY WAY OF LIFE

The pre-existing dominant ethnic community in archipelagic Southeast Asia forms the basis for the establishments of Indonesia and Malaysia as two sovereign nation-states. The culture of the ethnic community, namely, the Malay way of life, constitutes the central character of the two states’ respective national identity. As such, Indonesia and Malaysia are bound by their common identities rooted in the Malay way of life. The Malay way of life is constituted by the combination of three essential elements — the notion of kingdom, the Malay language and Islam. Within the mindset of kingdom, the people of the dominant ethnic community in archipelagic Southeast Asia speak the Malay language and adhere to Islam.

This chapter reveals that a special relationship between two states is founded on their two sources of closeness — that of the two states’ common identities and shared strategic interests. It subsequently discusses about the expressions of a special relationship. This chapter then brings to light the understanding that two states bound by common identities each needs to own a necessary amount of power before they could share a special relationship. After defining a security community, this chapter demonstrates that a special relationship and a pluralistic security community are basically different from each other, yet they are essentially interlinked — the two concepts each represents a relationship of common identities as well as power between two sovereign states. Finally, the chapter reveals that certain conditions need to be in place before a special relationship can transform into a pluralistic security community.

THE CONCEPT OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

The Coming About of the Conception of a Special Relationship

The concept of a special relationship is generally being understood as a closer friendship between two states when compared to their other bilateral relations, where such a relationship is founded on the two states’ closely shared interests and their sentimental assertion of shared identities. The idea of a “special relationship” entered into the discussion of international relations when the term was coined by Winston Churchill in his “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. Churchill in his speech warned that permanent peace would not be achieved without “the fraternal association of the English Speaking People. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.”

The notion of a special relationship between Britain and the United States was a century in the making, amid the ripening of their friendship since the late eighteenth century. The sense of closeness between the two states was naturally and consistently generated by their common identities, rooted in the two states’ shared culture, common language, historical ties and shared political values and institutions. In 1782, after it was reminded by Britain of the possibility of French pursuing deceptive tactics, the United States had decided to ignore its treaty with France, which obliged them not to make separate peace with other states.