The 1960 Sino-Soviet split and its 1962 border clash with India had left the People's Republic in international isolation. As a result, the Chinese Communist leadership attempted to remedy this situation by reaching out to countries inside and outside Asia. To contextualize Beijing's international behavior following the Sino-Indian War, we must first examine how Chinese foreign policy evolved throughout the 1960s. Historian Niu Jun argues that Chinese foreign policy took a sharp left turn in 1962 primarily due to domestic pressure resulting from the Great Leap Forward. The catastrophic effects of this event invited criticism of Mao's policies by Marshall Peng Dehuai. Placed on the defensive, Mao tightened control and rejected pragmatic foreign policy proposals by Central Committee member Wang Jiaxiang on the basis that “there was a connection between revisionism at home and abroad.” Nevertheless, Niu acknowledges that Wang's realist foreign policy did not disappear entirely. Even though China used force to respond to Indian activities at the Tibetan border, it embarked on a “peace offensive” immediately after the 1962 war, attempting to construct new alliances and bolster old ones.

What China lacked in international alliances it possessed in frontier security. The Indian army was routed during the 1962 war, and the People's Liberation Army could mobilize faster than before. Beijing felt little pressure to overhaul its frontier policy

As India assumed a more assertive posture at the frontier, Western countries became more interested in stabilizing this region. Former U.K. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan put it best when he proclaimed in November 1965 that Britain got involved in the Sino-Indian War not only to help a Commonwealth partner under attack, but also to fight in the “battle for Asia.” This battle embodied a struggle between Indian democracy and Chinese communism. Macmillan concluded, “If I once said that Britain's frontier is on the Himalayas, that frontier is perhaps not so much a military frontier, it is economic, indeed it is more moral and philosophical.” With democracy in Asia seemingly at stake, Britain, members of the Commonwealth, and the United States continued to provide military assistance and moral support to India and its neighbors at the frontier in the years following the 1962 war. Via this support, assessments of Chinese military capabilities, and overtures to Pakistan, the West pursued a united front to stymie what they saw as Chinese expansionism. Be that as it may, Commonwealth powers and the United States held divergent views on backing Tibetan rebels.

Pakistan bristled at Western assistance to India. Pakistan and India had been on poor terms since partition in 1947, so it is not surprising that the Pakistani government opposed aid to India.

In the frigid morning of October 20, 1962, the People's Liberation Army launched an attack on Indian troops at the Himalayan border. The Chinese had forded the Namka Chu, a river in the eastern sector of the disputed frontier near the China-India-Bhutan trijunction, and then used mortars and artillery to strike Indian positions. Simultaneously in the western sector, the People's Liberation Army captured the Chip Chap and Galwan Valleys as well as Pangong Lake (see figure 1.1). The Western Command of the Indian army ordered soldiers not attacked on the first day to withdraw.

Successful tactics of the People's Liberation Army involved concentrating its forces and catching India by surprise. Furthermore, the Chinese attack on remote Indian posts incited a hasty reaction, which overstretched India's lines of communication and drew forces away from defending the longdisputed monastery town of Tawang. This town fell without a fight on October 24 (see figure 1.2). After these initial routs, the People's Liberation Army paused its advance. On October 24, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sent a note to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru seeking a peaceful resolution to the border conflict. He put forward a three-point proposal:

• 1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometers from this line.

During and immediately after the border war, India and China made overtures toward the international community to secure moral and material support. Western governments sympathized with India and rendered assistance in the form of equipment, advisors, and informal alliances. The intersection of national interest with rhetoric of upholding democracy in Asia unified the United States and Commonwealth. Regarding India as a domino that they could not let fall strongly influenced foreign policy in the West long after the shock of the Sino-Indian War had faded. At the same time, a desire to reduce financial strain and defense commitments caused these countries to “pass the buck” among one another. The Soviet Union professed neutrality, and Pakistan rebuked the West's support of its nemesis. Members of government and the public sometimes challenged these “official” views. Nevertheless, mainstream views and policies prevailed, shaped by geopolitics of the Cold War.

India's Path Forward

Indian diplomat C. V. Narasimhan, Chef de Cabinet in the United Nations, spoke angrily to that body, expressing shock at both the Chinese assault in 1962 and the absence of support from the Third World. “When Nehru and India needed their nonaligned friends most, where were they? Where was Sukarno? Where was Nasser? Where was Tito? Not a single word of support or even sympathy from them.”

To understand the lead-up to the Sino-Indian War, we must examine how each side dealt with and perceived its frontier. After the People's Republic was founded on October 1, 1949, Chinese leaders focused on domestic consolidation. The new Chinese state pledged to unify the nation, which included peripheral areas. On October 6, 1950, the People's Liberation Army invaded Tibet as part of this effort, and Tibet became incorporated into China in 1951. Beijing drew attention to instances in which the Indian military encroached on territory claimed by China, while keeping apprised of more subtle activities such as espionage. Tibet transitioned from a periphery of China to a central battleground. Thus, as historian Srinath Raghavan argues, “the origins of the [1962] war lay in two intertwined issues: the boundary dispute and Tibet.”

The Himalayan kingdoms and Burma also entered the frontier/foreign policy calculus of the People's Republic. These areas’ porous borders and connections to India in addition to their harboring enemy agents were a constant vexation. The Chinese Communist leadership used moral and material support to these governments to mitigate Indian influence. Furthermore, the People's Republic settled its borders with Nepal and Burma not only to regulate the inflow and outflow of people, but also to pressure India to negotiate its northern boundary. The People's Republic also backed communist groups throughout the border region in case actions taken through official channels failed to produce results.

Beginning in the 1950s, China and India competed for the leadership of non-Western states emerging from colonialism. At the same time, there existed unresolved border contests and competition for influence in the Himalayan kingdoms that separated the two. But the two sides professed friendship for each other via Panchsheel, Hindi-Chini bhai bhai, the Bandung Conference, and state visits. These symbols of peaceful coexistence were fleeting, however. Mutual suspicions between India and China existed during, before, and after the 1962 war.

Beijing supported revolution throughout Asia—especially in Korea and Indochina. It also did so in other neighboring states, such as Nepal and Burma under the fig leaf of party-to-party relations. The “dual-track approach” of simultaneously supporting a given country's government and communist party allowed China to play a double game, despite the Panchsheel principles. The Chinese Communist leadership made overtures to countries inside and outside the border region to reverse international isolation brought about by the 1960 Sino-Soviet split and the 1962 border war. This realist foreign policy was dismantled during the Cultural Revolution. It was then that Beijing began backing insurgent groups throughout India's northeast.

How India handled the border issue in the postbellum contrasted with the approach by the People's Republic. A trend of frontier military neglect by India reversed with the onset of the 1962 war. The shock of defeat compelled Indian policymakers to develop a lean, well-trained fighting force. Consequently, India's defense budget increased from five billion rupees in 1962–1963 (1.5 trillion rupees adjusted for inflation) to seven billion rupees in 1963–1964 (2.2 trillion rupees adjusted for inflation). To place these figures into perspective, India's defense budget in 1950–1951 only amounted to 1.64 billion rupees (704 billion rupees adjusted for inflation). Partly due to this increased defense budget, India made up for its defeat in 1962 by achieving victory over Chinese forces in 1967. Indian leaders comprehended the impracticality of attempting to match China's army size, instead focusing on ways to make the border with China impenetrable.

In addition, India expanded development aid to political entities along the Sino-Indian frontier. Indian leaders remained convinced that Beijing endeavored to bring the Himalayan kingdoms and Burma into its orbit. New Delhi combatted Chinese incursions through countersubversion efforts. Certain techniques India used to project itself at the frontier were novel, but New Delhi's overall frontier strategy deviated only slightly from that of the pre-1962 era. The key change was its level of assertiveness.

Like the People's Republic, India regarded control over its frontier as a fundamental part of nationhood. India fortified its border with Pakistan not long after the 1947 partition. China's advance on and infiltration of India's peripheries began to dominate Indian thinking prior to the 1962 war, however. Indian leaders posited that Beijing was chipping away at important buffer zones while diminishing India's sphere of influence. Domination of Tibet by the People's Republic as well as Beijing's overtures to the Himalayan kingdoms and Southeast Asia shaped this perspective.

Indian officials had much to consider about how to respond to China. Some adopted a realist approach early on, arguing that India needed to recognize the Chinese threat and secure the border region. Some attached great significance to Hindi-Chini bhai bhai and eschewed confrontation, while others held moderate or ambivalent views. In the end, the Indian government used military contingency plans, economic development, careful management of the frontier town of Kalimpong and Tibetan border crossers (e.g., the Dalai Lama), and high-level diplomacy to deal with an increased Chinese presence at the frontier. These measures succeeded to varying degrees.

Border Security through Military Means

Concerned Indians interpreted the October 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet as an event that foreshadowed future border problems. Poet, nationalist, and mystic Shri Aurobindo stated in November 1950 (three weeks before he died) that the People's Liberation Army had entered Tibet to extend China's frontiers and threaten India in the future.

In 2020 and 2021, Indian and Chinese troops fought in areas along their disputed border, including the Galwan Valley and Pangong Lake. In 2017, China and India had a dust-up over a frontier area called Doklam (Donglang). These confrontations were far from isolated incidents. Rather, they comprised part of a series of border disputes between India and China dating back to the 1950s.

This work explores the evolution of the Sino-Indian border conflict— broadly defined—from 1950 to 1970.1 These dates are chosen for several reasons. The year 1950 was a watershed moment in Sino-Indian relations due to the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Furthermore, beginning with this year allows us to evaluate each nation during its infancy (the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China were founded in 1947 and 1949, respectively). The book ends in 1970 since the international scene changed in 1971 with the onset of the Indo-Pakistani War and ping-pong diplomacy. These dates also mark roughly ten years before and after the Sino-Indian Border War. Using ten years before and after as markers makes sense so that we can understand what events contributed to the conflict as well as what the medium-term ramifications of it were.

I specifically examine how conflict at the frontier destabilized spheres of influence and caused the countries involved to reassess their allies and rivals. This contest was a revival of the nineteenth-century Great Game, garnering the interest of political entities both inside and outside the border region. A range of actors viewed the border conflict as an opportunity to pursue their foreign policy goals, which comprised trade, security, and prestige.

It was not only India and China that engaged with their shared frontier prior to 1962. Although far from their main concern, English-speaking Western countries analyzed developments in that region and at times offered support to India, Tibetans, the Himalayan kingdoms, and Burma. The West's historical relations with political entities along the Sino-Indian frontier informed Cold War policies. The United Kingdom's relations with Tibet date back to the eighteenth century when British officials viewed it as both a curiosity and a potential trading partner. These views evolved during the nineteenth century as Britain came to regard Tibet as an important pawn in the Great Game. Britain specifically promoted Tibetan suzerainty to establish it as a buffer zone, as first exemplified by the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty. International relations scholar Dibyesh Anand argues that Britain used the ambiguous terms “Chinese suzerainty” and “Tibetan autonomy” to “deal with Tibet as a de facto independent buffer state without having to offend China and other Western powers.” By the mid-1940s, this need evaporated and Britain in practice recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet—thereby revealing its desire to strengthen Sino-British relations.

Britain's interest in Nepal stemmed from its enlistment of Gurkhas (i.e., Nepalese soldiers for hire), who served throughout the British Empire since the nineteenth century.