In this Introduction the point is underlined that no prior familiarity with Greek or Latin literature is taken for granted, nor are readers expected to know these languages: everything is translated. In this volume, literary interpretations are suggestive, not prescriptive. There is a brief discussion of the hazards of periodisation in any history of literature and a warning against accepting too readily the teleological view of Latin literature which one finds in ancient sources and, sometimes, in modern accounts. The difficulties inherent in dealing with texts that survive only as fragments – an unavoidable necessity when discussing republican literature – are discussed; fragments are preserved for a range of reasons: sometimes owing to a linguistic oddity, sometimes to a later writer’s literary or political agenda. Consequently, conclusions about fragmentary texts can only be provisional. This Introduction also furnishes guidance on various features of this volume.

In this treatise Bartolus applies the Aristotelian schema of constitutions to the city republics of his own day and argues that for the smallest such cities, such as Perugia, where Bartolus lived and worked, the most appropriate form of government is ‘government by the people’ or regimen ad populum. He argues that aristocracy is preferable in larger cities such as Venice and Florence, and then corrects Giles of Rome’s universal endorsement of monarchy as the best constitution by limiting it to much larger political organizations which hold sway over other peoples. He argues that where monarchy is appropriate at all, elective monarchy is superior to hereditary, and established by law for the Roman empire and for the church. Bartolus uses Roman constitutional development as presented in the Roman law to exemplify the different systems of rule brought into being by the growth in numbers and influence of a people. He casts his treatise in part as a lawyer’s version of the Aristotelian constitutional analysis made popular by the theologian Giles of Rome. The concept of the common good is central to Bartolus’s treatment.

As a phrase, sovereign atonement brings two concepts – “sovereign” and “atonement” – together, which is perhaps not the first combination that comes to mind when we think of them individually, not least because they are rarely discussed on the same page due to their treatment predominantly by two distinct domains of knowledge: politics and theology. However, the idea of the sovereign is primarily discussed in close relation to power and violence, in sharp contrast with an image of an apologetic and amending body atoning for its past deeds. It is therefore unsurprising that the phrase appears unorthodox or even “weird” on first reading. Nonetheless, throughout the book, I have demonstrated that atonement can be used productively in relation to the sovereign to further unlock the everyday state, power, territory, governance, violence, citizenship, and belonging in novel ways. It does so not just by offering a lens through which to examine these issues more deeply but also by providing a foundation on which they are cross-examined against each other. In this epilogue, I undertake precisely this task: teasing out how sovereign atonement, both as a lens and as a framework, coherently binds the book through an inquiry into the issues that have been discussed in their specificity across the chapters in thick ethnographic detail. In doing so, I start by taking a step back. First, I discuss the meaning of the “sovereign” the book has used. I then shed light on the nature of “atonement” to clarify precisely in what sense I have used the term throughout. Finally, I delve into a discussion of how the merging of these two concepts – that is, sovereign atonement – pans out across the book.

Sovereignty's meaning has been discussed in a range of ways and contexts. Yet Stephen Krasner identifies four major applications of the term (Krasner, 1999). These are international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. According to Krasner, international legal sovereignty refers to the practices that allow one territorial entity to recognize another through formal juridical independence. Westphalian sovereignty is generally used to describe a political organization of territories based on the inclusion and exclusion of actors who have the power to exercise authority within the territory in question.

This chapter presents the Talker–Listener–Language, or TL2, framework for analyzing variation in speech intelligibility in conversational interactions between interlocutors from different language backgrounds. The TL2 framework is based on three fundamental relations: (a) the relation between the talker and the language being spoken (Talker–LBS), which can vary from low proficiency L2 to L1; (b) the relation between the listener and the language being spoken (Listener–LBS), which also varies from low proficiency L2 to L1; and (c) the relation between the language repertoires of the interlocutors (Talker–Listener), which can either match or mismatch. The central claim of the TL2 framework is that each of the three language relations influences speech intelligibility both independently and through modulation of the others. Evidence from various independent strands of research on speech intelligibility for L1 and L2 talkers and listeners is reviewed to support this claim. The TL2 framework is thus presented as both a coherent perspective on prior research on bilingual speech intelligibility and a map for future research.

To define irreducible representations, spinors with dotted and undotted indices are defined. Irreducible representations of susy are defined, first in the massless case, then in the massive case, with and without central charges. The R-symmetry of the algebras is defined. The Lagrangians for the d = 4 multiplets, N = 1 chiral, N = 1 vector, their coupling and the N = 2 models, and finally the unique N = 4 model, are described.

This chapter introduces chief postulates common to usage-based (UB) approaches to language. The UB approach maintains that speakers’ experiences with language shape how language is stored. Experiences with specific words and word combinations in particular linguistic, discursive, and social contexts accrue in memory and subsequently contribute to patterns of variability evident in speech productions. Usage-based approaches regularly consider independent effects on lexical representations of decontextualized prior probabilities (e.g. phone/word/bigram frequencies, type frequencies), and, increasingly, contextually informed counts (e.g. lexical items’ cumulative exposure to conditioning effects of the production contexts, phone/word probabilities) are considered. This chapter offers an overview of studies exploring the connection between usage patterns and bilingual sound systems as well as studies exploring evidence of interlingual influence arising from bilingual lexical storage (schematic ties in memory). The chapter suggests potential avenues for future UB research into bilingual phonetics and phonology.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

An inquest is an inquisitorial process, and this has an impact on the roles of the advocates and the jury, if there is one. This chapter explains their roles, and also when a professional may require separate legal representation, with some further tips on giving evidence from the perspective of an advocate.

In the received view, God is perfect, meaning that He is complete, lacking in nothing, without undeveloped potentialities; He is always full. Contemporary English tends to use the term “perfect” differently, in the sense of what is entirely good. Though one might anticipate that if God is perfect, then He is entirely good, the question of His goodness per se is not explored until Question 6. Here we are asking only about His fullness or complete actuality.

Who has the authority to decide on behalf of children the balance between advancing the child rights regime over the legal certainty of real children? This question is put to the test with the Swedish incorporation of the CRC into the national legal system without adhering to normal democratic safeguards; pairing the hierarchy of norms with the corresponding hierarchy of sources when conducing judicial review, or a political question doctrine to maintain the line between the courts and the democratically elected legislator. To incorporate the CRC directly without a process of transference, an international treaty that is as wide in scope and open for interpretation to be directly applicable in concrete cases has caused a persistent condition akin to Agamben’s state of exception, read through Swedish scholar Herbert Tingsten.

Many polytheists would be perfectly happy to borrow yet another god from Christianity, but only so long as they could demote Him from the One God to a god among gods: “What have you got against the others?” The naïve assumption is that God belongs to the genus “gods” – that He is just one more of those things (but in Christian belief, the real one). St. Thomas has argued that He is not that sort of thing at all – in fact, He is not a “sort of thing.” Moreover He is of such a nature that there could not be more than of Him. But how do we know He is one? Even someone who considers the many gods of polytheism false, foolish, base, demonic, or all too human may ask, “But is monotheism true?”

The liturgical forms depicted in William Wordsworth’s Excursion (1814) provide the foundational instance of the nineteenth-century resistance to excarnation and the natural/supernatural binary. Rather than naturalizing otherworldly Christian doctrines – as seminal readings of Romanticism suppose – The Excursion’s rituals disclose how material reality already participates in the divine. This participatory vision challenges voluntarist pictures of God as a large, powerful being who exercises his arbitrary will over creation – a picture of God often unwittingly adopted by modern readers. Divine participation, moreover, challenges typical readings of Wordsworth’s lyrical inwardness. For, liturgy not only draws the poem’s characters out of themselves, it also sacralizes nature. Nature’s sacredness in turn opposes the desecrating rituals – or anti-liturgies – of industrialization. Via liturgy, then, Wordsworth comments on material conditions and remains historically engaged. The Victorians will repeatedly echo this use of liturgy to sacralize material reality and to resist any forces that would violate that sacrality.