Starting in 1990, the lethal combination of three factors led to genocide: political transition, civil war and bipolar ethnicity. In the second half of 1990, the start of the democratisation process coincided with an attack by the RPF, the political–military organisation of the Tutsi refugees. Despite the signing of a peace accord in 1993, the civil war resumed in 1994 and led to the RPF's victory. From April to July, the Tutsi were the victims of a genocide orchestrated by Hutu hardliners.

In this chapter we argue that a predominant concern in many contemporary European crime novels is the consolidation of a democratic culture that protects the rights of citizens and upholds the rule of law. Drawing on a wide range of literary texts from across the continent, we analyse this overall ambition via three of its major manifestations: democratization as seen most clearly in post-dictatorial transitional societies, the treatment of immigrants as an indicator of inclusiveness and social equality and the honest discussion of the national past as the foundation for a healthy democratic culture. What these three themes have in common is that they embody our greatest social aspirations while at the same time being vulnerable to horrific criminal aberrations, which is why crime fiction is a particularly apt medium for analysing and understanding them. This duality forms the basis of one of the master narratives of European crime fiction: the story of how the unsettling and often dangerous process of uncovering crime is the precondition for a more perfect democratic society.

Political transitions in a multiethnic setting are often marred with violence between groups. Why does ethnocommunal violence during a country’s democratic transition erupt in some places, and not others? Why does it subsequently decline? Existing explanations typically focus on the weakness of state capacity, the power struggle between political candidates around elections, or the structural factors such as economic inequality between groups. However, in many countries in transition, administrative units with similar characteristics have varying levels of violence. In this book, I build on Albert O. Hirschman’s framework of exit, voice, and loyalty, and I argue that excluded local elites mobilize violence to leverage their demands for greater inclusion in local politics during democratic transition. When these demands are accommodated, violence will decline. This chapter provides an overview of my theory, contributions to related literature, methodological approaches, key findings, and plan of the book.

The post-apartheid ANC government took pride in repurposing the country as a modern, democratic state and promoted a vision of science and technology for the common good. Astronomy was a particular beneficiary of the new dispensation. The Southern African Large Telescope at Sutherland was part of the dividend resulting from the country’s transition to democracy and the decommissioning of nuclear weaponry. Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, advocated national renewal through an ‘African Renaissance’ that promoted both indigenous knowledge and scientific ambition. Mbeki’s suspicion of the authority of Western science and his Africanist affinities impelled him to intervene in the controversy surrounding HIV/AIDS and to support AIDs denialism. It has often been alleged that Mbeki was caught between ‘indigenous’ and ‘Western’ knowledge, yet his scientific legacy was more complex. In fields such as ethno-botany, for instance, there is evidence of complementary research in post-apartheid South Africa between scientists and carriers of African knowledge of plant medicines. The process of developing a new spirit of ‘South Africanism’ in the post-apartheid rainbow nation meant greater openness to South Africa’s position as an African nation, while also inviting bids leadership of Africa through ‘big science’ initiatives like astronomy and Antarctic research.

This chapter provides an account of the sudden rise in demand for intermediaries in Myanmar after the opening up of the country to foreign aid and influence. It focuses on the competitive ‘market’ for rule of law intermediaries, showing how individuals have reinvented themselves as consultants, NGO leaders, and employees for international organisations and then how central are personality and linguistic ability when it comes to getting selected by foreign actors, as well as the important difference between often reluctant governmental intermediaries and those operating non-governmentally. The chapter also adds structure to the picture; these questions are significant because they reveal structural aspects of development aid as it operates in the rule of law sphere: for example, who gets to be included, who gets to exert influence, and why. The chapter concludes that intermediaries emerge because foreign development actors need the assistance of individuals who understand their aims and objectives, to navigate unfamiliar systems, and to reach out to potential counterparts as intermediaries of the rule of law.

This chapter develops a new theoretical framework that explains the role played by state agents in the constitution of organized criminal groups (OCGs) and why electoral politics can become a decisive factor for peace and violence in the criminal underworld. The gray zone of criminality is introduced as the ecological space where the state and crime intersect and corrupt members of state security forces and criminals give rise to OCGs.The gray zone often emerges in authoritarian regimes, where autocrats allow state specialists in violence to regulate, protect, and profit from the criminal underworld in exchange for their loyalty. When countries transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, and postauthoritarian elites fail to reform the military and the police and to dismantle state–criminal networks, democratic mechanisms become intertwined with criminal violence. Electoral competition, party alternation, and the decentralization and fragmentation of political power introduce uncertainty in the gray zone, stimulating criminal rivalry, wars, and large-scale violence. We use these definitions and propositions to explain the outbreak and escalation of inter-cartel wars in Mexico.