This article reflects on the dynamics that underlay the circulation of military technology during the early modern phase of globalization. The debate on the development and transfer of gunpowder weaponry has been dominated by a grid of analysis which implicitly puts value on sovereign production and direct state control over the resources used for war. Focusing on the transfer of naval artillery between Europe and Asia, the article argues for the need to expand the scope of analysis of the contractor state, so far centred on Europe, and study the potential world-scale of the market for naval resources and services in the period between 1500 and 1750. It also highlights the need to replace the reading of technological transfers centred on nation-states by a more fluid and transnational vision which articulates the demand stemming from both states and non-state actors and the rise of regional clusters specialized in providing naval technology with competitive levels of prices, in an age of increasingly interconnected maritime economies. Therefore, the article aims to show why naval artillery, despite being a protagonist of old imperialistic narratives, is still a relevant object of study for the agenda of global history.

Aerial visuals play a central – and increasing – role in military operations, informing military decision-makers in real time. While adding relevant and time-sensitive information, these visuals construct an imperfect representation of people and spaces, placing additional burdens on decision-makers and creating a persuasive – yet misleading – virtual representation of the actual conditions on the ground. Based on interdisciplinary analysis of critical security studies, behavioural economics and international law literature, as well as rich data from US and Israeli military investigations into four military operations spanning from 2009 to 2021, this article identifies three types of challenges stemming from the mounting reliance on aerial visuals to inform military operations: technical challenges, relating to the technical capabilities and features of aerial vision technologies; cognitive challenges, relating to decision-making biases affecting human decision-makers; and human-technological challenges, relating to the human–machine interaction itself. The article suggests ways to mitigate these challenges, improve the application of the law of armed conflict, and protect people, animals and the environment during armed conflicts.

Almost all technology is dual use to some degree: it has both civilian and military applications. This feature creates a dilemma for cooperation. States can design arms control institutions to curtail costly competition over some military technology. But they also do not want to limit valuable civilian uses. How does the dual use nature of technology shape the prospects for cooperation? We argue that the duality of technology presents a challenge not by its very existence but rather through the ways it alters information constraints on the design of arms control institutions. We characterize variation in technology along two dual use dimensions: (1) the ease of distinguishing military from civilian uses; and (2) the degree of integration within military enterprises and the civilian economy. Distinguishability drives the level of monitoring needed to detect violations. When a weapon is indistinguishable from its civilian counterpart, states must improve detection though intelligence collection or intrusive inspections. Integration sharpens the costs of disclosing information to another state. For highly integrated technology, demonstrating compliance could expose information about other capabilities, increasing the security risks from espionage. Together, these dimensions generate expectations about the specific information problems states face as they try to devise agreements over various technologies. We introduce a new qualitative data set to assess both variables and their impact on cooperation across all modern armament technologies. The findings lend strong support for the theory. Efforts to control emerging technologies should consider how variation in the dual use attributes shapes this tension between detection and disclosure.

This contribution reflects on the development of informal expert manuals in the field of the laws of armed conflict. These manuals are presented as restating existing customary law, perhaps adding a few elements de lege ferenda but not having a straightforward normative intent. The authors of expert manuals state them to be non-binding, and their drafting takes place mostly in self-appointed groups. Although a normative intent may be absent when drafting such informal expert manuals, such rules may obtain normative effect nevertheless. While States are mostly absent in these processes, they seem to have a specific interest in the development of these manuals.

Military technology has developed rapidly in recent years, and this development challenges existing norms. It has produced countless debates about the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to areas of war and technology including cyber military operations, military artificial intelligence (including autonomous weapons), the use of drones, and military human enhancement. Despite these rapid progressions, the prospect of creating new treaties to specifically regulate their use by militaries and in armed conflicts is very low. This is largely due to the unequal allocation of military technology among States and the differing interests that result from this inequality. The absence of formal regulation means that State and non-State actors are increasingly embracing informal means of law-making. This is similar to other areas of IHL, such as the regulation of asymmetric conflicts, where norms are contested. In such cases, State and non-State actors employ various informal law-making techniques to advance their normative positions through treaty interpretation and the identification of customary international law.

However, the discussion on military technology differs from other contemporary IHL debates. First, due to the rapid development of such technology and uncertainty about how it will be employed in practice, the interests of the various actors are less clear. Second, there are significant challenges in obtaining accurate information about new military technologies. This makes even the informal law-making path in the context of new technologies more challenging.

This paper explores the dynamics of contemporary international law-making as it relates to the regulation of new military technologies. It identifies the main techniques that are used by the relevant actors and explores the common themes among the various debates over military technology, as well as the potential specific challenges in relation to certain technologies.

This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Advances in military technology have led many, including the developers of such technology, to propose new regulation. International lawyers have extensively examined the adequacy of the existing law to address emerging technology, but they have devoted relatively little attention in these analyses to the prior development of the law as a result of, or despite, technological change. This essay highlights two challenges that those wishing to undertake such an exercise might encounter. The first of these is the general paucity of serious engagement with the history of international law applicable in armed conflicts and the perpetuation of a particular “origin myth” of international humanitarian law. The second challenge has to do with the controversies about the impact of technology on society in general, and the impact of military technology on warfare in particular. Nevertheless, the essay concludes by pointing towards some of the insight that might be gained from a more history-conscious analysis of the relationship between technology and law in the military context.

This article identifies five factors that will shape the legal implications of the use of autonomous military systems. It contends that the systems which present legal challenges are those programmed to “make decisions” that are regulated by law. In so doing, they transfer control of, and responsibility for, those decisions away from those who have been traditionally seen as decision-makers to persons responsible for developing and deploying the system. The article also suggests that there may be limits to the extent to which the rules of international humanitarian law can appropriately regulate the altered relationship between soldiers and their increasingly autonomous weapon systems.

Recent excavations at La Bastida in south-eastern Spain have revealed an impressive stone-built fortification system dating to 2200–2100 cal BC that protected one of the main economic and political centres of Argaric Early Bronze Age society. It consists of parallel walls with projecting towers flanking a narrow entrance passage. The defensive character of these structures appears beyond question and their design suggests they were a response to significant changes in warfare and weaponry in this period. This sophisticated fortification system raises once again the question of possible Mediterranean contacts, along with social change and the role of physical violence in the rise of Argaric society.

As recently as 2001, there were few lengthy discussions in English on the Imjin Waeran (Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea) aside from William George Aston's contribution to the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (‘Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea’) from the 1870s and 1880s and a clutch of articles. The last nine years, though, have seen an extraordinary production of published works and the appearance of translations of primary sources, some full, some partial, some finished, and some on the way. Stephen Turnbull's Samurai Invasion appeared in 2002. Just three years later, in 2005, Samuel Hawley published The Imjin War, and now we have Kenneth M. Swope's A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's Tail. The three books are each written from the perspective of the three main belligerents: Turnbull working from Japanese sources, Hawley from a Korean perspective, and Swope from Ming sources. These three offer detailed narratives on the war and allow English-language scholarship to set aside general narrative in favour of specific research agendas.