Catastrophe insurance markets fail to provide sufficient protections against natural catastrophes, whereas they have the capacity to absorb the losses. In this paper, we assume the catastrophic risks are dependent and extremely heavy-tailed, and insurers have limited liability to cover losses up to a certain amount. We provide a comprehensive study to show that the diversification in the catastrophe insurance markets can be transited from suboptimal to preferred by increasing the number of insurers in the market. This highlights the importance of coordination among insurers and the government intervention in encouraging insurers to participate in the catastrophe insurance market to exploit risk sharing. Simulation studies are provided to illuminate the key findings of our results.

This paper reconstructs the history of the reform of Britain’s company laws during the 1850s and makes three major arguments. First, the Law Amendment Society was the driving force for reform and organized the campaign for change. Second, the advancement of working-class interests and ideas of fairness were central to the conceptualization of these reforms and the course of their advocacy. Company law reform was broadly conceived to include the revision of the law of partnership, corporations, and cooperatives to create a level playing field in which smaller entrepreneurs could compete against established capitalists. Finally, central to this campaign was the institutional logic of “fair competition.” Socialists and liberals both used this logic, demonstrating how moral ideas can shape organizational change.

I investigate the historical development of limited liability – widely considered a cornerstone of the business corporation – and challenge the commonplace linear narratives about how limited liability evolved. I dismiss the claim that limited liability was invented with the very first joint-stock business corporations around 1600. I also reject the assertion that it became dominant with the limited liability acts of the mid-19th century. My argument is that it was only around 1800 that limited liability became a separate corporate attribute, distinct from legal personality, and that limited liability in the modern sense became a uniform attribute of all corporations only in the 20th century. Since corporations, stock markets and the corporate economy enjoyed a long and prosperous history well before limited liability in its modern sense became established and dominant, the economic theory of limited liability needs to be revisited. The paper opens a new set of conceptual, empirical and theoretical research questions, and points to new possibilities in terms of viable future liability regimes.

The purpose of this symposium is to shed light on the genealogy of the idea of a business corporation, an economic institution which has long been regarded with a mixture of awe and apprehension. Each of the four original contributions addresses the history of some of its key features. In the process, each contributor reveals some of the insights that history has to teach us regarding the central concepts that inform contemporary debates about the nature of the corporation, the contours of the corporation's purpose, the sources of corporate power, the functions of corporate law, the duties of directors, the status of shareholders, and the legitimacy of corporate rights.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate – in an argumentative style – that once we refrain from the usual neoclassical assumptions and integrate transaction costs, imperfect foresight and bounded rationality into present neoclassical (spot and futures) market theory, we get a more realistic perception of the decentralisation of intertemporal economic decision making. The failure of most futures markets for goods and services is compensated by firms (‘hierarchies’), which are led by entrepreneurs in the sense of Knight (1921) who may be seen as surrogate forward traders of goods and services. We claim that the ‘more realistic assumptions’ of New Institutional Economics, inter alia, provide a better perception of what takes place behind the veil of ‘money and finance’ than neoclassical economics, and why it makes sense to occasionally limit liability and, as a consequence, apply forms of private or public regulation. It might also help to explain some aspects of the financial crisis of 2008.

This article examines the general characteristics of limited liability principles and exemptions to limited liability introduced for creditor protection in Turkish Law. In the first section, it examines the general application of limited liability in the Turkish Commercial Code. In the second section, it examines the exemptions to limited liability introduced by case law and statutory laws. This work concentrates on recent developments that might attract interest at international level by broadening the discussion in the area of limited liability. Thus, this article does not cover every exemption. The chosen examples introduce fundamental and controversial exemptions to the limited liability principle. The third section of the article examines the future of limited liability in Turkish law by examining the Draft Commercial Reform Bill. As the Draft Bill introduces some exemptions to limited liability in corporate groups, the issue is examined in detail as a special concern.

Protection of corporate creditors has become an important topic within the European Union. At EU level, discussion has been sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with some very rigid and cumbersome provisions, and even with the whole concept of the Second Company Law Directive. At EU Member State level, three landmark decisions by the European Court of Justice – Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art – opened the way for an all-out competition between the different company forms provided for by national company laws. At both levels, albeit for different reasons, British company law – and in particular the absence of any legal capital in the private limited company – acts as the main driving force putting pressure on the concept of legal capital as enshrined in the Second Directive, which in turn was modeled on German company law notions.

The High Level Group of Company Law Experts provided the appropriate starting point for the present discussion by dealing not only with the raising and maintenance of capital, but by also taking up the wrongful trading remedy (s. 214 British Insolvency Act) and the equitable subordination remedy. This present article builds upon this broader approach, seeking to develop a conceptual framework for an efficient creditor protection regime within a purely national setting, i.e., leaving aside the additional problems created by pseudo-foreign companies and the impact of the provisions of the EU Treaty for the free movement of companies on national company laws.

Given the rich variety of creditor protection mechanisms within EU Member States, any attempt at developing even a high-level framework has to start by identifying the relevant risks against which creditors need protection and the required extent of such protection. Against this backdrop, any jurisdiction has to make a choice whether to rely mostly on creditor self-help or on mandatory protection rules. In principle, since all mechanisms for creditor self-help are inherently costly and fail to protect involuntary (tort) creditors and “weak” contractual creditors as effectively as they do “strong” contractual creditors, there is a case for mandatory protection rules. The article then goes on to review the different well-known mechanisms for mandatory creditor protection. In line with earlier findings and the criticism mostly from English scholars, the case for a German-style legal capital regime turns out to be weak, at best.

On the other hand, since shareholders' incentive to act to the detriment of creditors increases with the company becoming financially distressed, it is important to provide for mechanisms that will work to effectively control any opportunistic behavior on the shareholder's part. In this respect, equitable subordination of a shareholder's right as well as the wrongful trading remedy may serve important roles. The article concludes by taking a brief look at the resultant high-level framework for an efficient creditor protection regime.

La loi limite la responsabilité des salariés même lorsque ces derniers disposent de suffisamment de fonds propres pour supporter une punition de la part de leur employeur en cas de sinistre grevant la production. Un modèle d'agence généralisée est analysé afin de montrer que ce type de législation, bien que censé accroître le bien-être de tous les salariés, peut nuire aux individus les plus productifs. Imposer une contrainte de responsabilité limitée sur les niveaux de rémunération peut entraîner un effet pervers lorsque les agents les plus productifs, en participant au financement d'un fond couvrant la responsabilité limitée de tous, subventionnent ainsi les agents les moins productifs.

This article argues that in analysing the efficiency of the German legal capital rules, it is helpful to distinguish carefully between three different aspects: the question of whether the law should impose a minimum legal capital requirement, the relevance of provisions in the articles of incorporation pertaining to the legal capital of the company as a collective offer to the company's creditors, and the role of legal capital rules in limiting distributions prior to the company's insolvency. The existence of a minimum legal capital requirement, while it may not be particularly burdensome to serious-minded entrepreneurs, does not do much to help creditors. The second aspect, namely, the role of provisions in the articles of incorporation pertaining to the legal capital of the company as a collective offer to the company's creditors, is far more important. It explains why the traditional system of capital protection constitutes an efficient contractual instrument facilitating the entrepreneurial activities of companies. Most importantly, however, legal capital rules are the most efficient way of limiting distributions prior to the company's insolvency, providing less room for manipulation than the ad hoc solvency tests used in Anglo-American legal systems.