Energy transition in the European Union (EU) and its Member States involves questions of federalism, which are subject to various perspectives. The distribution of powers cannot be properly understood using classical legal methodology alone because Articles 192 to 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain too many ambiguous political compromises. On the one hand, Article 192(1) TFEU (on the environment) and Article 194(1) and (2)(1) TFEU (on energy) enable EU legislation on energy transition through the ordinary legislative procedure, including majority voting in the European Parliament and the Council. On the other hand, there are significant textual limits for EU action in neighbouring provisions with a ‘sovereignty exception’ for the Member States in both Article 192(2) and Article 194(2)(2) TFEU. This article argues that, in the light of the Paris Agreement, the allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States should, in case of doubt, be understood in such a way that effective climate protection becomes possible. Because under Article 191(1) TFEU the EU is to promote measures at the international level to combat climate change, such an international law-friendly interpretation is part of a legitimate teleological approach. Economic theories of federalism and innovation research in the social sciences help us to understand which aspects of economic or innovation theory can promote effectiveness in this respect. It is necessary to interpret the distribution of competences in a dynamic way, thereby slightly shifting the limits of interpretation.

In 2008, Lord Reed in his paper ‘Foreign precedents and judicial reasoning: the American debate and British practice’ noted the lack of full scholarly consideration of judicial comparativism in the UK. Ten years later, judicial reference to foreign judgments is still a very common phenomenon in this jurisdiction, however very little has been written about it. This paper assesses the UK Supreme Court's constitutional law jurisprudence in light of the main themes and arguments underlying the international debate concerning judicial comparativism. I argue that: (i) the use of foreign law is constitutionally legitimate where clear statutory language is respected; (ii) transferability concerns are mitigated by the interwovenness of the global common law system; and (iii) methodology concerns are mitigated by the UK Supreme Court's flexible, humble approach, which applies careful scrutiny to the foreign authorities put before it. Foreign judgments, I conclude, are never followed blindly or arbitrarily, and perhaps this is why there is no domestic debate about judicial comparativism, not even in the constitutional sphere.

This essay provides a commentary on the ongoing discussion of the relationship between the two legal regimes and attendant paradigms of hostilities and law enforcement in armed conflict. The discussion has, to an extent, taken the form of a disconnect between the IHL and IHRL communities. In order to get past this, a plea is made here to apply basic well established tools of legal methodology, to apply both regimes within their respective scope of application and to utilise common sense in determining which regime is the most relevant to a particular situation. This is in the interest of legal coherence and maintaining respect for the law, as well as in the interest of the persons the law is meant to protect.

The concept of transnational environmental law is used descriptively and prescriptively to refer to a multitude of legal processes which are distinct from transnational law in other legal areas. Hence, the rise of transnational environmental law requires environmental lawyers to reflect on their skills and knowledge and to foster both their contributory and interactional expertise in this area. That process of fostering expertise needs to be seen in light of a number of intellectual challenges, including the necessity to engage with comparative environmental law methodology, the need to not privilege one legal system over others, the need to engage with extended legal pluralism, the importance of thinking about the role of language in legal processes, and the significance of understanding the process of co-production.