Cooperatives are a promising link that can coalesce subdisciplines such as agrarian, labor, economic, and social history. This article reassesses the significance of cooperatives in the agrarian and social history of South Asia. It provides a broad sketch of the major historical developments—legal, economic, and social—in India up to 1970, emphasizing the continuity between the colonial and postcolonial periods in terms of state engagement with cooperatives. The article goes on to discuss the existing historiography regarding the cooperative movement on the subcontinent, arguing for the substitution of the prevailing notion of failure with a more historically grounded and nuanced approach that takes into consideration the broader economic context, as well as social stratification and inequality. Finally, some promising avenues—including, but not limited to, organizational economics, bottom-up social and cultural history, and global history—are suggested for the future historiography of cooperatives in South Asia.

Concentrating on the connection between the cooperative movements in colonial India and Ghana, the article has two aims. First, it counters the diffusionist story portraying the cooperative institution as indigenous to Europe, from where it was exported to the rest of the world. Second, it draws attention to the contribution and overall importance of cooperatives in the global market economy. Pursuing these two aims, and following a review of the existing literature, the article discusses the development of the cooperative movement in British India between 1900 and 1950. It then turns to the global establishment of the Indian experience as a role model for other colonial regions, notably West Africa. The article then considers the practical implementation of cooperatives in the Gold Coast and Ashanti (both now in Ghana) around 1930, and their development until 1955. Finally, based on the two main cases, as well as on the Cooperative Wholesale Society in Britain, it explores the economic function of cooperatives beyond national particularities, and tentatively analyses the relation of the institution to the broader forces of capitalism.

As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors; The monthly bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bargaining strength of the processors in all twelve months, ranging from a low of 0.6664 in January to a high of 0.7831 in September. The monthly average bargaining strength across all months for SDC is 0.7326.

This article evaluates the effects of alternative fluid milk procurement strategies on the aggregate net revenue of Florida cooperative members. They are (1) supplemental milk obtained from import sources, (2) supplemental milk obtained from a supply plant, (3) increased supply as a result of an expanded production area, and (4) supplemental milk obtained through pooling arrangements with regional dairy cooperatives. The final ranking of a scenario appears to be dependent primarily on the total cost of exports within the model. The optimum procurement strategy for Florida cooperatives should concentrate on reducing the quantity of surplus milk.

Producer-owned business models are rapidly evolving. Producer-owned, value-added ventures face a number of organizational challenges, including capital acquisition, security exchange registration, antitrust exemption, borrowing eligibility, and operational flexibility. This paper examines the success of evolving producer-owned business models in addressing these challenges. The need for uniform criteria to distinguish producer-owned business from other business forms throughout the complex structure of policies and laws affecting value-added ventures is highlighted.

The transition from agricultural producer to agribusiness entrepreneur is littered with obstacles not associated with traditional farming operations. Producers are typically faced with an established market for their products as well as defined production practices and budgets. These familiar industry institutions are not available for use in the agribusiness environment. As a result, entrepreneurs are faced with new, unfamiliar situations that can significantly affect the success of their proposed or fledgling business.

This article analyzes the contractual relationship between a wine cooperative (winery) and its member (growers). This relationship is plagued by moral hazard and adverse selection problems in grape quality. Indeed, growers can be opportunistic since the cooperative is unable to observe: (1) their effort level due to imperfect monitoring technology; and (2) their productive abilities (types) due to adverse selection. Because the growers' vineyard practices and efforts are one of the main determinants of grape quality, the cooperative implements an incentive compensation system to induce growers to make the maximum effort toward the achievement of quality. This compensation scheme is similar to that in tournaments (Green and Stokey, 1983; Knoeber, 1989; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999). In our case, the cooperative promotes competition between growers by offering a promotion to a higher-quality contract, while, at the same time, organizing the contest by creating homogeneous groups of growers using a menu of contracts and monitoring through regular visits to the vineyard. Using a database of 1,219 contracts, we test the effect of: (1) the cooperative's tournament compensation scheme; (2) the menu of contracts and monitoring mechanism. The results of our econometric estimations provide some confirmation of both effects. (JEL classifications: L14, D82, Q13)

Supported by policy-makers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), coffee farmer organizations obtain organic and Fairtrade certifications to upgrade their coffee and, thus, increase returns to their members. Whether this and other upgrading strategies fit into the business model of the cooperative and lead to success are often not considered. This research aims to identify similarities and differences between conventional and certified cooperatives and the resultant impact on farmers' incomes. We analyze the business models, upgrading strategies, and strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of seven conventional, organic and Organic-Fairtrade certified coffee cooperatives and link these to members' coffee gross margins. We use data from over 100 in-depth qualitative interviews and a household survey of 327 cooperative members in northern Nicaragua. Results indicate that cooperatives often apply the same upgrading strategies despite very different business models and SWOT. There are also many commonalities of SWOT among cooperatives but no clear-cut differences between conventional, organic and Organic-Fairtrade certified cooperatives. The qualitative comparison of coffee gross margins among the cooperatives shows no clear income effect from participating in certified coffee production and certified cooperatives. It indicates, rather, dependence of gross margins on yield levels, the business model and upgrading strategies of the cooperatives. Upgrading through certification seems only successful with a suitable business model and other upgrading strategies. Policies should focus on (i) increasing as well as stabilizing coffee yields, and (ii) on the institutional framework of cooperatives by offering strategic support, credit access, external auditing of cooperatives and the establishment of a functional national coffee institute.

Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative's «business» characteristics. In this paper, we trace the Spanish cooperative's legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.

Intermediate constructs are required as bridges between complex behaviors and realistic models of neural circuitry. For cognitive scientists in general, schemas are the appropriate functional units; brain theorists can work with neural layers as units intermediate between structures subserving schemas and small neural circuits.

After an account of different levels of analysis, we describe visuomotor coordination in terms of perceptual schemas and motor schemas. The interest of schemas to cognitive science in general is illustrated with the example of perceptual schemas in high-level vision and motor schemas in the control of dextrous hands.

Rana computatrix, the computational frog, is introduced to show how one constructs an evolving set of model families to mediate flexible cooperation between theory and experiment. Rana computatrix may be able to do for the study of the organizational principles of neural circuitry what Aplysia has done for the study of subcellular mechanisms of learning. Approach, avoidance, and detour behavior in frogs and toads are analyzed in terms of interacting schemas. Facilitation and prey recognition are implemented as tectal-pretectal interactions, with the tectum modeled by an array of tectal columns. We show how layered neural computation enters into models of stereopsis and how depth schemas may involve the interaction of accommodation and binocular cues in anurans.

Les espaces de visualisation immersive se développent dans de nombreux secteurs de la recherche et de l'industrie où ils s'intègrent de plus en plus dans les chaînes de décision, de développement ou de production. Se pose alors la question délicate de l'utilisation optimale des applications logicielles dans ces environnements. Dans cette étude, nous définirons tout d'abord une séance de travail immersive et ses contraintes en termes d'interaction. Nous passerons ensuite en revue les nombreuses solutions matérielles et logicielles déjà proposées pour repousser les limites du modèle du clavier et de la souris. Puis, à partir d'une synthèse des besoins industriels de commande des applications, nous proposerons d'imiter un modèle d'interacteur très usuel qui a fait ses preuves en utilisation domestique : la télécommande. Nous présenterons enfin le prototype que nous avons implémenté sur la base d'un assistant personnel numérique de type PocketPC connecté à un réseau radio sans fil et la bibliothèque de classes C++ associée qui permet de l'utiliser très rapidement dans n'importe quelle application.