Carbon neutrality cannot be achieved without different economic sectors, individuals and households, and the government making serious efforts. Green finance in different forms including environmental, social and governance investment and carbon emissions trading are used to measure the reduction in carbon emissions and place a monetary value on them. However, because of inconsistencies or even manipulation in the monitoring/measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of air quality and carbon emissions data, the effectiveness of green finance has been largely compromised. Environmental MRV is a technology-based engineering task, which is also heavily impacted by institutional design and professionalism. This commentary will draw upon principal–agent theory and the practical arrangements of environmental MRV to discuss why professionalism is badly needed and how to bridge the missing link for achieving carbon neutrality and sustainability transitions.

Examining oral argument in the Australian High Court and comparing to the U.S. Supreme Court, this article shows that institutional design drives judicial interruptive behavior. Many of the same individual- and case-level factors predict oral argument behavior. Notably, despite orthodoxy of the High Court as “apolitical,” ideology strongly predicts interruptions, just as in the United States. Yet, important divergent institutional design features between the two apex courts translate into meaningful behavioral differences, with the greater power of the Chief Justice resulting in differences in interruptions. Finally, gender effects are lower and only identifiable with new methodological techniques we develop and apply.

Competition policy is one important aspect of trade liberalization. However, when examining preferential trade agreements (PTAs), a major type of policy tools to liberalize trade, competition provisions are revealed not to be uniformly distributed across these treaties. What explains the variation in the design of competition clauses in PTAs? Borrowing insights from the rational design of international institutions and combining them with those from treaty ratification and policy diffusion literatures, I identify five major causal mechanisms through which competition provisions are incorporated into PTAs. In evaluating them, I employ a range of operationalization techniques to capture the proposed mechanisms. A treaty-level analysis of 319 PTAs over the period 1960–2015 lends strong and robust support to most of the hypothesized relationships. By integrating theoretical frameworks across international political economy literatures with that from law and economics scholarship, this study demonstrates the utility of political science thinking to the real-world international law-making.

Economic accounts of repugnance concern two broad questions: the rationalisation of sentiments of repugnance (do emotional and visceral reactions of repugnance track valid reasons for not engaging in or condemning certain (trans)actions?) and institutional design (how to institute, regulate, or restrict markets in response to reasonable objections). If repugnance expresses valid practical reasons for regulating or limiting markets, our institutions should acknowledge and express these. If attitudes of repugnance are not rationalisable in the sense of instrumental or moral values, we should disregard or eventually counteract or reduce them. Focusing on a special case of repugnance, when commodification, i.e., the sale of goods or services for money meets societal disapproval, this paper identifies three characteristic ways to combine conceptual, empirical, and normative arguments and map repugnance into a disciplinary ‘epistemic frame’ of economics: repugnance as taste; repugnance as proxy for market failures or moral reasons; repugnance as hypocrisy or contingent cultural fact. Correspondingly, economists advise to (1) work around; (2) make sense of; and (3) explain away people's sentiments of repugnance.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) uses a chamber system to more efficiently decide cases. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the CJEU’s chamber system undermine the consistency of the Court’s application of EU law? This paper contributes to the literature on the internal organization of collegial courts by presenting a computational formal model that predicts (a) that hearing cases in smaller chambers undermines the consistency of the Court’s application of EU law and (b) that the magnitude of this effect is larger when judges’ preferences are more heterogeneous and smaller when plaintiffs strategically bring cases. Based on these findings, I use machine learning and empirical data on CJEU judgments in infringement cases to estimate the degree to which we should expect the chamber system to undermine the consistency of the CJEU’s application of EU law in practice.

Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) observed that macro-level patterns do not necessarily reflect micro-level intentions, desires or goals. In his classic model on neighborhood segregation which initiated a large and influential literature, individuals with no desire to be segregated from those who belong to other social groups nevertheless wind up clustering with their own type. Most extensions of Schelling’s model have replicated this result. There is an important mismatch, however, between theory and observation, which has received relatively little attention. Whereas Schelling-inspired models typically predict large degrees of segregation starting from virtually any initial condition, the empirical literature documents considerable heterogeneity in measured levels of segregation. This paper introduces a mechanism that can produce significantly higher levels of integration and, therefore, brings predicted distributions of segregation more in line with real-world observation. As in the classic Schelling model, agents in a simulated world want to stay or move to a new location depending on the proportion of neighbors they judge to be acceptable. In contrast to the classic model, agents’ classifications of their neighbors as acceptable or not depend lexicographically on recognition first and group type (e.g., ethnic stereotyping) second. The FACE-recognition model nests classic Schelling: When agents have no recognition memory, judgments about the acceptability of a prospective neighbor rely solely on his or her group type (as in the Schelling model). A very small amount of recognition memory, however, eventually leads to different classifications that, in turn, produce dramatic macro-level effects resulting in significantly higher levels of integration. A novel implication of the FACE-recognition model concerns the large potential impact of policy interventions that generate modest numbers of face-to-face encounters with members of other social groups.

International organizations come in many shapes and sizes. Within this institutional gamut, the multipurpose multilateral intergovernmental organization (MMIGO) plays a central role. This institutional form is often traced to the creation of the League of Nations, but in fact the first MMIGO emerged in the Western Hemisphere at the close of the nineteenth century. Originally modeled on a single-issue European public international union, the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics evolved into the multipurpose, multilateral Pan American Union (PAU). Contrary to prominent explanations of institutional genesis, the PAU's design did not result from functional needs nor from the blueprints of a hegemonic power. Advancing a recent synthesis between historical and rational institutionalism, we argue that the first MMIGO arose through a process of compensatory layering: a mechanism whereby a sequence of bargains over control and scope leads to gradual but transformative institutional change. We expect compensatory layering to occur when an organization is focal, power asymmetries among members of that organization are large, and preferences over institutional design diverge. Our empirical and theoretical contributions demonstrate the value a more global international relations (IR) perspective can bring to the study of institutional design. international relations (IR) scholars have long noted that international organizations provide smaller states with voice opportunities; our account suggests those spaces may be of smaller states’ own making.

How do face-to-face, assembly processes, and non-face-to-face, popular vote processes impact the decisions made by citizens? Normative discussions of the comparative merits of these two broad types of participatory decision-making processes partly rely on empirical assumptions concerning this question. In this paper, we test the central assumption that assemblies lead to decisions that are more widely supported by participants than popular votes. We do so by analyzing 1,400 decisions made through these processes on the highly salient issue of municipal mergers in Swiss municipalities since 1999. We find that assembly decisions are consistently made by larger majorities than popular vote decisions and that this relationship is significantly mediated by turnout. This suggests that higher levels of agreement in assemblies mainly result from selection biases – with fewer dissenting citizens participating in assemblies than in popular votes – rather than from internal dynamics in assemblies.

With the benefit of hindsight, much scholarship across political science, law, and economics has told the story of the international trade regime as if it had been pulled all along by a definite aim. By contrast, this article emphasizes the contingent aspects of the trade regime's development, looking especially to its dispute settlement mechanism. The very creation of the Appellate Body had by no means a certain outcome, and once created, the tribunal's evolution was largely unanticipated by states. An often-overlooked actor played a key role in that development: the WTO Secretariat. Drawing on recent findings, this article lays out the full extent of the Secretariat's role in dispute settlement, which remains largely hidden from view, and deliberately so. From appointing adjudicators and managing their remuneration, to providing them with legal arguments and drafting final rulings, the Secretariat of the WTO looms larger than in any comparable tribunal. Making its influence more transparent, I argue, would go a long way to returning the system to the shape it was designed to have at its outset.