In this article we explore the practical conditions of ritual practices of Hui and Uyghur Muslims in China. Ceaseless conflicts among different religious ideas and elements exist, but they are integrated into religious pluralism, which meets the needs of Muslims' daily practices. Furthermore, we probe the reasons for the resulting religious harmony through investigating the historical process of the formation of religious pluralism, and showing present ritual performances in which there is a hierarchically built ritual structure functioning to make religious integration possible, though different opinions regarding diverse religious elements occur elsewhere among Hui and Uyghur Muslims. Finally, the discussion supports the related assertion that rituals can be reliable and effective ways of understanding the sociological and psychological functions of religions, or religious beliefs, and other related socio-cultural realities.

Islamophobia, along with other forms of alt-right discourse and hate speech, is a well-documented phenomenon in the Euro-American world. Despite increasing scholarly attention in the West, however, research on Islamophobia in authoritarian regimes is more limited. Using content analysis of key online Islamophobic accounts, this paper shows that there are two distinct types of Islamophobic narratives in the Chinese cyberspace: a “confessional” narrative attributed to Uyghur authors, and a warning narrative specifically for Han readership, cautioning them about the hidden dangers posed by the Hui. This paper explores how these Islamophobic pieces share a Han-centric gaze where the Han, the majority-dominant group in China today, are placed in both a saviour role in terms of the Uyghurs, and a victim role as underdogs coming under attack from the Hui. The successful assimilation of the Hui has led to suspicion and narratives of betrayal, despite state efforts to promote Hui assimilation as a successful example of ethnic harmony. Whereas the Uyghurs are welcomed and accepted as long as they are willing to admit Han superiority, the Hui are rejected based on their perceived threat to Han dominance.

Although ethnic governance in the People's Republic of China is often portrayed as a matter of controlling “minority nationalities” in the country's frontier regions, the ethnic affairs bureaucracy operates in every province. The origins of “nationalities work” as a discrete domain of governance can be traced to the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to mobilize scattered Hui communities in the eastern provinces of Shandong and Hebei in the 1930s–1940s. Thanks to the initiative of Hui Communists, local Party leaders came to understand that Hui were not simply scattered but interconnected. They adapted and replicated organizational methods to exploit Hui networks for gathering intelligence, smuggling goods and penetrating enemy-controlled cities. This history offers an instructive case of adaptive governance in the revolutionary period and the role of ethnic minority cadres in policy entrepreneurship. It also underscores the importance of the Party's experience in eastern China in the study of Chinese ethnic policy.

In this paper, we examine the role played by religion in a struggle waged by Hui Muslim villagers against land expropriation. Religion can provide powerful resources for protest movements, especially for religious minorities, but it can also be dangerous. This is particularly true in China where the state has had little toleration of autonomous organization and has long been suspicious of religious organization, especially among ethnic minorities. Scholarly literature about collective action by religious minorities in China has focused on protests about cultural and political issues – and the repression of such protests – but there has been relatively little scholarship about protests by religious minorities over economic issues. The number of protests over economic conflicts has increased in recent years, and the state has been more tolerant of economic than of political protests. These conditions have shaped the following questions: what happens when villagers employ religious ideas and use religious organization to advance economic demands? How effective are religious ideas and organization as tools of mobilization? How do government authorities respond?

Objectives: There is relatively little evidence on the test–retest reliability of utility scores derived from multiattribute measures. The objective was to estimate test–retest reliability for Health Utilities Index Mark 2 (HUI2) and Mark 3 (HUI3) utility scores in patients recovering from hip fracture.

Methods: We enrolled an inception cohort of hip fracture patients within 3 to 5 days of surgery. Baseline assessments included the Functional Independence Measure (FIM™), Folstein Mini-Mental State Examinations, and the HUI2 and HUI3 questionnaire. Follow-up assessments at 1, 3, and 6 months also included a global change question. Test–retest reliability was assessed as agreement between 3- and 6-month scores using the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). Two approaches were used to classify patients as stable; a third approach based on the generalizability theory was also used. Patients were classified as stable if their FIM™ overall scores changed by 10 points or fewer and if they classified themselves as having experienced no or only a little change according to their global change question.

Results: Complete data at both the 3- and 6-month assessments based on self-report were available for 196 patients; 141 patients with complete data were classified as stable. The ICCs for HUI2 and HUI3 for stable patients were 0.71 and 0.72; the ICCs derived from the generalizability theory were 0.76 and 0.77.

Conclusions: Test–retest reliability for HUI in this cohort was similar to reliability estimates for other preference-based multiattribute and generic health-profile measures—in the acceptable range for making valid group-level comparisons.