Eurozone economies were the most adversely affected by the Global Financial Crisis, with forecast macroeconomic outcomes still highly uncertain. This article argues first that the Eurozone policy framework can be viewed as neo-liberalism overlaid with policy constraints associated with a mis-specified Optimum Currency Area. We are critical of this framework since it is incompatible with the policy sovereignty that is experienced, if not utilised, by sovereign economies such as the USA, UK and Australia. Second, recent and proposed policy reforms which generally lie within the constraints of the Eurozone framework are examined. We conclude that these policies are piecemeal and fail to restore policy sovereignty, which ultimately requires that member countries exit the Eurozone. Key issues associated with such an exit are briefly discussed.

Far from being an event of a decade ago, the 2008 global financial crisis is a manifestation of an ongoing crisis of the world order, with social, political and ecological dimensions that cannot be seen separately from each other. The root cause of the crisis can be traced back to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in August 1971, and the failure to design an equitable and inclusive global financial and economic governance architecture consistent with the changed global economic realities. The vacuum was quickly taken up by the neoliberal orthodoxy that pushed the agenda of wholesale liberalisation, resulting in unprecedented domination of speculative finance capital and multinational corporation–led globalisation. This has seen falling share of wages in national income, growing wealth concentration, rising income inequality and ballooning of household debts. The consequence was frequent and increasingly deeper and wider financial crises.

Our study of the day-to-day management of monetary policy in the Netherlands between 1925 and 1936 reveals that policy leaders and central bankers were both willing and able to deviate from the monetary policy paths set by other countries, all while remaining firmly within the gold bloc. The Netherlands wielded an independent monetary policy while remaining on gold thanks to its central bank's plentiful gold reserves. Central bankers quelled any speculation against the guilder by exploiting their domestic policy influence and international reputation to restrict capital mobility. However, maintaining pre-war parity until the collapse of the gold standard in September 1936 came at a cost. Our international comparisons and counterfactual analysis suggest that Dutch officials would have avoided a deepening of the Great Depression by leaving gold alongside the UK in 1931.

The Latin American debt crisis consumed the 1980s and was not restricted to Latin America. Starting from the August 1982 Mexican weekend, the crisis had three phases: Concerted Lending (1982-5), Baker Plan (1985-9) and Brady Plan (1989 to mid 1990s). This article describes the evolution of the debt strategy and the road to embracing debt write-downs at the end of the decade. In the absence of an external coordinating mechanism, four groups of parties had to reach agreement on any change in the strategy: the borrowing countries, their commercial bank lenders, the home-country authorities of those lenders, and the International Monetary Fund as the principal international institution. Each group could effectively veto any change in the strategy. This need for consensus is lesson number one from the 1980s for today. Lesson number two is that political economy aspects dictated that the strategy be implemented on a case-by-case basis. The article concludes with an application of these lessons to a similar, but even more global, potential debt crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic.

Between June 1959 and March 1964, the democratic governments of Brazilian presidents Juscelino Kubitschek (January 1956 – January 1961), Janio Quadros (January–August 1961), Ranieri Mazzilli (August–September 1961) and João ‘Jango’ Goulart (September 1961 – April 1964) received no support from the World Bank (WB), which refused to fund even a single new project during this period. During this same period, and, more specifically, between July 1958 and January 1965, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WB's twin institution, granted financial assistance to Brazil only twice: a controversial and highly conditional Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) signed in May 1961; and a non-conditional and automatically approved Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF), granted in May 1963 to compensate Brazil for the decrease in coffee prices on the international market.

This attitude towards Brazil changed significantly following the military coup of March 1964. Money flowed into the country and by 1970 Brazil had become the largest receiver of WB funds and a chronic borrower from the IMF, signing two SBAs in 1965, and one per year between 1966 and 1972. We use recently disclosed material from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank archives to analyse the relationship of these two institutions with Brazil and to foster the debate on their political neutrality, arguing that the difference in the IMF's and especially the WB's relations with the military regime reflected, more than anything else, the existence of an ideological affinity between the parties with regards to the ‘right’ economic policy.

This article examines the aftermath of the 1897 Riksbank Act in Swedish banking. The act placed banks with unlimited liability and those with limited liability on equal footing, removing the note-issuing privileges of the former. We consider whether changes in risk preferences occurred subsequent to the act, or whether extended liability was a sufficient deterrent. We conclude that when legal differences were removed, lower transaction costs for unlimited liability banks (ULBs) spurred aggressive competition, reflected in narrower interest spreads relative to limited liability banks (LLBs). ULBs also took on greater leverage and held less liquidity, which supports the Coasean interpretation that the shareholder liability regime mattered little. After 1897, ULB shareholders continued to receive higher dividends, enjoyed substantially superior returns on equity, and maintained an array of corporate governance controls to shield themselves against their additional risk.

The article considers crises of globalization: the 1840s, the 1870s, the Great War, the Great Depression, the Great Inflation (1970s), the Global Financial Crisis (2008) and the Great Lockdown (2020). Each led to a reshaping of the institutions that supervised or regulated economic development globally but also nationally. In each case, a series of questions are answered: what were the origins of the crisis, what were the monetary and fiscal policy responses, how did the crisis affect the drivers of globalization, trade, migration and capital flows? And how did these different challenges affect governance and views of politics? The article concludes that supply shocks are most easily dealt with by inflationary mechanisms, allowing groups to gain some apparent compensation for their losses through the supply shock. But the resulting mobilization into groups also strains social cohesion.

This article explores the global cycle hypothesis by testing whether the US stock market serves as an explanatory variable for the evolution of expansions and contractions in the UK stock market from 1922 until 2016. Alternatively, it tests an index that groups the stock markets of advanced economies to identify whether this driving force is international. Second, regarding co-movement with the US, the article explores whether its time-varying nature is contingent on the domestic and international economic policy regimes. I find evidence that there is a strong and contemporaneous co-movement between the US and UK stock markets. Additionally, through a VAR model, I identify that the movements in the UK stock market cause, in the Granger sense, changes in the index for advanced economies up to two years later. Furthermore, in the short-run co-movement between the US and UK stock markets is contingent on the macroeconomic trilemma while, in the long run, both domestic and international policy regimes affect the relationship. A final contribution is the design of a new methodology for describing the evolution of financial time series as risk-adjusted above or below average returns to different time horizons: the Local Bull Bear Indicators (LBBIs).

This article documents and analyses monetary reform in Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Romania from 1815 (Serbian autonomy within the Ottoman Empire) to 1910, when Greece became the last country in the region to join the gold standard. It explains the five key steps towards monetary reform which the four countries took in the same chronological order, and asks why national coinage and the foundation of a bank of note issue came late in the reform process. The South-East European countries tried to emulate West European prototypes, yet economic backwardness meant such institutions were often different from the outset, remained short-lived or both.

The British people voted for Brexit for a variety of reasons. A literature is emerging that seeks to explain the outcome using the increasing amount of aggregate and individual data being generated. Less often considered is the impact those factors that shaped the referendum outcome might continue to exert on the debate about the UK's future relationship with the EU. We argue that they will continue to weigh on political debates. The continued resonance of the Leave message militates against anything but what has come to be known as a ‘hard Brexit’.

This paper examines whether EU membership enhances or diminishes the UK's financial sector stability, and therefore its prominence in global finance. The UK is host to the largest share of financial services in the EU, despite being outside of the Eurozone. An important reason is that, as a member of the EU, the UK has direct access to the Eurozone's financial infrastructure. If the UK leaves the EU (and EEA) banks and other financial services firms may continue to have access to the Single Market, but they are unlikely to have direct access to the Eurozone's infrastructure. Banks in the UK will no longer be direct members the Eurozone's payments system. The swap arrangement between the European Central Bank and Bank of England would have no legal enforcement mechanism. Resolution of cross-border banks would be more challenging with less incentive for a cooperative outcome. While some may welcome the reduced size of the financial system, not without reason, this could be achieved more effectively with domestic regulation than by leaving the EU. Given the uncertainty that would follow a vote to leave, there is a risk of capital flight.

This paper considers which currency option would be best for an independent Scotland. We examine three currency options: being part of a sterling currency zone, adopting the euro, or having an independent currency. No currency option is the best when considered against all criteria. Therefore, making the decision requires deciding which criteria are most important. Recent events around the world, particularly in Europe, show that it is essential to consider how an independent Scotland would seek to adjust to adverse economic circumstances. In economists' terms, it is important to think through the ‘off-equilibrium’ adjustment paths of each of the currency options. The amount of public debt, and so the capacity for a fiscal response, is a critical determinant of these paths and therefore of the optimal currency choice. Since commitment to a currency union by an independent country can only be conditional, an independent Scotland might find it optimal to abandon the currency union in the future if the financial stability advantages to having its own currency begin to outweigh any disadvantages due to trade and transactions costs.

Korea has been a forerunner in incorporating macroprudential policies to mitigate the vulnerabilities from currency crises that can turn into a more generalised liquidity crisis. This paper examines longer-term design issues for a more resilient and stable financial system that could be expected to complement the existing macroprudential measures in achieving a more stable financial system. In particular, the paper examines the rationale and mechanics of a new public financial institution, provisionally called the Exchange Stabilisation and Guarantee Corporation (ESGC) whose main role is to buy dollar forward positions from Korean exporting companies who wish to hedge the currency exposure from long-term export orders. The ESGC is intended to mitigate the risks arising from the reliance on the role of the banking sector in providing currency hedging services to exporters. Rapid growth of short-term foreign currency denominated debt has been the result of banks receiving forward dollar sales by exporters, and then hedging the long dollar position by borrowing short in dollars. A public institution that can buy dollars forward, but which is designed so that there is no need to hedge by taking short dollar debt, can mitigate the rapid increase in short-term dollar debt in booms.

We identify similarities and differences in the scale and nature of the banking crises in 2008-9 and the Great Depression, and analyse differences in the policy response to the two crises in light of the prevailing international monetary systems. We find that the scale of the banking crisis, as measured by falls in international short-term indebtedness and total bank deposits, was smaller in 2008-9 than in 1931. However, central bank liquidity provision was larger in the flexible exchange rate environment of 2008-9 than in 1931, when it had been constrained in many countries by the gold standard.

Estimation and simulation of sustainable real exchange rates in a sample of EU member countries find vulnerabilities connected to the adoption of the euro if the rate vis-à-vis the euro were to be fixed with weak fundamentals and inappropriate policies. Sample countries have benefited from dramatic improvements in their external positions, in part driven by inflows of foreign direct investment. As a result, exchange rate misalignments have narrowed in most countries and, looking ahead, are expected to narrow further. These results are conditional, however, on optimistic projections with respect to world import demand and foreign direct investment inflows.

Dans un modèle à deux pays où on considère le policy-mix en réponse à des chocs, on examine la question de savoir si le gain résultant de la coordination des politiques budgétaires entre pays est plus élevé en union monétaire qu'en change flexible. On montre tout d'abord que l'asymétrie des chocs peut contribuer à rendre le gain d'une telle coordination plus élevé en union monétaire qu'en change flexible. On montre aussi que le poids accordé par la banque centrale à la stabilisation de l'inflation par rapport au produit agrégé s'avère aussi jouer un rôle. S'il est élevé, il peut contribuer à rendre ce gain plus élevé en union moné

L’article analyse la coopération monétaire en Europe comme une coalition (au sens de la théorie des jeux) au sein de l’économie mondiale. Le modèle de Canzoneri et Henderson sert de point de départ; il est enrichi, notamment par la prise en compte d’une fonction de création de la monnaie internationale, pour répondre à trois questions: La coordination des politiques monétaires européennes contribuera-t-elle à améliorer l’équilibre mondial, spécialement du point de vue de l’emploi? Quelles implications associer au refus d’accorder à l’objectif d’emploi une place explicite dans la formulation de la politique monétaire européenne conformément au traité de Maastricht? Quelles implications associer à la promotion de l’euro comme une monnaie internationale concurrente du dollar?

La présente étude traite de la question de I'union monétaire européenne é partir d'une approche empirique. L'objectif principal de l'étude est d'évaluer le degré d'asymétrie des chocs affectant un ensemble de huit pays européens stisceptibles de former le noyau d'une éventuelle union monétaire. Étant donné que la mesure qui importe le plus est le degré d'asymétrie des chocs réels, notre approche consiste à utiliser les fluctuations observées des taux de change réels comme un indicateur du degré d'asymétrie des chocs et d'en extraire les composantes réelles (qui sont permanentes) et nominales (qui sont transitoires) par le biais de l'information contenue dans le mouvement du taux de change nominal. La méthode de décomposition utilisée est celle recommendee par Blanchard et Quah [1989] et adapteé au cas des taux de change reels. De facon générate, les résultats démontrent que meme à court terme, les chocs réels constituent la principale source des fluctuations des taux de change réels. Les résultats suggérent également que l'Allemagne, les Pays-Bas et la Belgique pourraient former le noyau d'une union monétaire, alors que le Royaume-Uni et l'Espagne auraient à as-sumer des coûts d'ajustement importants. Quant aux autres pays inclus dans l'étude (la France, l'ltalie et la Suisse), ils représentent des cas intermédiaires.

L’article s’interroge sur les relations entre l’intégration monétaire européenne et la persistance de spécificités et d’un certain degré d’autonomie des marchés nationaux du travail, actuellement hétérogènes dans leurs structures institutionnelles, leur fonctionnement et leurs résultats. L’inspiration théorique trouve son origine dans la remarque de John Hicks selon laquelle les économies seraient passées, après 1932, de l’équivalent d’un «gold» standard, à un «labour» standard. L’intégration européenne désigne un changement de régime économique d’ampleur équivalente mais de sens opposé. Le fait que l’intégration monétaire précède très largement la charte sociale pose donc la question de la viabilité de relations professionnelles et des mécanismes nationaux de formation des revenus. En effet, il est peu de variables macroéconomiques nationales susceptibles de garantir le parallélisme des évolutions de prix et l’identité des taux d’intérêt, si ce n’est à relation salariale inchangée, des mouvements divergents du taux de chômage. Il faudrait donc réformer les relations professionnelles mais les partenaires sociaux ne seront pas nécessairement conduits à négocier des contrats salariaux compatibles avec les objectifs macroéconomiques associés à l’intégration européenne.