The article discusses the role for systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law. It does so by analyzing in depth that law as regards the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), but also across measures of EU criminal law that have not yet been explored under this light. While the attention of the literature has been mainly on the EAW and the way those deficiencies can led to refusing the execution of the warrant, a wider assessment reveals the existence of a latent law of the systemic and the particular in this field. The conclusions reveal that the understanding and application of systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law have significant implications in terms of the principle of mutual trust and the complex interaction between different EU values.

The general principle of effective judicial protection grants the right to obtain a remedy in the fields covered by EU law and is an essential component of the EU enforcement toolkit. Recent jurisprudential developments have complexified the role of this principle, by transforming it into a vehicle for the enforcement of the rule of law in the EU. As a result, the principle of effective judicial protection appears as the factotum of the EU legal system: it acts as a fundamental right and is an expression of the EU rule of law; furthermore, it is a legal basis to influence national fundamental rights and to impose procedural obligations on the EU institutions. This overview Article offers a novel account of the evolution of this principle in the EU legal landscape. First, it reflects on the trajectory of this evolving principle in the EU case law and in the academic discourse. Second, it identifies conceptual issues surrounding the role of effective judicial protection in the EU legal order in the light of the latest jurisprudential developments.

EU citizenship, now so central to the European Union's project, remains a highly contested concept in respect of its meaning, its scope, and its purpose. By considering the large body of legal texts and their travaux préparatoires from the 1972 Paris European Council until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, we have explored what the original drafters had in mind in developing the concept of EU citizenship and, crucially, what they did not. The article argues that the notion of European citizenship was seen as a tool to define European identity, and thus to continue the building of the European Union as a whole. European citizenship was thus viewed through a constitutional prism from the outset. The constitutional approach to the concept of European citizenship fed into the wider constitutionalisation project under the Maastricht Treaty and, later, permeated the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. We wish to argue that this focus on the constitutional nature of EU citizenship overlooked the more practical implications of citizenship, such as how to manage immigration flows or the infrastructure changes needed in the host state to accommodate a significant number of arrivals of EU citizens (in particular in respect of housing and social welfare benefits). It took more than 20 years after the introduction of EU citizenship for the Court of Justice to become aware of the practical, as opposed to constitutional, implications of the direction of travel it had pursued. By that time, it was too late for the United Kingdom, one of the countries which had received the largest number of EU citizens; the UK voted by a narrow margin to leave the European Union.

In multi-panelled higher jurisdictions, a larger, extended formation of judges tends to be established within the court. It bears various names: the grand chamber, the extended chamber, the expanded composition, the reunion of several chambers, a court sitting en banc, an extended section or a division of a court. In larger but not too large jurisdictions, the same role is adopted by the plenary. For ease of reference, I shall refer to all such extended judicial formations with the generic name ‘grand chamber’.

To bear the same name does not necessarily mean to perform the same function. As a Czech lawyer, I have always intuitively assumed that the role of such a body within an apex court is to unify the case law. In the Czech Republic, as well as in a number of other supreme continental jurisdictions for that matter, there tends to be only one reason for the presence of a grand chamber within a supreme court: to unify the diverging lines of case law and to set a clear line of precedent. However, that has never really been the job description, least of all the practice, of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’). This begs the question: what may then be other structural reasons for the existence of such a body within an apex jurisdiction? What is the specific role, function, and ensuing justification for the Grand Chamber of the Court?

This article offers some personal reflections on that question. It is structured as follows: it begins with a short comparative overview of some of the grand chambers within European (national) courts, overseas in the common law world, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, in order to tease out the functional rationale for various types of extended judicial compositions within those systems (Part I). Next, two types of such functional justifications for grand chambers in the form of ideal models are identified (Part II). Finally, those justifications are then considered in light of the legislative design and the current practice of the Grand Chamber of the Court, before concluding with two modest suggestions (Part III).