Are we flexible in using different strategies to regulate our emotions during our daily functioning? What are the personal and situational mechanisms accounting for this complex set of emotion regulation (ER) processes? And to what extent different forms of ER flexibility are adaptive? Current empirical evidence challenges a static view of ER strategies as inherently adaptive or maladaptive. This has led contemporary accounts to consider the variation in use of ER strategies across time depending on the complex interplay of personal characteristics, specific situational demands, and motivational goals. However, despite the relevance of these new approaches and their obvious theoretical and practical implications, the study of ER flexibility is a relatively young research field, still lacking common integrative views. In this paper, I briefly discuss the shared and unique components across different theoretical frameworks of ER flexibility and make recommendations for future research to advance the understanding of this crucial phenomenon. I identify specific questions that may be contrasted through programmatic research lines and propose that the integration of cognitive mechanisms known to affect ER may help to advance the science of ER flexibility. I also enumerate a series of methodological approaches that can be used to tests proposed models of ER flexibility. Finally, I highlight potential practical implications that can be derived from these new research programs in order to improve interventions aimed at promoting adaptive ER flexibility and adaptive functioning.

Modeling human cognition is challenging because there are infinitely many mechanisms that can generate any given observation. Some researchers address this by constraining the hypothesis space through assumptions about what the human mind can and cannot do, while others constrain it through principles of rationality and adaptation. Recent work in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and linguistics has begun to integrate both approaches by augmenting rational models with cognitive constraints, incorporating rational principles into cognitive architectures, and applying optimality principles to understanding neural representations. We identify the rational use of limited resources as a unifying principle underlying these diverse approaches, expressing it in a new cognitive modeling paradigm called resource-rational analysis. The integration of rational principles with realistic cognitive constraints makes resource-rational analysis a promising framework for reverse-engineering cognitive mechanisms and representations. It has already shed new light on the debate about human rationality and can be leveraged to revisit classic questions of cognitive psychology within a principled computational framework. We demonstrate that resource-rational models can reconcile the mind's most impressive cognitive skills with people's ostensive irrationality. Resource-rational analysis also provides a new way to connect psychological theory more deeply with artificial intelligence, economics, neuroscience, and linguistics.

We can observe some developments that indicate a further strengthening of human rights and the rule of law even after 2001. These developments are puzzling as they occurred despite largely unfavourable scope conditions. This article offers an account of these developments that focuses on dynamics endogenous to the law. These internal dynamics provide a causal mechanism that sets in once a certain threshold of legalization has been reached. We employ the Hartian notion of secondary rules which we think is an especially helpful conceptual tool to analyse the endogenous dynamics of legal systems. To the extent that law is programmed towards consistency, secondary rules become necessary in an environment of rapidly increasing legal density to govern the complexity resulting from this proliferation of norms. Upholding consistency is necessary to maintain the autonomy of law in a Luhmannian sense and the ‘morality’ of the legal system in a Fullerian sense. Our goal is to show this and at the same move beyond an argument of system or normative functionality by identifying causal mechanisms that can explain the law’s built-in drive towards secondary rules, and that are in accordance with broader social science theory. We use some insights from cognitive psychology to develop these causal mechanisms further. While testing these causal mechanisms would be beyond the scope of this paper, we hope to provide the conceptual tools for future empirical research on the dynamics of secondary rule-making and offer some empirical illustrations to demonstrate how dissonance reduction operates in practice.

The goal of this study was to understand factors related to humor comprehension in old age. This study proposes that, in contrast to younger adults, older adults have greater difficulty with humor comprehension due to age-related cognitive decline. Tests of verbal and nonverbal humor comprehension and tests of cognitive flexibility, abstract reasoning, and short-term memory were administered to 40 younger and 41 older adults. In general, older adults scored lower than younger adults on tests of humor and cognitive abilities. Regression analyses support the idea that cognition affects humor comprehension, but the relative contribution of each specific mechanism remains unclear. The results of this study suggest that there may be age-related deficits in humor comprehension, but more importantly, that a more sophisticated model is needed to clarify the role of cognition in humor comprehension. Humor comprehension warrants further study because of the potential physical and psychological benefits of humor. (JINS, 2007, 13, 606–614.)