Free choice sequences play a key role in the intuitionistic theory of the continuum and especially in the theorems of intuitionistic analysis that conflict with classical analysis, leading many classical mathematicians to reject the concept of a free choice sequence. By treating free choice sequences as potentially infinite objects, however, they can be comfortably situated alongside classical analysis, allowing a rapprochement of these two mathematical traditions. Building on recent work on the modal analysis of potential infinity, I formulate a modal theory of the free choice sequences known as lawless sequences. Intrinsically well-motivated axioms for lawless sequences are added to a background theory of classical second-order arithmetic, leading to a theory I call $MC_{LS}$. This theory interprets the standard intuitionistic theory of lawless sequences and is conservative over the classical background theory.

In [17], we introduced an extensional variant of generic realizability [22], where realizers act extensionally on realizers, and showed that this form of realizability provides inner models of $\mathsf {CZF}$ (constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory) and $\mathsf {IZF}$ (intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory), that further validate $\mathsf {AC}_{\mathsf {FT}}$ (the axiom of choice in all finite types). In this paper, we show that extensional generic realizability validates several choice principles for dependent types, all exceeding $\mathsf {AC}_{\mathsf {FT}}$. We then show that adding such choice principles does not change the arithmetic part of either $\mathsf {CZF}$ or $\mathsf {IZF}$.

We prove that the first-order logic of CZF is intuitionistic first-order logic. To do so, we introduce a new model of transfinite computation (Set Register Machines) and combine the resulting notion of realisability with Beth semantics. On the way, we also show that the propositional admissible rules of CZF are exactly those of intuitionistic propositional logic.

There seems to be a view that intuitionists not only take the Axiom of Choice (AC) to be true, but also believe it a consequence of their fundamental posits. Widespread or not, this view is largely mistaken. This article offers a brief, yet comprehensive, overview of the status of AC in various intuitionistic and constructivist systems. The survey makes it clear that the Axiom of Choice fails to be a theorem in most contexts and is even outright false in some important contexts. Of the systems surveyed, only intensional type theory renders AC a theorem, but the extent of AC in that theory does not include, for instance, real analysis. Only a small amount of extensionality is required in order for the obvious proof an intuitionist might offer for AC to break down.

Vardanyan’s Theorems [36, 37] state that $\mathsf {QPL}(\mathsf {PA})$—the quantified provability logic of Peano Arithmetic—is $\Pi ^0_2$ complete, and in particular that this already holds when the language is restricted to a single unary predicate. Moreover, Visser and de Jonge [38] generalized this result to conclude that it is impossible to computably axiomatize the quantified provability logic of a wide class of theories. However, the proof of this fact cannot be performed in a strictly positive signature. The system $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ was previously introduced by the authors [1] as a candidate first-order provability logic. Here we generalize the previously available Kripke soundness and completeness proofs, obtaining constant domain completeness. Then we show that $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ is indeed complete with respect to arithmetical semantics. This is achieved via a Solovay-type construction applied to constant domain Kripke models. As corollaries, we see that $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ is the strictly positive fragment of $\mathsf {QGL}$ and a fragment of $\mathsf {QPL}(\mathsf {PA})$.

The language of linear temporal logic can be interpreted on the class of dynamic topological systems, giving rise to the intuitionistic temporal logic ${\sf ITL}^{\sf c}_{\Diamond \forall }$ , recently shown to be decidable by Fernández-Duque. In this article we axiomatize this logic, some fragments, and prove completeness for several familiar spaces.

We investigate which part of Brouwer’s Intuitionistic Mathematics is finitistically justifiable or guaranteed in Hilbert’s Finitism, in the same way as similar investigations on Classical Mathematics (i.e., which part is equiconsistent with $\textbf {PRA}$ or consistent provably in $\textbf {PRA}$ ) already done quite extensively in proof theory and reverse mathematics. While we already knew a contrast from the classical situation concerning the continuity principle, more contrasts turn out: we show that several principles are finitistically justifiable or guaranteed which are classically not. Among them are: (i) fan theorem for decidable fans but arbitrary bars; (ii) continuity principle and the axiom of choice both for arbitrary formulae; and (iii) $\Sigma _2$ induction and dependent choice. We also show that Markov’s principle MP does not change this situation; that neither does lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (except the choice along functions); but that limited principle of omniscience LPO makes the situation completely classical.

Here, we present a category ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ which can be considered a predicative variant of Hyland's Effective Topos ${{\mathbf {Eff} }}$ for the following reasons. First, its construction is carried in Feferman’s predicative theory of non-iterative fixpoints ${{\widehat {ID_1}}}$ . Second, ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ is a list-arithmetic locally cartesian closed pretopos with a full subcategory ${{\mathbf {pEff}_{set}}}$ of small objects having the same categorical structure which is preserved by the embedding in ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ ; furthermore subobjects in ${{\mathbf {pEff}_{set}}}$ are classified by a non-small object in ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ . Third ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ happens to coincide with the exact completion of the lex category defined as a predicative rendering in ${{\widehat {ID_1}}}$ of the subcategory of ${{\mathbf {Eff} }}$ of recursive functions and it validates the Formal Church’s thesis. Hence pEff turns out to be itself a predicative rendering of a full subcategory of ${{\mathbf {Eff} }}$ .

In the present paper we use the theory of exact completions to study categorical properties of small setoids in Martin-Löf type theory and, more generally, of models of the Constructive Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets, in terms of properties of their subcategories of choice objects (i.e., objects satisfying the axiom of choice). Because of these intended applications, we deal with categories that lack equalisers and just have weak ones, but whose objects can be regarded as collections of global elements. In this context, we study the internal logic of the categories involved, and employ this analysis to give a sufficient condition for the local cartesian closure of an exact completion. Finally, we apply this result to show when an exact completion produces a model of CETCS.

For the Heyting Arithmetic HA, $HA^{\text{*}} $ is defined [14, 15] as the theory $\left\{ {A|HA \vdash A^\square } \right\}$, where $A^\square $ is called the box translation of A (Definition 2.4). We characterize the ${\text{\Sigma }}_1 $-provability logic of $HA^{\text{*}} $ as a modal theory $iH_\sigma ^{\text{*}} $ (Definition 3.17).

Using a technique developed by Coquand and Hofmann [3] we verify that adding the analytical form MP1: $\forall \alpha (\neg \neg \exists {\rm{x}}\alpha ({\rm{x}}) = 0 \to \exists {\rm{x}}\alpha ({\rm{x}}) = 0)$ of Markov’s Principle does not increase the class of ${\rm{\Pi }}_2^0$ formulas provable in Kleene and Vesley’s formal system for intuitionistic analysis, or in subsystems obtained by omitting or restricting various axiom schemas in specified ways.

Kripke recently suggested viewing the intuitionistic continuum as an expansion in time of a definite classical continuum. We prove the classical consistency of a three-sorted intuitionistic formal system IC, simultaneously extending Kleene’s intuitionistic analysis I and a negative copy C° of the classically correct part of I, with an “end of time” axiom ET asserting that no choice sequence can be guaranteed not to be pointwise equal to a definite (classical or lawlike) sequence. “Not every sequence is pointwise equal to a definite sequence” is independent of IC. The proofs are by Crealizability interpretations based on classical ω-models ${\cal M}$ = $\left( {\omega ,{\cal C}} \right)$ of C°.

The purpose is to study the strength of Ramsey’s Theorem for pairs restricted to recursive assignments of k-many colors, with respect to Intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic. We prove that for every natural number $k \ge 2$, Ramsey’s Theorem for pairs and recursive assignments of k colors is equivalent to the Limited Lesser Principle of Omniscience for ${\rm{\Sigma }}_3^0$ formulas over Heyting Arithmetic. Alternatively, the same theorem over intuitionistic arithmetic is equivalent to: for every recursively enumerable infinite k-ary tree there is some $i < k$ and some branch with infinitely many children of index i.

In this paper we describe an intuitionistic theory SLP. It is a relatively strong theory containing intuitionistic principles for functionals of many types, in particular, the theory of the “creating subject”, axioms for lawless functionals and some versions of choice axioms. We construct a Beth model for the language of intuitionistic functionals of high types and use it to prove the consistency of SLP.

We also prove that the intuitionistic theory SLP is equiconsistent with a classical theory TI. TI is a typed set theory, where the comprehension axiom for sets of type n is restricted to formulas with no parameters of types > n. We show that each fragment of SLP with types ≤ s is equiconsistent with the corresponding fragment of TI and that it is stronger than the previous fragment of SLP. Thus, both SLP and TI are much stronger than the second order arithmetic. By constructing the intuitionistic theory SLP and interpreting in it the classical set theoryTI, we contribute to the program of justifying classical mathematics from the intuitionistic point of view.

We compare two influential ways of defining a generalized notion of space. The first, inspired by Gelfand duality, states that the category of ‘noncommutative spaces’ is the opposite of the category of C*-algebras. The second, loosely generalizing Stone duality, maintains that the category of ‘point-free spaces’ is the opposite of the category of frames (that is, complete lattices in which the meet distributes over arbitrary joins). Earlier work by the first three authors shows how a noncommutative C*-algebra gives rise to a commutative one internal to a certain sheaf topos. The latter, then, has a constructive Gelfand spectrum, also internal to the topos in question. After a brief review of this work, we compute the so-called external description of this internal spectrum, which in principle is a fibred point-free space in the familiar topos of sets and functions. However, we obtain the external spectrum as a fibred topological space in the usual sense. This leads to an explicit Gelfand transform, as well as to a topological reinterpretation of the Kochen–Specker theorem of quantum mechanics.