INTRODUCTION

Law No. 3 of 2022 on Indonesia's State Capital City (Ibu Kota Negara, IKN) has provided a legal framework for the development of Nusantara, the new capital city of Indonesia. The IKN's development is estimated to be accompanied by the mass in-migration of construction workers, civil servants and their family members, academics and researchers, and tertiary students. Around 1.7 to 1.9 million people are estimated to inhabit the new capital by 2045.

The residential mobility of around 250,000 construction workers and civil servants in 2024 would be the main feature of the initial phases of the capital relocation. Public service workers from particular institutions are prioritized to move earlier to Nusantara. These include the coordinating ministries, the triumvirate of the Ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, government agencies supporting the offices of the president and vice president and those responsible for development planning and budgeting, and law enforcement. In addition, civil servants from ministries that directly support the development of the IKN and agencies that work on basic needs services and human capital development are also targeted to migrate earlier. However, Annex II of the law states that not all public sector workers would be posted to the IKN. Several criteria have been defined as bases to assess how qualified civil servants are for the relocation, including their highest educational attainment, retirement age and performance evaluation.

In addition to being the centre of government-related activities, the IKN is designed to provide world-class tertiary education institutions focused on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), as well as specialized skills training. Although Indonesia has become one of the largest and fastest-growing tertiary education systems in the world, with approximately 7.6 million students enrolled in over 3,100 institutions, Indonesia's tertiary education system still faces problems like considerable variations in the quality of institutions. Based on the clustering of higher education institutions (HEIs) by the Ministry of Education and Culture in 2020, only fifteen Indonesian universities are acknowledged to have “excellent” academic performance and are classified in the first cluster.

Introduction

“Citizen participation” can be defined as the active involvement of the general public in the government's decision-making process to influence and address issues of public concern. It covers a range of practices, from volunteering to political participation. Civic participation is similar, although it includes involvement in non-political activities. The advancement in digital technologies has enabled collective participation and civil actions, encouraging greater participation, better decision-making and more trust.

Among different forms of civic participation, crowdfunding has emerged as one type of public participation in a democratic environment. The ability to accept small amounts of money from a larger number of people positions crowdfunding as a platform for citizens to express their views on services that they require and their civic rights. It allows citizens to participate in society and the government by donating their resources as an act of support for particular programmes or projects. It also allows social movements to pool financial resources from the public relatively quickly. This potential should be emphasized because a system that handles and provides civic services would result in increased citizen participation. Crowdfunding also allows citizens residing outside the country, or diaspora, to participate in the projects. The diaspora community is said to be more willing to participate in smaller-scale but beneficial initiatives that many larger project backers would not pursue. With an expected number of 8 million Indonesians in the diaspora with an average monthly income of US$1,999,7 this potential should not be overlooked.

In August 2019, the Indonesian government announced its plan to move the capital from Jakarta to a new city in East Kalimantan province. The new capital is named Nusantara (also called IKN) and its construction is targeted to be completed by 2045. Government officials are set to move to the new capital in stages. The development is divided into three main stages: developing the urban infrastructure, developing the city along with the economic sector and moving government officials to the new capital, then finally increasing connectivity with other cities near the IKN.

INTRODUCTION

On 16 August 2019, President Joko Widodo officially announced the relocation of the capital city (or Ibu Kota Negara, IKN) in his state address. The new IKN, named Nusantara, is in East Kalimantan's regencies of Kutai Kartanegara and North Penajam Paser. It will have an area of 256,142.72 ha, including a core city of up to 56,180.87 ha and the main government zone of 5,644 ha. It is divided into three zones, the Central Government Core Area (Kawasan Inti Pusat Pemerintahan, KIPP), the State Capital Area (Kawasan IKN, KIKN), and the National Capital Development Area (Kawasan Pengembangan IKN, KPIKN). According to Bappenas, the goal of the IKN relocation is to realize the Golden Indonesian Vision 2045 (Visi Indonesia Emas 2045), one of whose aims is to create a new economic growth centre, apart from the previously Java-centric one.

East Kalimantan has a large forest, covering more than half of its total provincial area. However, the level of environmental damage, particularly in this forest area, is prominent. Its forest damage has reached 9.7 million ha (60 per cent). Thus, many parties, especially environmental civil society groups, at local and national levels, have been resistant to the development of the IKN, which is expected to further damage the forest. However, the Indonesian government, through Bappenas, has asserted that the IKN would be built by implementing a “forest city” concept, prioritizing environmental factors, to realize the vision of a “Smart, Green, Beautiful, and Sustainable City”. Based on the UU IKN (IKN Law), the new capital city is managed by Badan Otorita IKN Nusantara (Nusantara Capital City Authority, NCCA), including its environmental aspects.

This chapter discusses how the relocation of IKN, with its concepts of “Green City” and “Forest City”, can be an opportunity for improved forest governance. It uses a case-study approach with a qualitative method, using in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions as primary data collection techniques complementing secondary data from published sources. Based on the data related to forest management in Kalimantan, at least three forestry issues could become the cornerstone of the management model on a broader scale. They are: (1) deforestation and forest degradation, (2) overlapping land concession, and (3) human-wildlife conflict (HWC).

INTRODUCTION

The plan to move Indonesia's national capital from its historic site in Jakarta to a new purpose-built city in East Kalimantan Province is undoubtedly the most ambitious state infrastructure project of modern Indonesian history in terms of scale, logistics and cost. It has understandably provoked divergent responses, from praise as a visionary attempt to reimagine and modernize the nation, to criticism of the massive expenditure required and its environmental impacts, and scepticism that it is driven by political interests. Beyond issues of the economic and logistical feasibility of the plan's implementation at a time of investor wariness and economic uncertainty, significant questions emerge regarding how a purpose-built capital will impact the ways that Indonesia's national politics is imagined and conducted.

Purpose-built capitals are by no means a new or unique phenomenon. There have been twelve capital cities built since the 1960s, with several others underway or in pre-planning stages. Pojani notes that, regardless of whether the political setting is democratic, a hybrid regime or authoritarian, new capital cities have been almost entirely planned by those in power as “totalizing projects”, rather than being developed and built piecemeal over time through processes involving a range of social political and economic interests. This has generally resulted in a tendency for purpose-built capitals to reinforce and embody state and elite conceptions and “utopian” visions, of nation, state and spatializations of political order. In particular, the crucial role played by non-state and civil society actors in shaping political praxis and popular resistance in capital cities has often been omitted, by oversight or intent, from this state or elite vision, such as in Myanmar's junta-built capital of Naypyidaw or Nursultan, Kazakhstan's capital named after its former autocratic president.

This chapter will reflect upon two central questions in considering the implications of Nusantara for political praxis in Indonesia. The first is historical: What has been the relationship among space, rakyat and political change in Jakarta, the nation's capital and biggest city? Particular attention is given to the centrality of Jakarta's streets as political space, producing social and political movements and dialectical tensions that have shaped and constrained the political direction of the nation-stat

This book has provided a collection of academic writings examining the various aspects of the historic and momentous relocation of Indonesia's capital city from Jakarta to Nusantara. In this sense, this edited volume serves as the first academic summation of the myriad challenges and opportunities involved in the IKN's transfer, and simultaneously, as a call to Indonesia's policymakers and leaders to build or develop their new capital in a more balanced, more inclusive, and more sustainable fashion.

From the key takeaways and policy recommendations provided by the authors, there are a few central themes. First, as the overall level of practitioner and research knowledge on the IKN's relocation and development is still limited, this volume will hopefully inspire other researchers and organizations to conduct more detailed and focused studies on all aspects of the IKN's future development. This is particularly for areas related to the IKN's human and social capital, including the livelihoods and well-being of East Kalimantan's local and indigenous communities, the proposed physical and infrastructural development, existing and future environmental and ecological concerns and threats, and evolving social dynamics. Any future studies will need to be sensitive to the potential for unintended or unexpected consequences of IKN development, including widening socio-economic inequality and environmental degradation.

The editors hope that the present volume provides some direction for how the above themes and research questions might pan out, especially if certain recommendations are ignored or dismissed prior to the actual transfer of the national capital from Jakarta to Nusantara.

Generally, development initiatives need three frameworks for execution: a regulatory and policy framework, an institutional framework, and a system to trace and enforce accountability. While Indonesia's IKN Law is a start, the regulatory and policy framework and the actual implementation of the transfer still need regulations to operationalize the move at the ground level. Likewise, while the establishment of the IKN Authority marked the development of the IKN's institutional framework, this Authority is not fully operational yet and its accountability mechanism is not developed.

After many years of discourse, in 2019 the Indonesian government decided to build a new capital city (Ibu Kota Negara, IKN) in the Penajam Paser Utara and Kutai Kartanegara municipalities, East Kalimantan province. The new capital city is named Nusantara, which means “archipelago”, and it is planned that Nusantara will replace Jakarta as the main site of Indonesia's central government starting in 2024.

The capital relocation will mark significant transformations for Indonesians, not only in administrative, cultural and socio-economic aspects but significantly, in national politics. Jakarta has been the centre of gravity for Indonesia's government, business, culture and society since pre-independence days. Therefore, relocating the capital city to Nusantara, East Kalimantan, is perceived as a political commitment by the current administration to shift the national centre of gravity to a region outside Java.

Narrowing the developmental imbalance between Java and the outer islands has been at the heart of the capital city relocation narrative. Java, known for its overpopulation, is home to 152 million people (around 56 per cent of Indonesia's population), according to the most recent census in 2020.1 This contrasts sharply with the 6 per cent of Indonesians who live in Kalimantan, which is six times larger than Java island. With its massive demographic advantage, Java produces about 59 per cent of the country's GDP. East Kalimantan is nevertheless among the provinces with the highest gross regional domestic product (GRDP) per capita, second only to Jakarta. Yet, East Kalimantan is underpopulated, with just 3.7 million inhabitants or about a third of Jakarta’s.2 The opportunity for growth is thus significant.

The other main reason cited for the capital city relocation is that Jakarta is deemed increasingly unsuitable to be the nation's capital, given its numerous cross-cutting socio-economic and environmental challenges. Despite public policy efforts to control the effects of growth, worsening traffic congestion, pollution, and the increased risk and cost of frequent flooding have all adversely affected the quality of life in the city. IKN Nusantara, in contrast, is considered by some to be less exposed to natural disasters and is strategically located in the country's geographic centre.

COVID-19 triggered an economic shock in Myanmar and the world over. The pandemic disrupted the economy of many countries, affecting not only their domestic environment, but also their connections with other countries through trade, foreign investment and aid, migration, and remittances. Travel bans and border controls, supply chain disruptions, and economic slowdown in many outward investing countries has blocked trade and production, causing economic turmoil. This matters for livelihoods in the short- and long-term: not only does international trade, investment and aid support job creation and income generation, but earning foreign exchange is also crucial to managing debt and stimulating economic recovery. As such, countries’ connection to the global economy can shape their prospects for recovery. This can take different forms: it can bring the country back to its pre-pandemic path, for a ‘business as usual’ approach; or it can aim to build the foundations of a more resilient, climate-compatible, gendersensitive and transformative growth.

Consider the case of Myanmar. While the official number of recorded cases of COVID-19 was small compared to surrounding nations,1 the country experienced great economic damage due to the disruption to its international linkages, in particular through the impact on trade, investment and development finance (Turnell 2020). Moreover, on 1 February 2021, the military overthrew the country's elected government. The junta remains in power at the time of writing, generating political and economic instability and substantially undermining any prospects for recovery.

This study examines the impact of COVID-19 and the coup on the Myanmar economy through the country's international economic linkages, while also assessing its prospects for recovery. Rather than assessing the overall impact of the pandemic, it focuses on international trade, investment, aid and migration as transmission channels for the impact of COVID-19 and the coup. Therefore, this study does not aim to be a comprehensive assessment of the impact of these challenges, but rather to highlight some key areas that the international community can contribute to.

The study relies on analysis based on secondary data provided by national and international sources and on grey literature. The authors worked on the Myanmar economy, in particular on economic transformation, foreign direct investment and manufacturing, prior to the military coup.

The 1 February 2021 military coup in Myanmar ended a decade of political liberalisation and triggered a near-countrywide popular uprising, which soon turned into armed resistance and ultimately all-out civil war. Nearly two years later, the Tatmadaw1 is locked in an existential struggle for the soul of the country with an array of resistance forces, while the state and economy are collapsing, and tens of millions of people face a deepening humanitarian emergency.

The coup followed months of escalating tensions between the military and the civilian government over the 7 November 2020 elections, which delivered a landslide victory to the incumbent National League for Democracy (NLD), but were already mired in controversy before the polls. The military challenged the results, alleging widespread fraud, and sought to delay the convening of the new parliament until its concerns could be addressed, calling first for a special sitting of parliament and later for a meeting of the National Defence and Security Council. Its demands, however, were flatly refused by the civilian authorities, and after last-minute negotiations between representatives of the NLD and the military failed to resolve the brewing constitutional crisis, Commanderin- Chief Min Aung Hlaing at 16:00 on Sunday afternoon, 31 of January, issued a fateful order to his troops to stop the convening of parliament by force.2 In the early morning of the next day, just hours before the new parliament was set to convene, the military thus once again took control of the capital, arrested the country's elected leaders, and declared a state of emergency. The initial takeover was quick and bloodless, but the coup triggered a conflict that has cost thousands of lives and fundamentally changed the face of Myanmar politics.

In the present chapter, I set out to do three things.3 I start by outlining the main contours of Myanmar's post-coup politics. I then try to answer two key questions that have been the focus of much of the post-coup commentary and analysis: What were the reasons for the coup, and what is the likely outcome of the resultant political crisis? The main thrust of the analysis is pessimistic, but the conclusion entertains a few more hopeful possibilities.

Since its establishment as a sovereign state, Myanmar has demonstrated a firm commitment to a neutral and non-aligned foreign policy, capable of preventing the country's gradual tilt under the orbit of a great power or bloc of powers (Passeri 2020, 8–14). As such, the preservation of independence and freedom of action in the global arena has always embodied the paramount goal of Myanmar's diplomacy, pushing various generations of Burmese leaders to shy away from bilateral and multilateral security arrangements which could potentially jeopardise its non-aligned, “go alone” stance (Trager 1956; Silverstein 1982; Steinberg 2018; Passeri and Marston 2022). This is not to say, however, that Myanmar's diplomatic playbook has endured for more than seven decades without major twists and turns. On the contrary, even a cursory glance at the country's history reveals that Burmese diplomacy has constantly swung between two opposite archetypes of non-alignment, following an oscillating trend that has persisted up to present days. In a nutshell, this dilemma has revolved around the desire to implement a positive, dynamic, and proactive blend of non-alignment, aimed at expanding and diversifying Myanmar's international partnerships, and, on the other hand, the temptation of resorting to a more inwardlooking, reactive, and torpid practice of ‘negative neutralism’, conducive to a gradual retrenchment from the international dimension and to the assertion of autonomy through self-aloofness.

Unsurprisingly, the same puzzle experienced by Myanmar in selecting the most appropriate prototype of non-alignment has traditionally complicated the strategic calculus of many other small powers across the globe, pushing scholars to theorise different variants of what could be considered a neutral or non-aligned behaviour in the global arena. According to Khalid I. Babaa and Cecil V. Crabb (1965, 11–12), for example, the doctrine of ‘positive non-alignment’ entails a clear refusal to join tight and formal alignment links (e.g. alliances, stationing of foreign troops inside the national territory) with great powers, together with a deep-felt commitment to play an independent, constructive, and cooperative role in global affairs through good offices or bridge-building efforts. As such, this positive form of neutralism is often infused with moral and ethical considerations based on an active contribution to peaceful coexistence, coupled by an equally strong rejection of colonialism, imperialism, power politics, and foreign intrusions in the domestic dimension (Goetschel 1999, 120–121).

Since the February 2021 coup, the Myanmar junta, known as the State Administrative Council (SAC), has tried to embed its government and exert control over the population through administration, organised violence, and warfare (Callahan 2004). In response, a revolutionary movement has emerged contesting the military's legitimacy at national levels and resisting their authority at sub-national levels using violent and non-violent tactics.

This paper provides a contemporary snapshot of contested military rule in Myanmar more than a year after the coup d’etat, using evidence up to August 2022. First, it charts Myanmar's reordered political context. Second, it analyses overlapping realms of national contest over who has the legitimacy to govern between the junta and parallel National Unity Government (NUG), and the historically contested structure of the Myanmar state with new movements for democratic federalism. Third, it analyses the mix of new and old conflict dynamics, including waves of guerrilla warfare across once-peaceful areas in the Bamar heartland. Fourth, it introduces new evidence to examine changes to subnational contests for authority, including new practices of local governance by resistance forces, the post-coup expansion of territory for ethnic resistance organisations (EROs), and contested administration by the junta.

In this disrupted era, resistance to military rule and coercion has a new cast of characters and multi-ethnic alliances. While the military has consolidated and restructured control over the central state apparatus, this paper argues that subnational and local authority has become more complex and contested than ever before, including in the Bamar heartland. The post-coup political landscape is one of altered power struggles, revolutionary contests, civil disobedience, and increased conflict intensity which shows no signs of abating.

METHODOLOGY

The new realities of Myanmar's post-coup environment provide unique security challenges for international and local researchers. This paper draws on new qualitative research conducted in Yangon Region, Sagaing Region, Rakhine State, Mon State, and Northern Shan State by Myanmar researchers between November 2021 and February 2022. A template of case study questions was prepared and shared with researchers who conducted semi-structured key informant interviews in Myanmar language with known contacts in different sites. Much of the research was done through safe electronic practices to avoid meeting in public places. For their safety, the researchers are anonymous.