Introduction

This chapter examines how Europe is both a site of and participant in contemporary US–China geopolitical competition. As one of the richest and most technologically advanced regions in the world, the US and China compete for economic and political influence across the continent. At the same time, in everything from trade to investment to emerging technologies, US–China competition increasingly shapes Europe’s policy choices and strategic priorities.

For Europe—defined here as the European Union (EU) and European members of NATO—US–China competition differs in many important respects from US–Soviet competition during the Cold War. During that period, Europe was the main site and prize of US–Soviet rivalry. The continent was divided economically, politically, militarily, and ideologically. An Iron Curtain had descended across Europe, “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.” Both the US and the Soviet Union devoted enormous resources to secure and defend their respective parts of the continent (Hanhimӓki 2012).

Europe today is neither the main site nor the main prize of US–China competition. The key flashpoints lie not in Europe but in East and Southeast Asia, including Taiwan and the South China Sea (Shambaugh 2021). Nevertheless, both the US and China view Europe as an important strategic partner, and the continent has become an increasingly active economic battleground between the two countries (Brandt and Taussig 2020). In this new era of great power confrontation, therefore, “Europe has a comparable position to that of Japan before 1989: a reliable American ally, but one outside the main field of confrontation” (Krastev and Leonard 2021b).

This chapter analyzes Europe’s role and place in US–China competition with a focus on Huawei’s presence in Europe’s fifth generation (5G) wireless networks. This case reveals three broader features of Europe’s role in US–China competition. First, European countries’ desire to expand and deepen their economic links with China while continuing to depend on the US for their defense represents the central challenge they face in this new strategic environment. Second, while US and European views on China have converged in recent years, they are not identical, and European countries are unlikely to take as firm a position toward China as countries in Western Europe did against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Public sphere contestations in the digital age

Contemporary Western democracies have entered a new phase of enhanced public sphere contestation. In contrast to previous historical epochs marked by high degrees of political mobilization, we do not simply observe an increase in the intensity of contentious politics within the public sphere. The new quality of these conflicts can instead be seen in the way the media and the public sphere have themselves become a target of contention. In the new millennium, Western democracies have opened a field of social and political struggle over the utopia of the public sphere. What is at stake is the validity and the applicability of the underlying norms and principles of democracy in the context of digitalization and globalization.

The popular diagnosis of the presence (or diagnosis of our times) as postdemocracy does not grasp the new dynamics of contentious public sphere politics. Post-democracy is commonly seen as something that is passively endured or structurally embedded. It is something that just happens to our societies, a shared destiny because democracies cannot last and encounter a natural death. However, the transition from contentious politics within the public sphere to contention of the public sphere is not silent. Nor is it a linear process with a predefined outcome. The new contentiousness of the digital public sphere is an open-ended game that is not taking place somewhere at the periphery but encompasses the whole of the political system and its interrelations with media, markets and society. The way media has dramatically changed our daily lives and our professions has left a deep imprint on our democratic systems of political representation. Deep concerns with democracy not only affect state functioning but also other sectors, such as the economy, education and science. The plot for this large social and political struggle is still in the making. There is no central stage for performing the play, but many interrelated local, national and international stages with shifting audiences. Among the protagonists we find:

• 1. The digital industries, among them the big global players of social media capitalism, who in their role as collectors and merchants of big data often become the targets of political mobilization but can sometimes also become allies in the struggle for Internet freedom.

Hundreds of books have appeared since the early 2000 forecasting the erosion of liberal democracy in connection with what is identified as deep disruptions of media and communications in the digital age. Much collected evidence suggests that the best days of democracy are over, and that democracy might soon come to an end. Intellectuals have given up believing in the future of democracy, not because they embrace a better project, but because evidence speaks against it. But what binds democracy and the media so closely together? Why is democracy's destiny so intimately related to the health of public communication and the media?

The diagnosis of democratic failure does not start with a discussion of media infrastructures and dynamics but with political ideas and ideologies (Muller, 2011; Zielonka, 2018). The assumption that Western politics had witnessed the ‘end of ideology’ actually predates the fall of the Iron Curtain and of the ideologically divided world in 1989 (Bell, 1962) and relates to the sociological diagnosis of open societies shaped by secularization, individualization and enhanced reflexivity where collective projects lost their shine (Beck et al, 1994). Liberal democracy proliferated precisely because it did not require collective ideological commitments and allowed for the establishment of some sort of technocratic government with an emphasis on politics as ‘problemsolving’ (Giddens, 1994). Yet democracies are not simply made by individuals, and the ‘neglect of the collective’ has thus become ‘ideological’ in the way it has been promoted by some of the hardliners of neoliberal thought. In parallel, collectives began to be reshaped in the post-‘89 counter-revolutions and search for new expressions of popular sovereignty in the form of ethno-nationalism and populism (Snyder, 2003; Wodak and Boukala, 2015; Zielonka, 2018).

This book has explored the forms and functions of organized civil society as it developed before, during and after Myanmar’s political transition period between 2011 and 2020. Starting from the pre-2010 era, when the country was relatively isolated and civil society presumed largely absent, I traced back the origins of some of the organizations and movements that became visible to outside observers in the early years of political transition. I showed that both welfare organizations and democracy activists that gained prominence in the 1990s have partial roots in forces that emerged around independence from British colonialism. The military’s top-down ‘Roadmap to Democracy’ from 2003 onwards generated opportunities for some civil society actors to engage more openly in political debates, especially around the three national elections that were held between 2010 and 2020. As this book testifies, some people in Myanmar experienced increased room to manoeuvre, while others, particularly in the ethnic areas, saw their opportunities decreasing. The military coup of February 2021 brought an end to this decade of political transition, and the resistance in response to renewed violent repression led to the emergence of a number of younger and more progressive groups that sought out new alliances both within and beyond Myanmar.

When discussing the forms and functions of civil society, this book has focused on two types of contestation. The first, which dominates the country’s modern history, is contested political power and resistance against the military, both in central Myanmar and in the ethnic border regions. The impact of over five decades of military rule on the country and its (civil) society cannot be overstated. The formally military-ruled era from 1962 until 2010 and the power struggle between the military, the people and their elected representatives which has intensified since 2021 have been characterized by widespread repression, violence and destruction of the economy and social services. A series of repressive laws, some of which stemmed from colonial times, criminalized most forms of civic association from the 1960s onwards, while organizations that continued to operate often worked under the radar and were subject to intrusive surveillance. The arbitrary application of rules and the absence of an independent judiciary made people in Myanmar subject to the whims of the military, leading to widespread fear, distrust and self-censorship.

Introduction

The 21st century has witnessed economic, political, and normative transformations as a result of protracted economic crises, technological developments used to overcome these crises, shifts in global value chains, and the consequent shifts in power distribution among great powers and leading regions. The relations between the US and China are among the most contentious dynamics in the contemporary world. With the so-called “rise of China” as a result of China’s successful economic reform since the late 1970s, which has turned China into the second largest economy of the world following the US only, scholars and diplomats alike are wondering how the relations between the two powers in our world today will evolve. Many recent developments, such as the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia, and India since 2017, the Sino-US “trade war” since 2018, and the US-led “diplomatic boycott” of China’s Winter Olympics in 2022, seem to reveal the emergence of the Sino-US rivalry and the increase of the tension between the two in our international system. In this context of growing Sino-US conflicts, it is both academically and practically important to study their relations in one of the most strategically important regions in our world, the Middle East, which is producing one third of the oil for the whole world.

The Middle East is composed of multiple subregions with distinct political and socioeconomic backgrounds. However, the positions of these subregions in relation to regional and global powers are interconnected, forming the regional relations of the Middle East. Intriguingly, despite the huge strategic importance of the region, the tension between the US and China over the Middle Eastern issues has not been very high. While the US has been actively taking actions to intervene in regional affairs to protect and promote its interests in the region, China has been adopting a hands-off approach toward the region (that is, a less assertive and non-interventionist policy toward the Middle Eastern countries). Many studies that examine China’s responses to such issues as the US invasion of Iraq, the Israeli–Palestinian relations, and the US policy toward Iran even reveal that China has intentionally avoided being too assertive in the Middle East in order to prevent conflict with the US (Lai 2007; Wehrey et al 2010; Chen 2012; Ehteshami et al 2018; Conduit and Akbarzadeh 2019).

In order to analyse the activities and advocacy positions of various civil society groups (as covered in Chapters 4 to 6), it is important to establish the identity factors that influence people’s lived experiences and help explain their stance towards the government and other actors. By employing this intersectional lens, moreover, we can explore how certain minority identities interact to create multiple forms of marginalization. The fault lines in Myanmar that are most relevant for analysing contemporary civil society are ethnicity and religion, generation and gender, and class, including poverty levels and the rural/ urban divide. Furthermore, this chapter covers the division between independent and government-associated civil society organizations (CSOs), and between organizations inside and outside the country. Lastly, it will reflect on the elitist nature of some CSOs and their relationship with grassroots activism.

Fault line 1: ethnicity and religion

As discussed earlier, religious organizations have historically played a key role in Burmese society, where around 90 per cent of the population is Theravada Buddhist. Buddhist monasteries have been providing social services such as schools and orphanages in central Myanmar since long before any of the ‘Western type’ non-governmental organizations (NGOs) appeared, and Christian organizations (consisting predominantly, but not exclusively of ethnic nationalities) have long been active in the ethnic states. In fact, a distinction between religious and secular organizations in the context of Myanmar would be rather artificial, as many actors working outside faith-based organizations nevertheless identify with a particular religious group.

The role of Buddhist monks

Buddhist monks (together with nuns referred to as sangha) have gained prominence in the Western imagination of Burmese civil society, especially since the 2007 uprising in which they played a significant and internationally visible role. The role of Buddhism as a force in contemporary Myanmar politics, however, continues to be subject to debate (Jordt, 2007). Aung-Thwin (2013), for example, argues that the Western scholarly and media emphasis on politically motivated monks is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the sangha, which remains predominantly apolitical. According to Aung-Thwin, monks only made up 10 per cent of those involved in the 2007 uprising, and the uprising itself was heavily influenced by external (mainly American) funding.

Introduction

This book aims to contribute to reflection on the current state of planning on the island of Britain. More specifically, it brings together a collection of chapters from experts in different fields of planning to provide a review of the past decade or so of reforms of, and debates about, the planning system in England. The initial prompt for the book was the publication in 2020 of a White Paper, Planning for the Future (MHCLG, 2020). This was one of a series of governmental statements of intent and reform proposals for planning that have peppered the period since 2010. Since 2020, both the debate and governmental personnel have moved on. In 2022, the Levelling Up White Paper and the subsequent Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill were published as steps towards the enactment of the planning reform agenda. England has seen the departure of three secretaries of state with responsibility for planning – though one was subsequently reinstated – and the latest rebranding of the ‘home’ ministry for planning, which has changed from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) to the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC). Between the first draft of this book being submitted in August 2022 and its publication, the UK has also had three prime ministers. The reflections in the book and proposals for planning reform have taken place against this background of wider political churn and policy flux. As well as reflecting on planning reform and performance since 2010, the authors have therefore been asked to consider how far the planning proposals in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill differ from those that were floated in the Planning White Paper of 2020, and whether and to what extent, if applied, the proposals in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill might result in a change in current planning practices and outcomes.

The title of the book, Planning in a Failing State, uses the different meanings and usages of the term and noun ‘state’ as a means of framing its reflections on ‘the state of planning’ and ‘the state planning is in’. The word ‘state’ can refer to ‘a condition or way of being that exists at a particular time’.

The crisis of public health

The UK faces a health crisis. In 2018–20 growth in life expectancy stalled for women and declined for men, taking men back to the level in 2012–14 (ONS, 2021). Although the immediate cause was the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, a slowing-down in improvements in life expectancy had been happening for a decade, particularly affecting the most deprived 10 per cent of the population, and falling or stagnating for some groups (Marmot, 2022). In other comparable economies, life expectancy has increased at a faster rate (OECD, 2023), so the latest figures are the culmination of a longer term trend. But COVID-19 also led to a surge in the number of those of the working-age population being unfit for work through extended sickness. Before 2020, less than 5 per cent of the relevant population were unfit for work in this way; by 2022, it was more than 6 per cent (Neville and Borrett, 2023). COVID-19 hit the UK population hard because there had been a failure of public health planning over many years. The result was the growth in a number of health risks that bring illness in their wake and impose severe strains on the National Health Service (NHS). The omens in respect of these health risks look poor.

Consider obesity. As Figure 1.1 shows, obesity rates are high in the UK when set against comparable western European countries. While obesity has increased in all the high-income countries, rates in the UK more than tripled between 1975 and 2016, whereas France and Germany showed much lower rates of growth, as did other European countries like Italy. To be sure, the UK does not equal the US or Australia in its obesity, but it is closer to them than to its European neighbours. Obesity is an important public health measure because being obese leads to a predictor of poor health, causing strain on the skeleton and increasing the risk of fatal heart attacks or stroke. It also leads to an increased risk of type 2 diabetes, a disease that is responsible for some 10 per cent of NHS expenditure.