I want to use this opportunity to briefly summarize our discussion until now, and provide some lasting examples, to contribute to my overall argument. In this book, I have examined the use of surveillance technologies in migration, border management and humanitarian aid, with the aim of explaining contemporary capitalism’s mainstream approach to migration at a global level and the motivations behind the investments of tech companies in these fields. What is critical here is that the development and implementation of surveillance technologies in migration and border management have repercussions that extend far beyond these fields. Given the far-reaching effects of these technologies – encompassing lie detection and military robotics, and the prediction and prevention of mass movements – it is evident that they will soon have consequences for humanity as a whole.

In gaining an understanding of this potential, we also recognize that this topic is directly related to the evolution and future of global capitalism, and that surveillance capitalism is not simply a business model. The capabilities provided by these surveillance technologies and their use for mass surveillance have become an intrinsic component of contemporary capitalism and are actively tested on people on the move.

This process is led by an oligarchic structure based on close cooperation between the security, intelligence and financial bureaucracies of a small number of advanced capitalist countries and a small number of tech producers, military organizations and financial companies. Donor countries provide funding in the name of humanitarian aid, and, through academic projects or research and development, new and usually speculative surveillance technologies are developed using this public money. These are then tested on migrants and refugees in different countries by security bureaucracies or various organizations such as UN agencies, and products found to be successful and effective are commercialized and marketed to different states. The reason I refer to this as an oligarchic structure is that there is a network of people operating on different platforms in a small number of countries, including the US, EU, UK and Israel, who work together, share their experiences and frequently move among companies, and the decisions made by this network are implemented at a global level.

There is a large body of literature on the relationship between capitalism and migration. Structuralist, Marxist and Marxist-influenced theories examine migration from different perspectives, but mainly in terms of exploitation and relations of dependency; analyses that were particularly popular in the 1970s but remain relevant. There are many studies on how capitalism uses migrants as a labour force to increase surplus-value extraction and to lower wages, and on the tactics used by labour unions to organize migrants in different countries. Similarly, many studies deal with the consequences of migration, both for origin and destination countries (from ‘developing’ countries to ‘developed’ capitalist countries), the effects of remittances, the issue of brain drain and continuing colonial ties and racism. There is also an extensive number of studies that adopt a gender approach, for example the migration of women – particularly from countries such as the Philippines and Ethiopia – to work in domestic services, conditions of modern slavery, and the supply chain of care for children and the elderly at the global level (such as scenarios where a Filipino mother looks after the child of a middleclass German mother, whereas the Filipino mother’s child is looked after by another woman in her country of origin). Moreover, some studies examine the precarious working conditions faced by migrants to capitalist countries, and migrations among the emerging and more economically dependent countries called the Global South. Overall, these studies analyse the approach adopted by capitalism to migration – of labour, in particular – in different periods and countries (Zelinsky, 1971; Amin, 1974; Gilroy, 1993; Escobar, 1995; Anderson, 2000; Arango, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Creswell, 2006; Castles and Wise, 2007; Raghuram, 2009; Castles, 2010; Gardner, 2011; Cabanes and Acedera, 2012; Browne, 2015; Massey, 2015; Francisco, 2018).

In this chapter, I will make use of the accumulated findings and analyses of this literature, but I will not limit myself to the consequences of capitalist policies in the field of migration; I will also argue, making references to the surveillance technologies developed, that migration and border management policies and practices provide valuable data on the internal evolution and trajectory of capitalism.

The analysis of (big) data has exciting potential in the fields of migration and border management and humanitarian emergencies, as in many other fields. The reason I place ‘big’ in parentheses is that the definition of big data keeps expanding in quantitative terms. Therefore, it might be sufficient to simply talk about data analysis. Two issues make data analysis especially valuable. First, data sets that are too large for humans to analyse unassisted can be evaluated using AI algorithms thanks to advanced statistical applications. Second, with advances in cloud storage, it becomes possible to hold and use large data sets, without data going to waste.

What makes this analysis exciting, specifically for the issue at hand, is that inferences made from data sets allow us to analyse the basic characteristics and dynamics of mass movements and make predictions about the future (Bozçağa and Cansuna, 2022; Gürkan et al, 2022; Solano, 2022; Weber, 2022). The business model of surveillance capitalism, discussed in Chapter 1, is also based on the assumption that similar phenomena, under normal conditions, should lead to similar expectations. This, in turn, offers new opportunities for making projections about migration movements and analysing applicants to cross borders. Examining data from previous applicants and categorizing new applications using this framework make it possible to make judgements about whom to allow to migrate and where.

Capitalist companies’ dominance over big data

The biggest concern, for the purposes of this study, is that a significant portion of the main actors that collect and analyse data from migrants are capitalist companies. States, UN agencies and humanitarian aid organizations also collect data from migrants and refugees, but the field is dominated by a small number of companies. Mobile phone operators, financial firms, digital platforms, social media providers and companies that operate search engines and offer translation and navigation apps collect real-time data from migrants on a continuous basis. Using this data, they offer products and services to practically everyone, regardless of whether they are migrants are not. For example, as a Turkish-speaking migrant in the UK, I am usually shown ads for remittance companies when I use social media or search engines.

Many of the technological solutions that stand out in the field of migration and border management fall within the scope of the tech product package known as ‘smart borders’. These ‘solutions’ make it possible to control activities beyond physical borders and to detect and prevent immigrants before they even reach borders, through such tools as AI algorithms, unmanned aerial vehicles, facial-recognition systems, biometrics, satellite images, sensors and analyses of mobile phone and social media data. For example, Elbit, an Israeli security company that established an advanced surveillance system in Arizona, can detect people approaching the border from 7.5 miles away. The laser-enhanced cameras produced by Anduril, working in the same area, are able to detect all movement within two miles and distinguish human activity from animal activity through the use of artificial intelligence (Feldstein, 2019).

Smart border applications are the most visible examples when it comes to surveillance technologies in the field of border and migration management. The reason why I have discussed big-data analysis before moving on to smart border products is that smart border applications play a prominent role in collecting real-time data on human movements, and thus contribute to the development of surveillance technologies. Flows of real-time data collected using various methods including drones, satellites and sensors, and their analysis in comparison with historical data sets, play a very important role in predicting and preventing human movements and deciding who can be permitted to cross borders.

There are two basic issues involved, which have been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 as well. The first is the risk that, if the advanced technologies developed here are applied successfully, they might be used to monitor and steer the daily lives of entire societies. I will discuss the pilot use of lie detectors from this perspective. The second issue is that these technologies are developed by military/ arms firms, and the solutions they offer not only violate the basic rights of migrants and refugees by adopting a purely security-oriented approach, but they also militarize borders, contribute to intelligence work concerning other countries, put regional and global peace at risk and reinforce war preparations. They also provide ample opportunities for cooperation between tech companies on the one hand, and military/ arms firms and security bureaucracies, on the other.

We are living in a time when technological transformation permeates all areas of life and affects radical change. Private companies, state actors and academic institutions are in fierce competition among themselves, fostering rapid progress in fields such as artificial intelligence algorithms, digital platforms, the internet of things, blockchain and quantum computers, and, as a result, new products are being produced on a daily basis. The future trajectory of this change, the problems it creates, the inequalities it generates, and the winners and losers of this process, among many other issues, have become significant topics of interest.

On the one hand, more and more people are enjoying the benefits of new technologies as they become cheaper and widely accessible. We have become better informed about the world, have more opportunities to socialize, embrace new business opportunities and generally navigate the world with confidence. We rely more than ever on our phones and computers to live, stress about our batteries draining and feel compelled to check our devices throughout the day. On the other hand, trust in traditional institutions has been shaken because of disinformation, fake news, algorithmic discrimination and cybersecurity concerns.

It is in the context of the issues described in this book that migration and border management are such key areas of investigation. Indeed, it is now much more difficult to come up with alternative legal solutions and identify or prevent discrimination or errors with potentially lethal consequences for migrants or asylum seekers. This is partly a matter of risks and problems brought about by automating a corrupt and discriminatory system.

While there are arrays of technological products that we cannot see (satellites), notice (internet of things, mobile phone social media analysis), influence (machine learning) or even understand (blockchain) which improve our lives, these coexist with technologies that make life more difficult; hampering and ignoring our ability to assert autonomy and make decisions. Indeed, there is a deep anxiety regarding our world in 20 years’ time, as a result of technological advances and transformation – often reflected in utopian or, more commonly, dystopian works of art and media.

This book examines the role of migration and border management in understanding the process by which surveillance capitalism has become an intrinsic and fundamental component of contemporary capitalism, and discusses the reasons why many technological products are being tested on people on the move, as well as the potential ramifications. Up to this point, I have first discussed the concept of capitalism, followed by a discussion of its consequences in the fields of big-data analysis and smart borders. Now, I will take up a more complicated field. I will consider efforts for digital identity, or the digitalization of identity, in migration and border management.

The main reason why this is more complicated is that goals such as supporting migrants and refugees and contributing to their financial and social integration are at the forefront. Data analysis and smart borders, in particular, function to identify, track and, when necessary, stop people on the move, and decide and limit how far they are allowed to go. Basically, they are fields in which states and certain industries, such as border management and war technologies cooperate, with technology companies. Here, the lines are clearer. There might be people who view these tech products positively for reasons such as preventing migration movements, reinforcing national security and border security and fighting smugglers. Or, the ‘security-oriented’ approach in question may be rejected from a standpoint of migrant and refugee rights, human rights, the right to asylum and the right to live. Therefore, migration scholars are worried about practices in these fields, and the tragedy of the thousands of people on the move who lose their lives on the borders because of smart border applications.

However, the picture is different in the field of digital identity. There are, of course, academics who call attention to the corporate agenda-setting aspect of the field and criticize the entire process. However, a reformist approach is more dominant. The importance of issuing ID cards to people, digitalizing these IDs and providing people with ‘fast and efficient’ access to services thanks to digital IDs draws more attention.

This case study draws from work project-managing the research component and later following up researcher experiences of the multidisciplinary research study Imagining Autism. This brought drama practitioners and researchers together with an evaluation team from psychology. It exemplifies the borders of qualitative research where it meets with art, education, and therapy. While I was positioned within the evaluation team, I was very aware of similarities between the improvisational drama and my doctoral work with children. This case study also highlights the ways in which researchers reflect and position themselves in their research.

Context

Imagining Autism was a collaboration between a team of drama academics and practitioners and two teams of psychologists. The drama researchers had a long history of using improvised drama and puppetry with autistic children and children with other special educational needs. They had seen how their approach had a beneficial effect, increasing capacity for and willingness to engage in social interactions and imaginative play. They had heard from families and teachers about how their work ‘ameliorated’ some of the challenges the children faced day-to-day in allistic society. The two leads were both parents of autistic children and had personal reasons for their interest. However, they were unable to ‘prove’ in the scientific objective sense that what they did had an impact, or establish why. As drama academics they were used to using Practice-as-Research (Barrett and Bolt 2010) which is, rightly or wrongly, often not as highly regarded as other research approaches or methods within academia (Mårtensson et al 2016). They decided to collaborate with psychology researchers to evaluate the impact of a programme of improvised drama to ‘show’ that what they did was of benefit and had value. The study was designed to be systematic and rigorous, involving standardised tests of IQ, numeracy and literacy, momentary time sampled observations of the children in class and at play, and regular ADOS (autistic diagnostic observation schedule) tests. The study involved 27 children aged 7–12 years from three schools in the UK over 18 months to allow for improvements in testing due to developmental changes.

This book is the outcome of an in-depth study of Omega, a Malay Muslim prison gang which, over a span of less than three decades, transformed itself from a prison protection group into an organized criminal enterprise with transnational links. It has retained its notoriety among the secret societies of Singapore, albeit a racially exclusive one, having established its dominance in the drug trade locally and regionally since the 1990s. In part, this book documents the genesis of the gang and its use of Islamic doctrines and strong ethnoreligious overtones in creating a Muslim brotherhood within the context of racialized social structures of the prison and criminal underworld of free society. It also tells the story of a group of Malay men and youths, and their response to the hangover of colonial racialization and structural marginalization, as well as their attempts to achieve social mobility in the legitimate and illegitimate worlds by means of organizing themselves into gangs. While many working-class Malays experience disempowerment in conventional society on the basis of social class, those who have crossed over to the illegitimate sector also find themselves being structurally marginalized in that space on the basis of race. Reflecting global trends concerning many racial minority and Indigenous peoples, Malays are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system, particularly where drug abuse is concerned, and are often caught in the vicious cycle of arrest–incarceration–re-arrest (Ganapathy and Lian, 2016).

Theoretical contributions

In considering explanations for racial disparities in the criminal justice system, I have taken a functionalist-structuralist perspective, not that the contrary view – the racial bias thesis – is less efficacious or irrelevant in the Singapore context. The reason for my choice derives from the fact that there is no publicly available data or empirically based research to support such a premise that would incontrovertibly show evidence of such racial bias and discrimination. By assuming a functionalist-structuralist stance, I assume the position that racial disparity in crime is likely to be the result of the structural marginalization of a segment of a racial minority in postcolonial Singapore society.

This case study of my work with the international WISC network exemplifies the borders of qualitative research with science and therapy. Integrating and using qualitative research methods – explicitly embodied, creative, and reflective research methods – with scientists and in a scientific context allowed us all the opportunity to reflect on the ways in which research approaches and dissemination are defined by disciplinary boundaries. My work with international Principal Investigators and research groups felt at times like either teaching or group therapy, and definitely required my full set of therapeutic skills and holding, particularly as the bulk of the work was undertaken online throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

Context

In the very first chapter of this book, I shared the story of how I came to qualitative research after initially studying chemistry at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. That I ended up leaving science is unfortunately all too common. Women are marginalised in chemistry (Royal Society of Chemistry 2018), with the largest attrition occurring post-PhD (Royal Society of Chemistry 2019a). Although I left during a PhD and not after completion, I contribute to the statistics around the lack of retention for women and other marginalised groups. Those that choose to stay continue to have challenges. The Royal Society of Chemistry (RSC) recognised that women in the chemical sciences face barriers in publishing (Royal Society of Chemistry 2019b), which can be thought of as akin to microaggressions as defined by Sara Ahmed (2017). Even before the COVID-19 pandemic impacted women academics to a greater extent than men due to uneven loads of caring responsibilities and work distribution (Gabster et al 2020), the RSC stated that the rate of change meant gender parity would never be reached (Royal Society of Chemistry 2019a). The chemical sciences are not unique in this. The scientific community is not known for its diversity with respect to gender (Greider et al 2019), race (Makgoba 2020), sexuality (Smith 2020), or disability (CRAC 2020). Of course, the barriers that face an individual with a protected characteristic are intersectional (Crenshaw 1989) and compound.

The international WISC network was initially created to support a small group, before being scaled to build an intersectional sense of community supporting the retention and progression of women in the field.