Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- 1 The coefficient of resource utilization
- 2 A social equilibrium existence theorem
- 3 A classical tax-subsidy problem
- 4 Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy
- 5 Valuation equilibrium and Pareto optimum
- 6 Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function
- 7 Market equilibrium
- 8 Economics under uncertainty
- 9 Topological methods in cardinal utility theory
- 10 New concepts and techniques for equilibrium analysis
- 11 A limit theorem on the core of an economy
- 12 Continuity properties of Paretian utility
- 13 Neighboring economic agents
- 14 Economies with a finite set of equilibria
- 15 Smooth preferences
- 16 Excess demand functions
- 17 The rate of convergence of the core of an economy
- 18 Four aspects of the mathematical theory of economic equilibrium
- 19 The application to economics of differential topology and global analysis
- 20 Least concave utility functions
2 - A social equilibrium existence theorem
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- 1 The coefficient of resource utilization
- 2 A social equilibrium existence theorem
- 3 A classical tax-subsidy problem
- 4 Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy
- 5 Valuation equilibrium and Pareto optimum
- 6 Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function
- 7 Market equilibrium
- 8 Economics under uncertainty
- 9 Topological methods in cardinal utility theory
- 10 New concepts and techniques for equilibrium analysis
- 11 A limit theorem on the core of an economy
- 12 Continuity properties of Paretian utility
- 13 Neighboring economic agents
- 14 Economies with a finite set of equilibria
- 15 Smooth preferences
- 16 Excess demand functions
- 17 The rate of convergence of the core of an economy
- 18 Four aspects of the mathematical theory of economic equilibrium
- 19 The application to economics of differential topology and global analysis
- 20 Least concave utility functions
Summary
In a wide class of social systems each agent has a range of actions among which he selects one. His choice is not, however, entirely free and the actions of all the other agents determine the subset to which his selection is restricted. Once the action of every agent is given, the outcome of the social activity is known. The preferences of each agent yield his complete ordering of the outcomes and each one of them tries by choosing his action in his restricting subset to bring about the best outcome according to his own preferences. The existence theorem presented here gives general conditions under which there is for such a social system an equilibrium, i.e., a situation where the action of every agent belongs to his restricting subset and no agent has incentive to choose another action.
This theorem has been used by Arrow and Debreu [2] to prove the existence of an equilibrium for a classical competitive economic system, it contains the existence of an equilibrium point for an N-person game (see Nash [8] and Section 4) and, naturally, as a still more particular case the existence of a solution for a zero-sum two-person game (see von Neumann and Morgenstern, Ref. [11], Section 17.6).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Mathematical EconomicsTwenty Papers of Gerard Debreu, pp. 50 - 58Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1983
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