Preceding chapters have provided a wealth of data and analyses on the relevance of development models, especially that of China, for majority Muslim countries, with Latin America and Africa having been included to provide comparative context. The purpose of this conclusion is to draw out of these preceding chapters answers to the key questions about the transportability to Muslim countries of development models generally, and especially the Chinese one. Those questions turn on perceptions of the model at the sending and receiving ends; the viability and sustainability of the model itself; the economic, political and cultural bilateral and regional relations that provide the context within which the model is perceived and acted upon; preconditions for the adoption and success of the model; the role of competitive models; and the type of governance assumed by the model and whether viable functional substitutes for governance institutions can be found. Answers to these questions may, in turn, enable us to assess the relevance of models for development, especially across Muslim majority countries.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE “BEIJING CONSENSUS”

William Hurst is of the view that the Chinese model is an external construct, not a self-conscious blueprint for China's development. China's experimental, pragmatic approach has, according to him, been intellectualised and indeed glorified by outside observers, in the process rendering theoretical coherence to what has been an incremental, “groping for stones while crossing the river” approach to development.