The present chapter will analyze the theme of public bureaucracy in politics and implementing policies from the perspective of the power relations in which the bureaucracy intervenes as an actor in the political process and the institutional arrangements established for implementing public policies and attaining their goals. The involvement of bureaucracy in politics raises the question of its relative power vis-à-vis other actors, whereas its intervention in the process of public policy implementation is related to its performance (or productivity) in achieving policy goals.

The subject of bureaucratic power has been treated in the literature from several perspectives. Rourke (1984), for example, considered that the power of bureaucracies derives mainly from two sources: “(1) their ability to create and nurse constituencies and (2) their technical skills that they command and can focus on complicated issues of public policy” (1). At the same time, bureaucracy is seen as the one permanent institution in the executive branch and for that reason “it enjoys a certain degree of autonomy” (Cayer and Weschler, 1988:67). In Ripley and Franklin's (1982:30) synthesis, “bureaucrats are not neutral in their policy preferences; nor are they fully controlled by any outsider forces. Their autonomy allows them to bargain – successfully – in order to attain a sizeable share of preferences.” Hence, limitations on their power are a central issue. Rourke (1984) argued that its limits stem not only from the competitive pressures from outside but also from factors related to the way in which organizations operate and bureaucrats behave within their own habitat (competition among bureaucracies, internalized restraints, ethical codes, internal procedures, testing performance, representativeness).