Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Principles of cosmopolitan order
- 3 Territorial justice and global redistribution
- 4 International justice and the basic needs principle
- 5 Cosmopolitans, cosmopolitanism, and human flourishing
- 6 Global justice, moral development, and democracy
- 7 A cosmopolitan perspective on the global economic order
- 8 In the national interest
- 9 Cosmopolitan respect and patriotic concern
- 10 Persons' interests, states' duties, and global governance
- 11 The demands of justice and national allegiances
- 12 Cosmopolitanism and the compatriot priority principle
- 13 Beyond the social contract: capabilities and global justice
- 14 Tolerating injustice
- 15 Cosmopolitan hope
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Territorial justice and global redistribution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Principles of cosmopolitan order
- 3 Territorial justice and global redistribution
- 4 International justice and the basic needs principle
- 5 Cosmopolitans, cosmopolitanism, and human flourishing
- 6 Global justice, moral development, and democracy
- 7 A cosmopolitan perspective on the global economic order
- 8 In the national interest
- 9 Cosmopolitan respect and patriotic concern
- 10 Persons' interests, states' duties, and global governance
- 11 The demands of justice and national allegiances
- 12 Cosmopolitanism and the compatriot priority principle
- 13 Beyond the social contract: capabilities and global justice
- 14 Tolerating injustice
- 15 Cosmopolitan hope
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
It is a commonplace of political history that, at some times in some places, liberalism and nationalism have not been incompatible. More than that, they have been good friends – lending each other vital support, rejoicing in one another's triumphs, holding a shared view of who is the enemy and so forth. Nor, according to Onora O'Neill, has this affinity been merely coincidental.
In a pre-liberal world, [a person's] social identity might be given by tribe or kin, it might not depend on those who share a sense of identity being collected in a single or an exclusive territory. Because liberal principles undercut reliance on pedigree and origin as the basis for recognizing who count as our own, and who as outsiders, liberalism had to find some alternative basis for identifying who counts. Pre-eminent among these ways are the differential rights with respect to a given state that citizenship confers.
(O'Neill, 1992, p. 118)Liberalism, she seems to be suggesting, has actually needed nationalism. Why? Well, because its hallowed subjects – namely individual persons, each of whom it lavishly adorns with all manner of rights and liberties – find themselves badly in need of some salient form of social identity when they emerge from their various imperial subjugations, ancient and modern. For whatever severe oppression and disempowerment they for so long endured under those subjugations, one thing they did not thereby lack was a strong sense of social identity: a sense of identity underwritten by their being officially and principally regarded as members of this family or that clan.
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- The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism , pp. 28 - 38Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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