Introduction

Poor information sharing, communication and coordination between agencies in child protection have been a central concern in the UK since the early 1970s, following a series of public inquiries into child deaths (Parton, 2014a, p 20). In response, government policies have established procedures that require all professionals to share concerns about children and contribute to multi-agency assessments, plans and interventions. Core group meetings (CGMs) were introduced in 1986, responding to concerns about ‘poor planning’, ‘a lack of collated information’ and ‘a lack of clarity regarding respective roles and responsibilities’ (Calder and Horwath, 2000, p 267). They are seen as combining the best features of child protection and family support (Mittler, 1997, p 80), and have been described as the ‘control room of inter-agency operations’ (Calder and Horwath, 2000, p 268). However, research has questioned how far such ambitions have been realised, with concerns about how different professionals contribute.

This chapter examines CGMs as arenas of multi-agency work in child protection. There is first a review of the development of policy and procedures in child protection in England, including where CGMs fit in. Concepts of framing and boundary work are outlined next to analyse the data. Two main analyses are presented. First, there is an examination of the structuring role of the chair, and second, there is an analysis of how professionals negotiate boundaries of expertise and remit. The conclusion considers how far CGM practice appears to promote multi-agency coordination. The data examined in this chapter were collected in northern England.

Information sharing and coordination in child protection in England

The competence of child protection professionals in England has been the subject of media and government scrutiny as a series of public inquiries into child deaths identified professional and organisational failings (Reder and Duncan, 2003). Professionals were reluctant to share concerns about children or failed to act on crucial information. For example, the inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié reports: ‘12 key occasions when the relevant services had the opportunity to successfully intervene in the life of Victoria …. There can be no excuse for such sloppy and unprofessional performance’ (Laming, 2003, p 3).