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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2015

Edited by
Terence Horgan ,
Marcelo Sabates  and
David Sosa
Terence Horgan
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
Marcelo Sabates
Affiliation:
Kansas State University
David Sosa
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
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Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim
 , pp. 252 - 261
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Terence Horgan, University of Arizona, Marcelo Sabates, Kansas State University, David Sosa, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
  • Online publication: 05 April 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139939539.013
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  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Terence Horgan, University of Arizona, Marcelo Sabates, Kansas State University, David Sosa, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
  • Online publication: 05 April 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139939539.013
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  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Terence Horgan, University of Arizona, Marcelo Sabates, Kansas State University, David Sosa, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
  • Online publication: 05 April 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139939539.013
Available formats
×