“This period [1928-1934] between the murder of Obregón and the election of Lázaro Cárdenas is most perplexing,” wrote one of the most perceptive foreign observers of the Mexican scene some years ago. “If it were possible to discover what had taken hold of the leadership of Mexico in those debased and clouded years, it would illumine much of Mexican history.”

What are the reasons for perplexity? Basically, they are two: that the events of this period do not seem to fit the generally accepted view that the history of Mexico from 1910 to the present day forms one grand panorama of historical evolution called the Mexican Revolution, and that the only explanation that has been offered of why they do not seems inherently improbable. The view that the Mexican Revolution is a coherent whole we owe principally to the Mexicans themselves and to sociologists who see revolutions in general and the “Great Revolutions” in particular as social rather than political events.

In recent years the foreign policy of Mexico has often been criticized in the United States. The reaction of Mexico to steps taken by the United States in Latin America—in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere—has led to statements about Mexican foreign policy that indicate little understanding of Mexican mentality, history, and approach to international problems. Of primary concern in any attempt to shed light on the foreign policy of Mexico is the place of the Mexican Revolution in shaping the nation's approach to international problems.

The Mexican Revolution has had profound effects on the development of the country. Since the beginning of the Revolution in 1910, Mexico has followed a path to political stability unique in Latin America. The Revolution and its effects on subsequent Mexican attitudes have been studied by many scholars in attempts to learn lessons for the other developing nations of the hemisphere.

La atención médica es una de las áreas donde muchos han estimado que más cambios favorables a la población se han efectuado por el régimen que gobierna a Cuba desde 1959. Este artículo no va a entrar en un análisis de esos cambios ni pretende hacer un juicio sobre los mismos. Pero sí aspira a que la situación que existía anteriormente se conozca un poco mejor para que de esa forma el interesado en estas cuestiones tenga más elementos de juicio.

Es necesario destacar que el sistema de atención médica en Cuba hasta 1958 resultaba único, si se compara con los demás países de este hemisferio, por el predominio de instituciones no lucrativas que prestaban servicios médicos a sus asociados mediante el pago de cuotas muy modestas. Este sistema estaba tan enraizado en el país que aún hoy se notan amplios vestigios del mismo a pesar de los cambios que han tenido lugar.

During the past quarter of a century, Argentina has undergone a series of diverse political experiments. These included the rise and fall of Juan Perón (1943-1955), the military caretaker governments of Generals Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Aramburu (1955-1958), the emergence and overthrow of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962), the interim government of José Guido (1962-1963), the election and downfall of Arturo Illía (1963-1966), and finally the coming to power of General Juan Carlos Onganía. Onganía presently rules the country with no intention of loosening his control on the levers of power.

The Perón regime revealed a semitotalitarian tendency, an obsession with the building of new political authority and community. The Aramburu administration attempted to prove that the Perón regime was criminal and a destroyer of Argentine civilization. Ignoring the primacy of politics, the Frondizi government tried desperately to cope with the rapid economic development. Inertia characterized the Mia administration.

Argentine neutrality during World War II with its suspicious leanings toward fascism has become a cliché in inter-American relations. As far as the United States was concerned at that time, the Argentine Republic was the black sheep of the hemispheric community, the only nation that failed to cooperate wholeheartedly in the crusade against the Axis. The famous State Department “Blue Book,” so conveniently published prior to the Argentine general elections of 1946, spelled out the aid and comfort the Nazis had derived from Argentina's neutrality. By only the narrowest margin did Argentina avoid being drummed out of the hemispheric organization and barred from membership in the new United Nations.

It seems strange, therefore, to recall that it was the Argentine government that first suggested, in the spring of 1940, that the nations of the Western Hemisphere discard the posture of traditional neutrality in the face of the spreading conflagration in Europe, on the grounds that it was anachronistic and did not protect their interests.

Diplomatic relations between Chile and the Soviet Union were reestablished in 1964, increasing to five the number of Latin American countries with which the U.S.S.R. carried on diplomatic intercourse at that time. Two of these, Uruguay and Mexico, have a long record of “nonintervention” in diplomatic negotiations, e.g., recognition and diplomatic relations are almost pro forma, with little, if any, implied judgment of the nature and character of the opposite number's government. Brazil, a rather special case, reestablished diplomatic relations in 1961, at the beginning of the Quadros-Goulart flirtation with the Soviet Union. The Cuban case hardly deserves further consideration, having been discussed exhaustively in literally a score of publications. But the Chilean situation illustrates the juncture of evolving Soviet assessments of the Latin American political scene and the accompanying Soviet trade, aid, and diplomatic and cultural programs. The advent to power of the Christian Democratic regime of Eduardo Frei Montalva calls attention to significant maneuvering and probing in Soviet foreign policy.

In the Renaissance, colonization and exploitation followed soon after travel and discovery. Spaniards and Portuguese were the vanguard of this movement in the Atlantic world, and it is not surprising that the city was among the institutions brought by them as part of their cultural heritage. What makes the story of the urban conquest of Latin America particularly interesting are the specific configurations of society in the cities of empire and the conscious use of the city as a symbol of imperium.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the functions and social organization of two of these cities, Mexico City and Salvador da Bahia, and to demonstrate that despite a variety of often striking differences, the social structures of both reflected similar solutions to the common problem of integrating newly-created groups into an already structured society.