In the early 1890s, financial crises occurred in many countries, most of which were connected to international capital flows. Australia, a major importer of capital, had difficulty borrowing after the Baring crisis of 1890. This article argues that local factors shaped the consequences of the banking crash in early 1893. A fortuitous legislative change averted a calamity by allowing for reconstruction rather than liquidation of banks, economic activity was depressed as banks became more conservative lenders, and the reconstructions reduced the wealth of domestic bank creditors and shareholders. The article concludes by noting that there was no targeted policy response in the short or medium term to prevent a recurrence of such an event.

This article delves into the origins of the first national multi-sector employers' associations in Denmark and the United Kingdom to understand why some countries produce highly-centralized, unitary national business associations, which develop labor market coordination with unions and the state. In contrast, other countries conclude their experiment with coordination by ultimately falling back on laissez-faire liberalism. In particular, I explore how the structure of party competition works to augment or to diminish coordination among employers. I argue that the interplay of party politics in the policy-making process influenced the incentives of opposing parties to block the legislation sought by employers, informed the incentives of the business-oriented right parties to delegate policy-making authority to private business and labor organizations, and shaped the capacities of employers to get what they wanted from the state.

This article examines the marketing practices of the Soviet state trust for cosmetics, TeZhe, in the 1930s. Drawing on company records, industry reports, and popular press, we show that TeZhe used an array of marketing tactics, which were similar to those of the Western manufacturers. However, TeZhe's marketing was aligned with the state's economic and sociocultural initiatives and shaped by the ideological dictates of the Soviet system.

In both developed Western nations and developing countries, economic growth was based on the development of industrial districts, which were much more organized and institutionalized in modern Japan than economist Alfred Marshall had described. Local trade associations played an important role in enhancing Marshallian externalities, arising from the ease of imitating improved ideas and transacting unfinished products among clustered enterprises by facilitating joint actions in the supply of public goods, such as through the creation of local district brands and through the efficient provision of business information. These activities were clearly beyond the scope of agglomeration economies. This article examines the case of Kiryu, one of the best-known silk weaving districts in Japan.

This article traces the emergence of the General Motors Corporation as a multinational enterprise under the leadership of James D. Mooney from 1922 to the outbreak of World War II. Mooney's unpublished paper “The Science of Industrial Organization” (1929) portrays GM's multidivisional organization's use of the line-staff concept in organizing overseas assembly plants. Here I compare General Motors with Ford Motor Company, which had first-mover advantages overseas, and examine how each company organized and managed their international operations. “Linking pins,” a social-science concept, illustrates how GM's organizational hierarchy achieved vertical coordination of effort. Economic depression and the prelude to World War II followed the expansionary 1920s, requiring GM and Ford to adjust to a changing environment. The article also covers Mooney's naïve attempts to use business for diplomacy in the years leading up to the war.