Torn between divergent disciples, economic history needs to prove its usefulness as well as its scholarly virtuosity. Innovations in method and data have carried the field forward, but perhaps not fulfilled the claims of their champions. To economics in particular, economic history contributes a richer sense of space and time, and the importance of demographic factors. Three vignettes attempt to illustrate that useful economic history can result from confrontations of past and present that improve our understanding of both. Finally, emerging developments in the underlying fields may herald a more central future role for our discipline.

Through a detailed reconstruction of 1933 GDP for the two provinces in China's most advanced region, the Lower Yangzi, I show that their per capita income was 55 percent higher than China's average, and they had experienced a growth and structural change between 1914–1918 and 1931–1936 comparable to contemporaneous Japan and her East Asian colonies. This article highlights the unique political institution of early-twentieth-century Shanghai as a city state, with its rule of law and secure property rights laying the foundation for economic growth in the Lower Yangzi with long-term impact throughout East Asia.

By analyzing a newly compiled data base of grain prices, this article finds that prior to the nineteenth century the grain trade in India was essentially local, while more distant markets remained fragmented. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that these premodern structures were transformed, and a national grain market had emerged. In the Great Divergence debate, the California School's claim that early modern “Asia” reached a similar stage of economic development as early modern Europe is therefore rejected for India.

New England experienced a significant economic transformation after the Revolutionary War. Despite an extensive literature on American development, little is known about the precise role of banks in this process. This article exploits a detailed dataset from Plymouth County, Massachusetts to show that the first bank during its early stage was far more selective in lending than the pre-existing personal credit market. Thus the mere introduction of a single bank did not broaden access to credit. Following the liberalization of chartering policy in the 1820s, however, freer entry and competition drove banks to extend credit to farmers and artisans.

The Baring Crisis is the nineteenth century's most famous sovereign debt crisis. Using a database of more than 15,000 observations, we assess its effect on emerging market borrowers and find empirical evidence of a regional crisis but not a global crisis. During the crisis, Latin American yield spreads increased by more than 200 basis points relative to the rest of the world, even after controlling for macroeconomic, trade, political-institutional factors, and other country-specific effects. Our evidence suggests that European investors may have sold off or reduced their holdings of Latin American securities in the wake of the Baring Crisis.

The rapid development of the nationwide telephone network following the expiration of the Bell patents in 1894, along with expansion of private wire telegraph networks, created the “nerve center” necessary for rapid growth in the decentralized, dealer-intermediated, over-the-counter security markets. Using membership roles from the National Quotation Bureau—the predecessor of the NASDAQ—I link growth in the number of dealers to the expansion of these communication networks prior to World War I. Moreover, trading activity on the organized stock exchanges fell during this period, suggesting that these technologies provided a competitive advantage to the over-the-counter markets.

International productivity comparisons are often plagued by discrepancies between benchmark estimates and time series extrapolations. Broadberry and Burhop present both types of evidence for the Anglo-German comparison. For their preferred data, they find only a minimal German productivity lead prior to World War I, while use of a revised industrial output series for Germany by Ritschl leads to implausible results. This article presents further time series revisions and substantial corrections to the Broadberry and Burhop benchmark estimate. Results strongly suggest a considerable German productivity lead over Britain prior to World War I, which eroded during and after the war.