Bill Fulbright has suffered for some time from a Cassandra complex," said a senatorial colleague of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. With reason enough, for Fulbright has spent more than a decade warning of the dangers that come from the arrogance of power. In 1961 he advised John Kennedy against the Bay of Pigs invasion. Throughout 1965 and 1966 he warned Lyndon Johnson not to escalate the Vietnam war— and was rewarded with whispered rumors about his mental balance.

But on one occasion, although Fulbright's advice was good, his prophecy was wrong. One pleasant spring afternoon in 1969 he went to the White House for an amiable two-hour discussion with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

It is now well over a year since Bangladesh separated from Pakistan. General Yahya's decision to quell the independence movement failed. Millions of refugees had fled to India; a guerrilla movement had emerged in East Bengal, and the Indian army had come to its assistance. The Pakistan army was defeated, and now, over a year after the end of hostilities, 80,000 Pakistani troops remain prisoner.

The eruption of 1971 had left Indians with great hope that now, at last, major subcontinental problems would be resolved. The Bangladeshis had looked forward through their bitter misery to a reemergence of the Golden Bengal of legend. And Pakistanis, dismayed by defeat and secession, at least had hoped that a truncated countrv would be easier to govern.

Spanish counterrevolutionary thought was born in the eighteenth century as a reaction against the Rationalism of the Enlightenment which, advancing from France, threatened the ideological apparatus of absolutism. It represented the intellectual aspect of the struggle between the class interests of the rising bourgeoisie and the two partners of traditional monarchic power, the nobility and the clergy. The intelligentsia of the regime based their ideological defense on the traditional myths, opposing that "Reason" which represented in their judgment the spirit of Evil itself.

During the excitement of expansion, members of the European Economic Community may be forgiven if their comments on Community policy are often more rhetorical than rational. In sober moments European leaders display an awareness of the dilemmas they face in achieving that ambiguous state of grace known as unity. What is less fully recognized is the dilemma the Community presents to outsiders, particularly those who are and wish to remain its friends.

How are we to deal with, how are we to accommodate, how are we to make provisions for this creation which, because it is in the process of shaping itself, does not know what it is going to be? Do we accept it for what it seems to be at this moment, a loose association of sovereign powers which already can exercise some authority in internal matters but is not acting in external matters like the unit it seems to want to be? Or do we make our calculations on the basis of the rhetoric?

EEC spokesmen at times stress the freedom of its sovereign parts.