Rawlsian theory notoriously claims that basic principles of justice apply to the design of a society’s basic structure. G. A. Cohen found it disturbingly convenient to treat fundamental principles as merely political rather than personal—that is, as applying exclusively to questions of institutional design and saying nothing about how to live. Instead, to Cohen, a sincere champion of egalitarian principles would, as they say, “walk the talk.”

Taxation is more than one thing. Taxes can be levied in various ways on various things, with varying effects on a culture and an economy, and raising different challenges of justification.

Over its entire life, the Internal Revenue Code (like other tax systems) has never tried to tax economic income as such, because of the administrative and liquidity problems that arise from taxing any combination of values consumed and from appreciation (or depreciation) of capital stocks. Instead, the common practice limits tax occasions to a realization of income from sale or other disposition of property. Even then, if the proceeds of the transaction are not cash or marketable securities, as with many corporation reorganizations, taxation is deferred until these assets are converted in cash or marketable securities.

Any effort to eliminate these twin filters by taxing income—and income regardless of realization—will overburden government agencies and private taxpayers, while reducing economic activity. A wealth tax scores even worse by these welfare measures, creating massive problems of evasion and enforcement that will reduce capital formation across the board in the effort to transfer wealth from the ultra-rich to everyone else. A simple tax structure with affordable rates is the only path to economic prosperity.

G. A. Cohen is justly acclaimed for his penetrating and searching critique of the commanding Rawlsian liberal paradigm in contemporary political philosophy. He is also well known for his fervent advocacy of a radical view of economic equality, namely, that “justice requires (virtually) unqualified equality itself.” This essay focuses on two issues at the heart of Cohen’s critique, namely, his argument that economic equality is a moral as well as a political responsibility, and his interrogatory question: “If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich?” I take up critics’ objection that Cohen’s arguments for what economic egalitarianism requires are overly morally demanding. I also present a puzzle about the critical reception of Cohen’s work: Given the amount and quality of engagement with his arguments on what egalitarianism would look like in a future just society, how come there’s been such scant attention to his reflections on the predicament of the “rich egalitarian” in current-day unjust society? The essay culminates in a tentative answer to this question.

There are various egalitarian moral doctrines. They differ in the requirements they impose on institutions and social practices and on individual conduct. This essay sketches two versions of egalitarian social justice and claims that the requirements they impose should strike us as reasonable, all things considered. One is welfarist egalitarianism, a cousin of classical utilitarianism. This version requires bringing about good quality lives for people and fair (equal) distribution of this good across persons. A notable feature of welfarist egalitarianism is that it accommodates the seemingly antiegalitarian claim that it does not matter in itself how one person’s condition compares to that of another, so a fortiori it does not matter in itself whether or not one person’s condition compares to that of others in the one particular way of being equal. The other version is relational or freedom-oriented egalitarianism, which holds that we should above all ensure that people are free to live as they choose and relate as equals, without social hierarchy. In the latter half of the twentieth century, John Rawls developed a powerful articulation of relational egalitarian justice. This essay sketches the two rival egalitarianisms with a view to showing their respective moral attractiveness and to suggesting that the welfarist version has greater moral attraction.

The following essay analyzes the arguments made by the principal academic proponent of income taxation, Columbia University economist E. R. A Seligman, after it was found to be unconstitutional in 1894. Seligman thought that the prevalent theory of just taxation, that it should be based on a natural right to one’s person and property, was wrong. The principal American philosophical proponent of this natural rights-based approach to taxation was the late Brown University philosopher and economist, Francis Wayland. The essay analyzes the flaws in Seligman’s contention that there are no natural rights and, therefore, no natural property rights, so that taxation could not be justified by the benefits received for the protection of such rights. Instead, he claimed taxation should rest upon a person’s financial capacity. Since that capacity would be most accurately measured by net worth, we would have expected Seligman to endorse a proportionately assessed net worth tax (which was commonly used by the states in the nineteenth century). Alternatively, he argued for an income tax progressively assessed. This essay argues that since income is only a portion of financial capacity, his argument fails.

G. A. Cohen and David Estlund have recently defended utopophilia against utopophobia. They argue we should not dumb down the requirements of ethics or justice to accommodate people’s motivational failings. The fact that certain people predictably will not do the right thing does not imply they are unable to do so, or that they are not obligated to do so. Utopophiles often defend left-wing ideas; for instance, Cohen argues that people’s unwillingness to do what socialism requires does not imply that socialism is bad, but instead that people are bad. This essay shows that utopophiles must also endorse certain “conservative” conclusions, such as that most poor adults in the developed West are obligated to act more prudently, get jobs, become net taxpayers, avoid having children they cannot afford, and act to avoid needing welfare or assistance.

This essay seeks to answer the question of how the behavior of wealthy advocates of some version of socialism can be reconciled with their advocacy of those ideas. The answer is that the conception of egalitarianism under which they choose to live is one that redistributes income, not wealth, while the egalitarianism that they advocate for others is that in which all wealth is the property of one person who decides how much will be distributed to others.

Liberal egalitarians argue that the state is justified in taxing members of a political community to achieve distributive justice and ensure political equality and regime stability. This involves an uneasy compromise between equality and efficiency, a compromise that many argue has recently been undermined by the growth of unchecked wealth and income inequality. This essay argues that there is also a trade-off between selecting fair processes for taxation and aiming for particular distributive outcomes. The way people accumulate wealth, and the way states tax often matters more than distributive outcomes. Policymakers must allow for the fair assessment of tax liabilities, avoid excessive enforcement costs and prevent political actors from using tax systems to achieve their partial ends. Recognizing these considerations justifies a systematic scheme of taxation while constraining the mechanisms for collecting revenue. I justify this position using comparative analysis, which I contrast with the conceptual intuitionistic approach associated with egalitarianism.

I argue for an egalitarian conception of market exchange that places the idea of equal power at the center of a procedural evaluation of markets. I explain the fundamental concept of equal power in markets and show that the egalitarian conception gives us a remedial basis for society shaping markets so that they allow a significant place for worker participation in firms. I use the phrase “worker participation” to mean that workers participate in the authoritative direction of the firm. This can include collective bargaining and worker management to introduce the kind of flexibility that is desirable in regulating market economies. Worker participation is a remedy to the presence of rigidities in markets that strongly favor authoritarian firms and that follow from and maintain unequal power in markets. The argument differs from the traditional argument that draws a parallel between state and firm, and so does not entail a general requirement of worker participation. It allows for some degree of participation of owners of capital also in the governance of firms.

Imagine two friends. Anna inherits nothing and works for every penny she has, while Mary inherits millions. How should a world that respects individual autonomy and private property rights treat Anna’s earnings and Mary’s inheritance? Should it tax them the same, or tax one more heavily than the other? If the latter, which one? The conventional wisdom holds that although some “right” libertarian theories justify taxing income, none justify taxing inheritances. Such taxes are “expropriations” and “an especially cruel injury” that “run[] roughshod over [a] deceased’s interest in the ends his property will serve.” This essay explores the standard libertarian objections to taxing gifts and bequests and argues that libertarians overstate their case when distinguishing the taxation of gratuitous transfers from other types of taxation. At minimum, the benefit theory of taxation embraced by many minimal statists and classical liberals mandates that the receipt of gifts and bequests should be taxed to the recipient. Moreover, the goals of curbing inherited political power and preventing wealthy families from insulating their members from market competition provide two additional explanations for why taxing inheritances to recipients is compatible with classical liberal values.

There are three distinct forces that conspire to produce a great deal of economic misery. We can refer to them, for convenience, as misfortune, unfairness, and improvidence. Political philosophers have often shown an interest in one or another of these, but seldom all three. Furthermore, those who do acknowledge all three have often felt driven to collapse them into one root cause of inequality. My goal in this essay will be to argue that the three are independent of one another, but more importantly, that they each require distinct remedies. This is important for egalitarians because it defeats any attempt to develop a “one-size-fits-all” policy aimed at creating a more equal society. This analysis helps us to understand several of the tensions that arise in our attempts to combat inequality that are often obscured by an overemphasis on the power of redistributive taxation as well as generalized inattention to the way that successful welfare states achieve meaningful progress in promoting greater equality.

Egalitarian commitments have often been thought compatible with practices that are later identified as inegalitarian. Thus, a fundamental task of egalitarianism is to make inequality visible. Making inequality visible requires including marginalized people, questioning what equality requires, and naming inequality. At the same time, egalitarianism is a movement for change: egalitarians want to make things more equal. When egalitarians seek change at the institutional level, the two egalitarian tasks are complementary: making inequality visible is part of campaigning to make things better. However, at the level of social norms there is a dilemma because making inequality visible can make things worse. Making inequality visible can reinforce unequal norms and fail to address intersectionality. The case of gendered pronouns illustrates this dilemma.

Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based.

Developing countries often rely on consumption taxes, because these are broad, easy to administer, and harder to evade. However, the taxation system becomes inherently regressive. To counter this problem of the regressive nature of consumption taxes, there is a temptation among policymakers to address equity concerns through a multiplicity of rates, making the consumption tax system complex. Here, complexity is considered the by-product, or companion, to pursuing goals of equity. Complex tax systems, however, pose a different problem relating to equity. Assuming a minimum fixed cost of compliance imposed by a complex tax system, smaller firms and individuals face a much higher cost of compliance relative to larger firms and richer individuals. Oligarchic sectors dominated by a few large firms also find it easier to organize and lobby to get favorable rates compared to competitive sectors with small firms. Though complexity is considered a by-product of several equity-enhancing measures, the Indian experience with its Goods and Services Tax reform serves demonstrates the opposite, that there is a trade-off between equity and complexity.

It is widely accepted among political philosophers that distributive justice should be promoted by the state. This essay challenges this presumption by making two key claims. First, the state is not the only possible mechanism for attaining distributive justice. We could rely alternatively on the voluntary efforts and interactions of individuals and associations in civil society. The question of what mechanism we should rely on is a comparative and empirical one. What matters is which mechanism better promotes distributive justice. We cannot settle the question a priori in favor of the state. Second, several considerations suggest a presumption in favor of relying on civil society.