When do religious organizations develop human rights platforms during violent internal conflicts? This article offers the first comparative study to address this question and focuses on religious organizations in El Salvador, Peru, Turkey, and Indonesia. It identifies two causal factors to explain variation in religious human rights activism in these four countries: (1) transnational religious ideas and linkages, and (2) the nature of the state-religion relationship. First, Vatican II and Liberation theology significantly contributed to the rise of religious human rights activism in El Salvador and Peru. Similar transitional linkages were absent in Turkey and Indonesia. Next, the more conflictual nature of the state-religion relationship in El Salvador explains why the Salvadorian Church pursued a more determined human rights agenda than its Peruvian counterpart. A similarly conflictual state-religion relationship contributed to the presence of Islamic human rights activism in Turkey, and a less conflictual relationship prevented its emergence in Indonesia.

This article analyzes how the Muslim majority has engaged with, and contributed to parallel processes of democratization and European integration in post-Communist Albania. The assessment of Muslims' choices focuses on the Central organization, the Albanian Muslim Community, which is recognized by the state as the only authority in charge of all the administrative and spiritual issues pertinent to the community of Sunni believers, and serves as the main hub of respective religious activities in the country. The analysis of democratization, and Muslims' respective choices, are divided into two different periods, namely democratic transition (1990–1998) and democratic consolidation (1998–2013), each facing democratizing actors, including Muslim groups, with different challenges and issues. We argue that the existence of a useful pool of arguments from the past, the so-called Albanian tradition, has enabled Muslims to contravene controversial foreign influences and recast Islam in line with the democratic and European ideals of the Albanian post-communist polity. This set of historical legacies and arguments explain Muslims' similar positioning toward democracy throughout different stages marked by different institutional restrictions and state policies.

The Nordic countries pursue permissive policies with regard to morality issues. There is, however, one exception: the Faroe Islands. This country pursues remarkably conservative policies. Drawing on morality issue theory, secularization theory, and the supply side theory of religion, we develop a framework that explains the political dynamics around morality issues and policies in this country. We contribute to the understanding of the various ways in which religion can enter politics by showing how and why a minimal politicization of morality issues can coincide with a strong religious wording of such issues in a context where a high level of religiosity stands out. Religious vitality came about because religion became attached to the nationalist and language struggle, which encouraged religious activity. The ample supply of religion accounts for religious vitality, which, in turn, explains why religion continues to play in morality politics.

in 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) published its seminal decision in the Lautsi vs. Italy case, arguing that the requirement in Italian law that all public schools will display crucifixes in each classroom does not violate the European Convention on Human Rights. This decision gave rise to a storm of reactions. The goal of this article is to argue, that the ECHR used “majoritarianism” in an under-theorized way and/or unattractive way, and that this usage of the concept can be identified in other cases as well (see the highly controversial Dahlab vs. Swiss, ECHR). Demonstrating the procedural, monopoly based and circularity problems within the ECHR decision point to potential ways to criticize the court decision, without taking sides in the heated and highly divisive debate between so called “neutrality supporters” and (roughly) “endorsed church — majoritarian supporters,” sides of the debate surrounding “Lautsi.”

Islamist parties' electoral performance is a hotly debated question. Two arguments dominate the literature in terms of Islamist parties' performance in democratic elections. The conventional argument has been the “one man, one vote, one time” hypothesis. More recently, Kurzman and Naqvi challenge this argument and show that Islamists tend to lose in free elections rather than win them. We argue that existing arguments fall short. Specifically, we theorize that moderateness of Islamist platform plays a key role in increasing the popularity of these parties and leads to higher levels of electoral support. Using data collected by Kurzman and Naqvi, we test our hypothesis, controlling for political platform and political economic factors in a quantitative analysis. We find that there is empirical support for our theory. Islamist parties' support level is positively associated with moderateness; however, this positive effect of moderation is also conditioned by economic openness.

Turkish Islamists have long attributed the root causes of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey to the anti-religious Turkish nationalism promulgated by the secular Kemalist republican elite in the 1920s. As a result, they lay emphasis on “Islamic brotherhood” as the glue that holds numerous ethnic nationalities together. This article examines this claim and argues that Islam's role as a peacemaker has been overstated. The data from in-depth interviews with dozens of Kurdish Islamists in Turkey conducted in the summer of 2013 indicate that Kurdish Islamists in principle agree with the peacemaking potential of Islam. Distrustful of the “Islamic brotherhood” discourse however, they describe this allegedly new policy as yet another tactic to undermine the Kurdish struggle for equal rights

This article theorizes the self-immolation of alleged Falun Gong practitioners in Tiananmen Square in 2001 in relation to literature on martyrdom, self-immolation, and political protest. It explores the cultural context in relation to Buddhist traditions of self-immolation, Chinese political protest, and other uses of self-immolation as political protest. It will seek to expand the analysis of why these self-immolations may be said to have “failed” as a form of protest, and present a set of four key factors. Issues of legitimation and authority in the events and their representation will be raised, especially the contested nature of whether the self-immolations were “religious,” looking at the different meanings of this term in Chinese and Western contexts. It is argued that both secular and religious self-immolation can be seen as legitimate in the public sphere.

The rhetorical resistance to Apartheid in South Africa appealed to many sources of authority. In Christian communities, the New Testament was brought into creative conversation with traditional “confessional” texts, modern scholarship, and Marxist class analysis in order to develop contextually-located theologies and practices of resistance. This article highlights the important insights of Allan Boesak, Albert Nolan, and Itumeleng Mosala, which served the Apartheid struggle. After noting key differences in the methods and conclusions of these scholars, I suggest that another look at their insights may well be critical in developing Christian responses to the deep structural injustices of the post-Apartheid period.

This article analyses British prime ministers' use of religious language and their own religious beliefs in their political rhetoric. This is used to justify policy, support their ideological positions, present a public persona, and cultivate their personal ethical appeal and credibility as values-driven political leaders. The focus is on the use and the nature of the religious arguments of Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron. As political leaders, British prime ministers are aware of the need to modify and tailor their language in response to changing audiences and contexts. “Doing God” is a difficult and risky rhetorical strategy for British prime ministers but it increasingly has the potential to yield political benefits.

Across Europe populist radical right (PRR) parties advertise themselves as defenders of Christian identity and values, but they do not seem to strongly attract religious Christian voters. This article tests a general framework for understanding this religion gap in 13 countries. Findings extend earlier research on religiosity and radical right attitudes, provide insight on East-West differences in the PRR phenomenon, and lend conditional support to the notion of a “vaccine effect” suggested by prior research.