Robert Oppenheimer tells the story about a group of Bible scholars who practised exegesis with grim determination. A visitor, admiring so much earnest learning, inquired whether they did not find certain texts supremely difficult. Answered one Bible student: “Indeed—but what we do not understand we explain to one another.”

The conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics.

The purpose of this important series of Gifford lectures is to give an account of science; to show its method, its aims, its metaphysical presuppositions, and in what social context it may best flourish.

In his article entitled “Moore and Philosophical Analysis”, Professor Morris Lazerowitz selects Hume's analysis of causality as an example of the way in which philosophers have in the past misleadingly stated what they were trying to do. Professor Lazerowitz asserts at least three things of Hume's analysis. (1)Since Hume insisted that there was no impression of necessary connection, it follows that Hume could not have been examining sequences of events. (2)Therefore, Hume must have been doing something else; namely, misleadingly calling attention to the fact that it always makes literal sense to say of any two supposedly causal events that they are only accidentally connected. Hume, in other words, deprived causal verbs of their use “by linguistic fiat” so that he could more pointedly illustrate the likeness between causal and accidental-occurrence statements.

The old controversy between the classical education in the humanities and the modern kind of education in the sciences is frequently before us in these times. Russia is rapidly gaining ascendancy in scientific achievement; England and the United States of America are urged to meet the challenge by increasing the pressure of a scientific training for all capable of it. Is such a policy really desirable? From one point of view it might seem merely a matter of changing the subjects to be studied at school and university. Instead of the talented youth reading Plato and Thucydides, he is to be directed to the Infini-tesimal Calculus and the Quantum Theory of Radiation. The former studies, the argument would run, are agreeable but barren; the latter are austere but fruitful.

Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen (R. Piper, München) is the topical title of Karl Jaspers's latest book. His intention is excellent, he wants to arouse the conscience of man in face of the deadly danger of atomic warfare. It would be most interesting to compare this book of more than 500 pages with Bertrand Russell's corresponding short publications which concentrate on practical proposals. In order to do justice to Jaspers the English reader should, however, keep in mind that the author had to overcome formidable obstacles. His subtitle, Politisches Bewusstsein in unserer Zeit, indicates that he does not only wish to discuss the present dangerous situation and the means for mastering it, but also to lay the foundation of a Political Philosophy. But here he is faced with two brute facts. First, the Germans are almost by nature un political and falsify by their existence a famous Aristotelian dictum. Their political sense or instinct is, for complex psychological and historical reasons, underdeveloped; a fact which is, paradoxically, of great political importance. Secondly, a German Political Philosophy in the Anglo-American sense does not exist; it forms part of the Rechts-und Staatsphilosopie (cf. Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts, which should not be translated as Philosophy of Right) or of sociological studies. Consequently, Jaspers has to construct his Political Philosophy on the basis of his own Philosophy of Existence, an interesting experiment, beset with formidable difficulties. Here again he remains the gliding philosopher (der schwebende Philosoph), whose analysis of our political predicament moves in “possible perspectives” so that in the end everything remains in suspense (Es bleibt alles in der Schwebe). Indeed, Jaspers holds that rationally atomic warfare cannot be eliminated and that the total destruction of mankind is probable. He therefore appeals to every human being for a radical change of heart which alone could avert the disaster. This change of the “essence of man” remains a Utopian hope. Nevertheless, Jaspers is right in appealing to everybody's conscience. He confirms, moreover, that his existentialism cannot provide the basis for a Political Philosophy.

In his lucid paper “The Objectivity of History” (PHILOSOPHY, April 1958, pp. 97–111) Professor Pass more poses the problem of history's objectivity and seeks to find out in what the objectivity of history might consist. In this note I wish only to criticize his presentation of Popper's views (under his head Criterion Seven). I think Pass more's failure to report Popper's views correctly causes him to overlook the striking similarity between Popper's conclusion and his own.