Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace. By Timothy W. Crawford. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 304p. $39.95.

Pivotal deterrence highlights the problem of dual deterrence in which one state (pivot) attempts to preserve the status quo and prevent conflict between two revisionist adversaries, while each depends on the pivot's support and/or neutrality for its ultimate success. Timothy Crawford's book is an important and, in several ways, original statement on a topic unduly ignored in past studies. In the first two chapters, the author carefully lays out his theoretical expectations concerning the conditions that make pivotal deterrence 1) possible, 2) probable, and 3) likely to succeed. A set of necessary conditions expected to make pivotal deterrence possible are clearly outlined: The two adversaries must see each other as more threatening than the pivot, whereas the pivot must be at least equal in power to them, prefer the status quo between them, and believe that both adversaries are revisionist and willing to go to war if assured of its support.

Studies in International Mediation: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin.

Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. By Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 392p. $75.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.

This book is a highly ambitious attempt to provide a general theory on the self-sustainability of democratic federal systems of government. The authors' central hypothesis is that federal states can reach an equilibrium when both state- and federal-level political actors have an incentive to make electoral and other concessions in order to maintain the federal order. In contrast to unitary states, however, the central design feature of federations is not how best to create institutions that ensure that elected politicians faithfully serve constituent interests, but rather the opposite: How can institutions be designed in such a way that the politicians can become imperfect agents of the voters? For if the federation is to evolve into a stable polity, state-level elected representatives must persuade their voters that their interests must be put to one side, at least in the shorter term, because of the sacrifices involved in ceding power to the federal government. Similarly, federal-level politicians have to persuade their constituents to grant policy and other concessions to state governments.

Unwanted Company: Foreign Investment in American Industries. By Jonathan Crystal. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 256p. $35.00.

Jonathan Crystal's primary theoretical objective in this book is to refine our understanding of “how societal actors translate economic interests into policy preferences” (p. 2). In this respect, he is not concerned with explaining why societal actors achieve their preferences, but instead with why societal actors seek one policy rather than another to further their interests. To do so, the author examines U.S. firms' reactions to the increase in foreign direct investment in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.

Globalization and Human Rights.

The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Edited by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 440p. $75.00.

Realists see systemic competition as the key to international politics and expect states to converge on something like “best practice” under this competitive pressure. For realists, this should be especially true for military practices, where the penalties for suboptimality are most severe. Realism thus predicts rapid and comprehensive diffusion of military methods, with all quickly emulating the state of the art as demonstrated by the strongest. This view is shared by policymakers who worry about technology transfer and its security implications: Can America preserve its current advantages in the use of networked information and precision weaponry as technology and ideas spread to potential challengers?

Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies.

US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions. Edited by Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 312p. $74.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

This important and timely work has the potential to disturb those who feel they already understand the conditions, character, and consequences of U.S. hegemony with respect to the way in which this position of power shapes U.S. efforts at establishing, maintaining, transforming, and terminating multilateral institutions. For people who view the United States as a champion or villain in its relations with international organizations, this work is likely to be irritating and upsetting; and for those who are less certain or dogmatic, this collection of studies is an excellent introduction to the subject because the work includes detailed, empirical case studies on a wide range of issues. Regardless of one's alignment or identification with these groups, this finely edited volume is illuminating, and its high quality makes it relevant to scholars, decision makers, and interested members of the public. Support for this recommendation is found in the careful scholarship that runs throughout and in the firsthand experience of many of the authors with the topics and controversies they analyze and present. Given the international audience to which this study is directed, the work's overall credibility is probably enhanced by the fact that many of the authors are not Americans.

Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations. By Sarah L. Henderson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 224p. $29.95.

Sarah Henderson has written a courageous and eye-opening account of Western programs to create civil society in Russia. After having spent 12 months conducting surveys and interviews with more than a hundred activists of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a dozen Russian cities, as well as doing consultancy work for three major foreign foundations over a seven-year period, Henderson has provided one of the first comprehensive looks at the impact that Western democracy aid—now a $7 billion industry—has had in Russia (p. 5). Her disturbing conclusion is that, despite good intentions, such programs have been counterproductive.

Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy.

Regions of War and Peace. By Douglas Lemke. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 235p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

I highly recommend Douglas Lemke's book to all scholars and students who study international conflict and war. This study is an extension of work conducted by the author since the early 1990s, some of which was published in the major quantitatively oriented journals in the field of international politics. The book integrates and advances the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of those earlier studies and makes a notable contribution in the area of peace and conflict analysis. I believe that although it is of primary interest to scholars, it may prove useful in advanced undergraduate classes on international relations and in graduate-level courses on international conflict.

What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature. By Annette Freyberg-Inan. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 266p. $59.50 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Human nature is the subject of Annette Freyberg-Inan's sustained attack on political realism. She argues that all realist theory shares a common set of assumptions about human motivations. In short, realists believe that humans are, and always will be, up to little good. We are fearful, self-interested, power-hungry, and “by and large, rational” (p. 94). Realists apply these psychological characteristics to nation-states, modifying them only to the extent that states and their leaders are likely to be more rational—in the sense of being strategic and utility maximizing—than average people. Such understandings of human nature are, however, simplistic and misleading.

When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers.

Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. By K. J. Holsti. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 372p. $70.00 cloth, $25.99 paper.

For those who want to understand how international political institutions have developed and changed over the last 300 years, this is the book for you. K. J. Holsti begins from the premise that we actually know very little about how these institutions have changed and especially about the degree to which they have done so since the Second World War.

Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate. Edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 286p. $70.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.

International trade is often wrapped up in a package with many good things—wealth, development, democracy, and peace. The proposition that increased trade is related to pacific international relations is one of the most well-known tenets of liberal theory. Despite its long history in political thought, the relationship between trade and peace has not been subject to extensive and systematic analysis until recently. In this edited volume, Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins collect some of the most current thinking addressing the theoretical and methodological issues that arise in the quest to conceptualize and test the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict. Understanding this relationship is important both theoretically and for policy reasons: Many policymakers today assume that increased trade will create a more peaceful world.