The presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and the reshaping of Europe's internal borders sped up the separation between the Eastern and Western blocs in the first years after the end of the Second World War. In countries where communism had been declared illegal or lacked the support of the electorate before 1944, the accession of communist leaders to governmental structures had been advanced by the politics of the Soviet Union, based on systematised political intimidation, institutionalised violence, and blackmail. The communist authorities then legitimised their political positions in relation to the historical past of their countries and according to the development of their societies after the Second World War.

While traditional ethnic/religious rivals had been incorporated to form the modern multiethnic communist nation-state of Yugoslavia under the forceful presence of Marshall Broz Tito, the collapse of the communist bloc and ensuing revolutionary/democratization wave engulfing East-Central Europe created tremendous uncertainty and the perception of a power vacuum throughout the former communist bloc. Conflicts would erupt based on distinctions along traditional cultural/ethnic lines. The struggle for control and territory among Yugoslavia's political elite ultimately resulted in a series of secessionist conflicts in Croatia (1991–1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) and most recently Kosovo (1999).

This article is the second in this series, following “Part 1: The Legacy of Early Institutionalism: From Gypsy Fiefs to Gypsy Kings”, which covered the period from the arrival of Gypsies to Europe until the mid-nineteenth century and was published in Volume 32, Number 3 of Nationalities Papers. Part 2 describes the birth of the first modern forms of ethnically-based political and social organizations established by Romani elites from the nineteenth century up until the Second World War (WWII). The main pattern of the development of Romani representation and administration until the mid-nineteenth century—as described in Part 1—distinguished between institutionalization from within and without. In the time period described here, the pattern changes because the majority of organizations and institutions established in order to represent and administer Roma are started upon the initiative of Romani leaders. Some are, however, created under the umbrella or patronage of non-Romani authorities or organizations and their activities are controlled by these patrons; others are created in (various degrees of) cooperation with non-Romani authorities or organizations and a few are created and operate independently. In addition, during this period the first few non-Romani non-governmental organizations start to take interest in the plight of Roma, and some organizations are specifically created to address their plight and lobby “on their behalf.” The other pattern of the development that emerges in this period is the gradual ascent of the institutionalization to higher levels. While until the nineteenth century most of the Gypsies organized themselves locally and regionally (with the exception of the Polish Office of the Gypsy Kings and the Chief Voivods in Transylvania and Hungary), in this period we see the first attempts by Roma themselves to expand the institutionalization countrywide and even internationally. These patterns are again explored in the conclusion (and summarized in Table 1), while the main body deals with the various arrangements in a more or less chronological and geographical order.

This article surveys the history of Kyiv Rus within the realm of nation building, identity and historical myths. It argues that Ukraine's elites believe that Western, Russian and Soviet schools of history on Kyiv Rus (and Ukraine) are incompatible with nation and state building.

Two schools—Ukrainophile and East Slavic—compete within Ukraine. Nevertheless, the former has been promoted as the dominant school by ruling elites, many of whom date from the Soviet Ukrainian SSR and might personally favour the East Slavic framework. As Stepanenko states, Hrushevsky “is factually theorizing the most convincing version of Ukrainian history.”

Since 1991, throughout the former Soviet Union marketization has increased, and much of the social safety net has disappeared. Compared with other former Soviet republics, Estonia has fared well. In this paper, we examine the salience and seriousness of various social issues for groups in Estonia in 1996, and we compare the 1996 results with those of a survey that took place in Estonia in 1991 shortly before the coup. We also reflect on the findings in light of opportunities and challenges for Estonia.

All the changes of statehood, political and administrative interventions in the last century have influenced … the national, demographic, cultural, economic and social composition of Istrian villages as well as the coastal towns they surround. Thus it is not strange that today when Istrians discuss borders what they are really discussing is themselves and their identity, strategies for everyday life and the practices with which they have symbolically and physically interpreted the existence of borders on the multicultural and multiethnic territory of Istria.

The registration of citizens' ethnicity (“nationality”) in official documents was commonplace and often obligatory in the Soviet Union, and the practice continued in the Russian Federation through the 1990s. In 1997, the Yeltsin government replaced the Soviet internal passport with a new one not featuring the “nationality” entry. The new document was met with an instant wave of protests from Russia's regions, above all the ethnically defined federal subjects. They objected to the removal of the “nationality” entry, and also because the passport (unlike the Soviet one) did not have a section in the federal subject's own language(s) besides Russian, and did not display the emblems of the region in question.

Development in Estonia during the last decade has been very rapid and impressive. Changes that started at the end of 1980s and increased in intensity after Estonia reclaimed its independence in 1991 have completely transformed the face of the country. This rapid political and economic development has been accompanied by several worrying trends. The social cost of the reforms has been high: a decline in living standards, falling birth rates, increasing crime rates, and uneven regional development. Major declines in many other social indicators have occurred as well.

What role, if any, does kinship play in modern political life? Recent work in comparative politics has focused on a variety of informal relationships. It is striking that kinship has not received similar, sustained attention. The broad assumption of most theoretically-driven work is that kinship is the domain of the anthropologist; to the extent that political scientists consider kinship, they do so as something for modern institutions to overcome, as something in fundamental opposition to the state apparatus.

For several centuries the overall trend in the world development has been along the way paved by Western civilization. Hence, the predominant flow has been based on borrowed Western cultural features. The issue of cultural interaction among nations with different culture types became fairly topical in contemporary society. Humankind now faces the legacy of moral decline of the past century and is trying to find a way out of its ideological dead end through other cultures and civilizations. In addition, the globalization processes that developed towards the end of the last century have also embraced the nations' cultural ties, turning the cross-cultural communication into an integral part of humankind's existence. The unique role of Russia in Northeastern Asia calls for an answer to the following question: Is there any cultural interaction between the Russian Far East, on the one hand, and the East Asian nations, on the other? And if so, what are its manifestations and how big are they?

Despite the euphoria surrounding the 1989 revolutions, over the past 15 years voices have warned that resurgent nationalism may bring “democracy in dark times” (Isaacs, 1998; Tismaneanu, 1998; Ramet, 1997). Reflecting this fear, a stream of articles has asserted that nationalism in the East is different from the more civic nationalism of the West (Vujacic, 1996; Bunce, 2001; Schöpflin, 2003). If true, these sentiments should be reflected in the constitutions, documents that define the polity and the foundational values of the state in addition to creating the basic institutional order. Debates over religious references in the European Union constitution and the focus on constitutional change by Albanian forces in Macedonia in 2000 serve as reminders of the centrality of constitutions in contention over identity. However, as all constitutions in East Central Europe and the Balkans set out a democratic structure informed by a tangle of national and liberal ideas, they cannot be neatly divided between those which are nationalist and those which are civic, between those which respect minority rights and those which do not. In fact, what is striking about the constitutions is how they combine ideas of liberal individualism, strong democracy, and pluralism.

This paper seeks to analyze the nature of the German minorities in the Czech Republic and Poland. In order to achieve this goal, the relationship between Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and Poland with the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany/FRG) forms an essential intellectual backdrop to our main theme. Reference to the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic/GDR) will be made as and where appropriate. As we shall see, tensions simmered between the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany/SED) and the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Zjednoczona (Polish United Workers' Party/PZPR), and in reality relations between the two sides were poor. Reference will be made to wartime German occupation policy in both Poland and the Czech lands. Due attention will also be paid to the consequent expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, due to limitations of space these themes, that have been exhaustively dealt with elsewhere, do not form part of our main focus of study.

The good die young.

If you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the State by God; and the State is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the State, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me.

If the destruction of the Berlin Wall came to symbolize freedom in Central Europe, for the republics of the former Soviet Union it was the construction and recognition of new walls in the form of national borders that represented liberation. In the case of Estonia, the end of what was considered illegal Soviet occupation marked a return to the country's republic's rightful place as an independent, European nation. In demographic respects, however, Estonia could not easily escape the legacies of Soviet rule, due in part to the migration of hundreds of thousands of non-ethnic Estonians to the Estonian SSR. Far from completing a clean break with the past, Estonian independence has replaced legal distinctions between nationalities with social and symbolic boundaries between ethnic groups.

Since the 1990s, yet another entity has emerged among the wide range of groups and minorities in the Balkans attracting the attention of politicians, scholars and the public. Known as “Egypcani” in Macedonia and Kosovo, or as “Jevgs/Jevgits” in Albania, these Albanophone Muslims are usually identified as Albanianised “Gypsies” by the societies in which they live, although they consider themselves to be descendents of Egyptian immigrants to the Balkans. Today, Balkan Egyptians are officially recognised as a distinct population group in the Republic of Macedonia, while they enjoy political influence through representative and cultural organisations in Kosovo and Albania.

Because of the historic separation of western and eastern Ukraine under Polish and Russian spheres of influence, respectively, regional subpopulations have been seen as an important factor in Ukrainian politics. Arel and Wilson argue that the division on the all-important “Russian question” in Ukraine (relations with Russia and with the Russian-speaking minority) is increasingly regional: east and south versus the center and west. Hesli calculated the level of russification and industrialization in the various regions of Ukraine and concluded that both, together with geographic location, although interrelated, have their own bearing on variation in public opinion. Markus, however, has argued that despite economic, political and ethnic differences among Ukraine's regions, these differences pose less of a threat to reform than has sometimes been suggested. She further points out that speculation that the Donbass wants to unite with Russia “stems more from Russian claims to the area than from genuine indigenous sentiment.” Miller and colleagues, on the other hand, dispute the notion of regional differences independent of the socio-demographic characteristics of the local populations, challenging the conventional wisdom that there are regional political cultures that supersede any underlying demographic differences. They argue that national, political, economic and class identities represent the important cleavages in post-communist societies. The regional divide in Ukraine is thus not a foregone conclusion but a factor that bears closer examination.

The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is a highly visible institution in Russia, and arguably the most prominent and influential religious or cultural body. The Orthodox Church figures prominently in various discussions as the driving force behind Russia's post-Soviet renewal and recovery. Surveys show that Russians trust the Orthodox Church more than any other public institution, including law courts, trade unions, mass media, the military, the police and the government. Estimates of the number of self-identified Orthodox adherents range from 50 million, which amounts to slightly more than one-third of Russia's population, to 70 million, or roughly one half of the population. A leading newspaper consistently ranks Patriarch Aleksii II, head of the Moscow Patriarchate, the governing body of the Orthodox Church, in the top 15 of the country's most influential political figures. These indicators confirm that the Orthodox Church has a significant role in Russia's post-Soviet development. This is widely accepted by commentators both within and without the Orthodox Church, and within and without Russia.

The development of new states in Central and Eastern Europe during the inter-war period was an enthusiastic attempt to build free and democratic societies, which unfortunately was soon followed by a sense of disappointment among both the public and political elites. This eventually led to the replacement of the young democracies with authoritarian regimes in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and other countries. I explore this growth of anti-democratic tendencies through the case of Latvian democracy and its opponents in the 1920s and early 1930s. I particularly focus on the role of the nationalist intelligentsia as the author of anti-democratic and pro-authoritarian political ideas.