The proposed establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is a valiant effort to end impunity for the egregious crimes that were committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war. Nonetheless, the Special Court – which will have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and various offences under Sierra Leonean national law – will have a number of major hurdles to cross in order to fulfill its mandate. Most notably the Court as currently empowered lacks the ability to induce the authorities of third states to comply with its orders and has limited temporal jurisdiction: thereby allowing a number of accused to escape justice. More alarmingly the on-going discussions within United Nations Headquarters concerning the financing of the organisation has substantially eroded the credibility of the institution, especially as large numbers of potential accused have been languishing in jail for significant periods without being formally charged.

As a result of the perception that trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) are too lengthy, a discernible shift in the trial practice of the ICTY is occurring, with a greater emphasis on the role that the judges play in controlling the proceedings. While the first few trials at the Tribunal closely resembled common law criminal trials, the level of control being exercised by the Trial Chambers in recent cases is moving more in the direction of the civil law approach. As a result, a truly mixed jurisdiction, that is, one that contains elements of both the common law and the civil law, is emerging. This evolutionary process will be examined in the context of: (1) The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and amendments thereto concerning case management; (2) examples of case management under the amended Rules; and (3) the future evolution of the ICTY.

The Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court should contain provisions governing situations where requests from the Court might impinge on the privileges and immunities of the UN under its Charter and Privileges and Immunities Convention. In particular, the Court might need access to documents in the UN's archives, might require the testimony of persons serving, or having served, the UN in various capacities and might even consider some such persons as potential defendants; in addition, the inclusion of such provisions might make it advisable to include an effective disputes resolution clause in the Agreement.

The December 1999 judgment of the ICTY in the Jelisić case is the first ruling on the merits from that court dealing with an indictment for genocide. The Trial Chamber concluded that the Prosecutor had failed to prove that genocide was committed and that consequently the accused could not be convicted as an accomplice to the crime. It went on to examine whether despite the absence of genocide on any widespread or systematic basis it was still possible for an individual, driven by genocidal intent, to commit one of the underlying crimes such as killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm. The Trial Chamber considered this a plausible hypothesis but ruled that this did not correspond to the facts of the case. Since the Jelisić ruling, the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court has attempted to eliminate the lone génocidaire scenario in the Elements of Crimes. While the law remains unsettled, awaiting clarification from the Appeals Chamber, a wise prosecutorial policy would be to reserve international genocide prosecutions for serious cases involving organized and widespread crimes. Exaggerated attention to individual and isolated cases is a questionable use of valuable resources and risks diluting some of the terrible stigma now attached to the “crime of crimes.”

The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of the Convention in its judgement in the complaints of the former East German political and military leaders Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz. All three were convicted and sentenced to terms in prison by German courts in relation to the deaths of East Germans who were killed in attempts at fleeing across the fortified border between East and West Germany. Nonetheless, the Court's decision constitutes a clear rejection of the Radbruch Formula, which served as a central line of reasoning in the decisions of the German courts in the cases. The author addresses the Court's rejection of the Radbruch Formula, focusing especially on the distinct historical and political circumstances that existed after World War II and in 1989.

The speaker identifies the scale of the task facing the ICTY and ICTR. He speaks of the necessary procedural and personnel imperfections by which their performance is bound to be limited along with the imperfections of the people of the regions whose war crimes they deal with. He deals with some inevitable shortcomings in the lawyers and judges working at the tribunals and argues for the need to have personnel of the very highest quality doing the tribunals' work. He highlights the need to be truly objective about the tribunals and their work but expresses optimism about their potential beneficial effects.

The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Phase (Maritime Delimitation) of the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration follows the trend towards producing a single all-purpose delimitation line constructed on the basis of equidistance, the course of which is chiefly dictated by mainland coastal geography. Islands are accorded little impact upon the course of the final line, save to the extent necessary to permit them a full territorial sea. The potential relevance of other factors, including fishing and navigational interests is acknowledged but, given the methodology adopted, they did not influence the construction of the line. As in other cases, proportionality is demonstrated by comparison of areas with the relevant coastal lengths, although the usefulness of this is dubious. Although entirely separate exercises, it may be that the methodology pursued owes something to the outcomes of the first phase of the Arbitration, concerning sovereignty over the islands, and this may have a bearing upon the impact of the Award for maritime boundary delimitation more generally.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment on 19 June 2001. These Rules seek to address fundamental lacunae as identified by a panel of environmental law experts and the member states of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This article discusses some innovative provisions of the Environmental Rules and concludes that arbitration under the Environmental Rules could have some advantages over adjudication, and that the Environmental Rules can increase access to justice functioning as a tool for interpretation of existing agreements; possibly mending some of the fragmentation of international (environmental) law. The article also offers an examination of present systems and scenarios for how the Environmental Rules may lead to direct environmental improvement.

This article considers the implications of the Lockerbie case for Scots law. It examines the case from the standpoint of criminal procedure, the substantive charges against the accused, the presentation of evidence, the verdicts open to the court, and the available sentences. Originally written before the trial had commenced, it has been updated to take account of several important developments that occurred during the trial.

All crimes of genocide have a common structure: There must be an actus reus, a corresponding mens rea and, in addition, a second subjective element, the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a […] group as such.” This so called “genocidal intent,” is characterized by the fact that responsibility for completed genocide does not depend on the result, the perpetrator intended to achieve. The threshold of this intent is not higher than for the mens rea described in Article 30 of the Rome Statute; in particular, no special quality of the volitive side of this intent is required. Dolus eventualis, therefore, is sufficient to commit the actus reus and to have, in addition, the particular “intent to destroy […].” An inherent, additional and independent, contexual criterion, as proposed in The Draft Elements of Crimes is neither admissible nor advisable to limit the punishability of genocide or the jurisdiction of the Court for such crimes.

The present article describes the dispute settlement system of the Organization of the Islamic Conference through the envisaged creation of the International Islamic Court of Justice. The Court's Statute, adopted in 1987, considers the Islamic Shari'ah or Islamic law as the fundamental law to be applied by the Court for the resolution of international disputes. Therefore, the Court will have a religious character considering a local religious code as the primary applicable law. The International Islamic Court of Justice has not yet been set up. Its creation might have the effect of grouping Islamic states under the same international judicial system, and of causing a strong political impact in respect of the relations with the State of Israel and of the Palestinian question.

This article discusses the Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, which was issued by the Financial Action Task Force in June 2000. After a general overview of the problem of secrecy havens and of the criteria used to identify them, the article gives a critical assessment of the process used to arrive at the ‘black list’ of 15 jurisdictions that was eventually drawn up. In this respect, a comparison is made with the work carried out by the OECD in the field of unfair tax competition by tax havens. It also looks forward at the possible follow-up to this list, both by the FATF and other international fora.

Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court verifies the four most serious crimes to the international community as a whole upon which the Court shall have jurisdiction. Though it includes the crime of aggression the Statute lacks a definition of that crime. The purpose of the article is to offer a sustainable definition. It discusses the constitutive elements of the crime, focussing on the crucial points in a debate that has been actively engaged in for the past 50 years. Certainly, the crux of the matter lies in the role the Security Council should play in this regard. […] there has been a persistent undercurrent of opinion expressive of the view that there is no fixed limit to the possibilities of judicial settlement; that all conflicts in the sphere of international politics can be reduced to contests of a legal nature; that the only decisive test of justiciability of the dispute is the willingness of the disputants to submit the conflict to the arbitrament of law.H. Lauterpacht

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which is mandated under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights with promoting and protecting human rights in Africa, has attracted considerable criticism for being an ineffectual body. One of the complaints is that the Charter based regime lacks an effective system of remedies. This paper examines whether this criticism is justified. An analysis of the jurisprudence of the African Commission proves that the Commission is patiently constructing a concept of reparations which has some similarities with that developed by the UN Human Rights Committee.

The ILC has initiated the codification of the law relating to diplomatic protection. Two reports have so far been submitted, a preliminary one and a first one in which eight draft articles are proposed. An analytical synopsis of the preliminary report will be followed by a short outline of the object and purpose of the draft articles as well as of the comments of the Commission which discussed the articles during its 52nd session. In the conclusion the contours of diplomatic protection as may be inferred from the work done so far are sketched.

The quest for a constructive solution to the situation in Chechnya is a challenge of the greatest importance. The prospects are examined against a review of the historical background of conflict and suffering. Solutions would have to be based on some form of autonomy within the Russian Federation, providing for extensive self-government in relation to education, culture, use of local languages, measures to protect the environment, local planning, economic development, local policing functions, and housing, health, and other social services. But there are other matters which must be shared with the central authorities. Optimal divisions of functions between autonomous Chechnya and the federal authorities will take time had has to proceed step by step. The role of international agencies in achieving and guaranteeing this result is examined.