This article reviews and analyzes the Furundžija Judgment rendered by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the first international war crimes trial in history to focus virtually exclusively on rape. The judgment addresses what acts constitute rape, whether a non-physical perpetrator can be held individually criminally responsible for rape, and whether rape can constitute torture; it also broadens the purview of Common Article 3 crimes and considers acts which may constitute outrages upon personal dignity. This article discusses how these issues impact upon both international humanitarian law generally and gender jurisprudence specifically.

Thus far, witnesses have played a crucial role in most proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It can be expected that this will also be the case in the proceedings before the future International Criminal Court. The author of the note focuses on the position of witnesses and compares the rules, practices, and experiences of the Tribunal with the Rome Statute in this respect. In particular, the support and protection of witnesses and the role of the Victims and Witnesses Units of the respective courts will be discussed.

This article discusses certain key aspects arising from the negotiations leading up to the adoption of a Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC), to have its seat in The Hague. These aspects include individual criminal responsibility regardless of status as Head of State or constitutional organ and the transformation of international criminal law into domestic law. Also discussed are the two appendices to be added to the Statute pertaining to substantive criminal law and rules of criminal evidence and procedure to be used by the Court. The author argues that the appendix on the law of criminal procedure will be of particular importance to the Netherlands as the host state. The obligations regarding legal assistance of the host state will be dependent on this.

International law is a projection of the imagination and professional identity of the practitioners in the field. Take a diligent, somewhat idealistic Delegate X who participates in a major event in international law: the negotiations on the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), starting with the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995, continuing in the Preparatory Committee and culminating at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome in 1998. What takes place when the ambitious ‘world public opinion’ expectations for international law are supposed to be made everyday life by the delegates? How does X, a single committed person, play his or her role as a tiny part of the global reform machinery? What is the anatomy of the engagement: professionalism and a comfortable exit from the intolerable world of human suffering and injustice? What kind of mechanisms govern the vertiginous scenes of genocide, champagne and flirt? Do the everyday worlds of violence and of welfare touch each other only slightly, in the name of international law, just in order to disappear again in their own, irresistible orbits?

Despite the clear prohibition of rape by international law, no conventional or other international instrument defines this international crime or explains its relation to the international crime of genocide. This article reviews the recent precedent-setting judgments of the international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda which have sought to define rape in international law using different approaches. It also analyses the recent Akayesu Judgment of the Rwanda Tribunal. This is the first decision of an international tribunal to consider the question of whether rape can constitute genocide.

In light of serious problems with the assignment of counsel to defendants before the ICTR, this article examines the freedom of choice of assigned defence counsel before both ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals. International legal instruments guarantee free legal assistance for indigent defendants but do not recognize an unrestricted free choice of such counsel. International case law, however, recognizes that an effective defence can hardly arise from a client-counsel relation that is not based on trust and confidence. Trust and confidence are therefore decisive for a proper understanding of the right to have free legal assistance. Unlike the practice of the ICTY of recognizing the importance of these factors, the Registrar of the ICTR seems to give more weight to geographical distribution of lawyers and other discriminating factors. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR dealt with this policy in the Akayesu case and overturned the decision of the Registry to refuse the counsel of the defendant's own choosing.

In the absence of police powers, the International Criminal Court, like the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, will depend on the co-operation of states in order to fulfil its mandate. Discussing the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and the travaux préparatoires of the Rome treaty, the author compares the mandatory powers conferred on the respective institutions to this end. He concludes that the Security Council endowed the Tribunals with unequivocally binding powers, while under the Rome treaty regime, which resembles traditional inter-state co-operation in criminal matters, the ICC's powers are more limited and state obligations less stringent.

From time immemorial amnesty has been employed as a means of promoting a political settlement and advancing reconciliation in societies that have emerged from repression. At present there is a trend in support of prosecution of those who have committed international crimes, such as torture and crimes against humanity, which excludes the possibility of amnesty. That amnesty is no longer favored is illustrated by the failure of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to recognize amnesty as a defence to prosecution. While there is no place for unconditional amnesty in the contemporary international legal order an intermediate solution such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with power to grant amnesty after investigation, of the South African kind, may contribute to the achievement of peace and justice in a society in transition more effectively than mandatory prosecution.