The ICJ's Advisory Opinion adopted a very narrow approach to the question posed by the General Assembly, but its basic response – that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate general international law – was correct. While it might have been preferable if the Court had given more guidance regarding the contemporary scope of self-determination, neither supporters nor opponents of Kosovo's independence gained much from the opinion. No definitive conclusion about Kosovo's status can be drawn without agreement between Pristina and Belgrade, and outsiders should avoid prejudging or interfering in that outcome.

Counsel are regulated the world over in their dealings with a court of law through the enforcement of ethical duties that are owed by them. With the increased prevalence of arbitration in resolving disputes internationally, the question then arises: how are counsel kept in check when appearing before an arbitral tribunal? The issues involved are magnified when one considers the question in the context of international arbitral tribunals. This paper considers these issues by analysing them in three parts. First, is ethical regulation necessary in international arbitration? Second, does an arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction to consider and enforce ethical obligations owed to it by counsel? Third, what ethical obligations should be applied to counsel?

Since the early 1990s, the UN Security Council has used its enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to address different aspects of international refugee protection from the root causes of forced displacement to the search for durable solutions to the refugee problem. At the same time, however, the Security Council has been criticized for impelling trends towards state security concerns that have emerged in the refugee-protection regime over the past two decades. By establishing safe areas in Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda, or linking refugee status to terrorism, the Security Council has been accused of violating established refugee-protection standards. This paper seeks to use the prism of international refugee protection to draw a more nuanced picture of the normative effects of SC actions on the development of international law generally. Shifting the analytical focus from the much-discussed responsibility of the Security Council for wrongful acts, it is submitted that the practice of the Security Council has had a considerable influence on the development and even making of norms in the field of international refugee protection, thereby eroding established refugee-protection standards. This normative erosion through the inherently political actions of the Security Council will be assessed with regard to the principal measures by which the Security Council has addressed international refugee protection, namely peace operations and economic sanctions.

Inter-state use of force has always attracted much attention from international legal scholars. Many articles have been written on the subject. However, there are still a limited number of books addressing all the aspects of the contemporary prohibition on the use of force in a systematic way. Those written by Yoram Dinstein, Christine Gray, and Thomas Franck are certainly the best known in the English-speaking literature. This literature is now enriched following the publication of a new book entitled The Law against War by Olivier Corten. It is a translated and updated version of a book published in French and entitled Le droit contre la guerre, which explains why it has been published in the French Studies in International Law collection of Hart Publishing.

Thomas Buergenthal retired as a judge of the International Court of Justice in September 2010 after ten years of service and participating in 38 substantive decisions. This tribute to a member of the Court who arrived with outstanding and formidable scholarly qualifications, especially but not only in the field of international human rights, also draws on his earlier tragic, harrowing, and ‘lucky’ years. On the basis of the public record, for much of the work of the Judges as members of a collegial body is not public, the article emphasizes Thomas Buergenthal's commitment to the independence of judicial office, as demonstrated particularly in cases brought against his own country; to the sound administration of justice; to the indispensability of courts in any system of ordered government, national or international; and more generally to principle.

‘Fragmentation, verticalization, and constitutionalization form the holy trinity of international legal debate in the early 21st century’ – such is the opening phrase of Jan Klabbers's first chapter in his co-authored book, The Constitutionalization of International Law. Although Klabbers possibly did not intend it, by invoking the ‘holy trinity’, he is calling attention to an important aspect of the contemporary constitutionalist debate, namely what I would like to describe as the faith in constitutionalism as a secular religion. It is from this perspective – the complete and unquestioning belief in constitutionalism – that I will explore global constitutionalism and the three books that are the object of this review.

The pending dispute at the ICJ between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Italy on jurisdictional immunities of states bears on the hotly debated question of whether a state having committed a violation of jus cogens loses its immunity from civil jurisdiction abroad, as maintained by the Italian Court of Cassation. The article aims to demonstrate the untenability of the position of the Italian Court of Cassation, not only under current international customary law, but also under a prospective de lege ferenda. Nevertheless, different options are open to the ICJ to adjudicate the case, without impinging on possible future developments of state practice. The article closes by pointing at the risks that, in a strict dualist/pluralist perspective, not even an ICJ's decision in favour of Germany would eventually ensure compliance by Italian domestic judges.

This article examines the reasoning and findings of the International Court of Justice in its judgment in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua on issues relating to the effect of the passage of time on the interpretation of treaties. In arriving at the proper interpretation of the disputed phrase ‘for purposes of commerce’ in a Treaty of Limits between the parties, which entered into force in 1858, the ICJ followed a number of interpretative steps based on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which led the Court to conclude that the meaning of this phrase must be presumed to have evolved over time. The means and methods of interpretation employed by the ICJ to determine the effect of the passage of time on treaties are examined. More specifically, the question is raised whether the ICJ's approach to determining the evolutionary character of a treaty provision, based on an interpretative presumption, may not be considered unsatisfactory insofar as it does not appear to take full account of the actual common intention of the parties – the main task of interpretation.

Since its modern inception in the 1960s, international environmental law (IEL) has faced three main challenges: (i) justifying the need for an international regulation of environmental issues (legitimacy); (ii) finding mechanisms to ensure compliance with IEL (effectiveness); and (iii) distributing equitably the benefits and burden of environmental protection (fairness). While it is nowadays possible to say that the legitimacy of IEL is no longer in question, the need to respond to challenges (ii) and (iii) has never been more pressing. This is particularly the case in the context of the redesign of the climate change regime (CCR), as the responses to (ii) and (iii) may conflict with each other. Industrialized countries who historically contributed the most to the artificial increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere have been matched, and even surpassed, in their level of GHG emissions by countries such as China, India, or Brazil, who are now being pressed to undertake real emissions-reduction commitments. Historically, however, none of these latter benefited from the emission laxity characterizing the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century to further their development. While imposing specific emissions-reduction commitments on them would seem unfair, such commitments are nevertheless critical for the effectiveness of the regime both directly and indirectly (as without such commitments, industrialized countries may be reluctant to join or uphold a regime). The purpose of this article is to spell out in an orderly analytical manner the types of issue that must be addressed in seeking a balanced solution. This type of analysis can be conducted from several perspectives. The most directly relevant disciplines to deal with fairness considerations are admittedly ethics and political philosophy, and there is indeed a growing literature on climate fairness. Although this literature is briefly surveyed, the article focuses on the fairness dimensions of the existing legal arrangements or those currently being negotiated. There is a considerable gap between the theoretical approaches to climate fairness and the manner in which considerations of fairness operate in practice. This gap is mainly due to the need to account for political considerations or, in other terms, to balance fairness with political effectiveness. When such considerations are taken into account, the picture that emerges is quite different. The CCR is not built upon a single approach to fairness. Rather, fairness considerations are integrated through a patchwork of criteria used to distribute different objects (burden of emission reductions, emission rights, contribution to financial and technological assistance, and access to such assistance) among different actors situated at different levels.