The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of the Convention in its judgement in the complaints of the former East German political and military leaders Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz. All three were convicted and sentenced to terms in prison by German courts in relation to the deaths of East Germans who were killed in attempts at fleeing across the fortified border between East and West Germany. Nonetheless, the Court's decision constitutes a clear rejection of the Radbruch Formula, which served as a central line of reasoning in the decisions of the German courts in the cases. The author addresses the Court's rejection of the Radbruch Formula, focusing especially on the distinct historical and political circumstances that existed after World War II and in 1989.

The present article identifies a tension between the two main mandates of the UN's administration of East Timor: community-building on the one hand and human rights promotion on the other. While originally planned to accompany each other, in practice the goal of human rights promotion took over, perhaps on the basis of the thought that serious community-building presupposes that a catalogue of human rights (including enforcement machinery) is in place. This thesis, however, is debatable, and it is even thinkable that an emphasis on human rights forms an obstacle to community-building.

The issue of whether an international judicial forum may entertain the claim of a dual national against a state to which he owes allegiance, is an old one. What is new, however, is the challenge by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal of the traditionally held view that, in the absence of a clear mandate and where customary international law is exclusively invoked, the forum may not do so. Such a claim is admissible, says the Tribunal, provided the claimant is able to demonstrate: (a) that at all relevant times his “dominant and effective” nationality was the one on which he now relies; and (b) that the rights in question, those for the asserted breach of which he seeks redress, were not secured because of his other, non-dominant, nationality. Leaving for another day the questionability of the challenge, the present article offers to examine some of the more important aspects of the second test, as expounded and applied by the Tribunal.

Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN-13: 9780521839174, ISBN-10: 0521839173, 349 pp., £50.00 (hb).

M. Mubiala, Le Système régional Africain de Protection des Droits de l'Homme, Brussels, Bruylant, 2005, ISBN 280272021X, 299 pp., €65.00.

This article engages with the history of international investment law in the first half of the twentieth century. It traces how international lawyers inscribed their vision of an international legal order protecting private property of Western companies against attempts at nationalization in the wake of socialist revolutions and the decolonization of large parts of the world. The article focuses on the role of ‘general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations’ as building blocks for an international legal order today called international investment law. Rather than describing a direct line between contemporary standards of protection and the invocation of general principles, the article develops conditions of possibility for the emergent field of international investment law. These conditions are located both in arbitral practice, as well as in international legal scholarship of the early twentieth century. Based on the analysis of such arbitrations over disputes resulting from concession agreements and scholarly writings in the interwar period, the contribution draws out the modes of authorization upon which the legal claims advanced by international lawyers rested. At the heart of the vision were ideas of ‘modernity’, ‘civilization’, ‘equity’, and ‘justice’ that enabled a hierarchization of difference, locating Western claims to legality above rivalling claims of socialist and ‘newly independent’ states. These ideas ultimately constituted the paradox of a ‘modern law of nature’ that claimed timeless universality while authorizing the ordering of foreign property in line with Western conceptions of modernity.

In this separate rejoinder to Jan Klabbers' and Ino Augsberg's comments to the articles in the symposium on New Legal Realism in International Law (Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 28:2, 2015), we respond from the point of view of the European New Legal Realism (ENLR) as propounded in our initial contribution to the symposium. Agreeing with Ingo Venzke who wrote in his introduction to the symposium that ‘stakes are high’ in the debate over international law and methodology, we argue that both Klabbers and Augsberg, each in their own way, fail to take sufficiently seriously the ENLR challenge to doctrinal scholarship. We argue that Klabbers underestimates the evergreen and persistent character of this challenge when he portrays the current push for New Legal Realism as merely a whimsy fashion wave. And we argue that Augsberg's essentially Kelsenian defence of doctrinal scholarship is insufficiently robust because it inherits the excess epistemological liberalism of its underlying Neo-Kantianism.

The case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, better known as the ‘Nicaragua case’ or simply Nicaragua, is arguably one of the most important and controversial cases ever to be heard by the International Court of Justice. Twenty-five years after the judgment on the merits was handed down, it is high time to reassess the impact of Nicaragua on international law. The joint efforts of the Grotius Centre of the Leiden Law School, the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals at University College London, the Netherlands Society of International Law, and the law firm Foley Hoag LLP resulted in a one-day conference, on 27 June 2011, the very day on which the judgment on the merits of the Nicaragua case was handed down, 25 years ago.

In this article, I explore the concept of resilience and its relevance for evaluating hybrid court design and the impact of hybrid courts in societies that have experienced periods of mass violence or repression. I begin by tracing the evolution of the concept of resilience from the fields of materials science and ecology to human responses to natural and human-made disasters. Then, I examine the implications of how one defines the concept for the policy recommendations that should be provided to the architects and staff of hybrid courts. From there, I assess how the way one conceives of resilience shapes the assessment of the circumstances under which hybrid courts are more likely to be beneficial for violence-affected societies. I conclude by reflecting upon the utility of adopting resilience language in the study of hybrid courts. Resilience may be seductive conceptually because it provides a vision of empowerment and autonomy for victims and affected communities. However, resilience thinking is also consistent with neoliberal prescriptions that are contrary to the realization of the type of emancipatory justice that many hybrid court advocates seek.

The adoption of the 2004 budget of the International Criminal Court completed the first full budgetary process for the Court. The document sets out the framework and financial parameters that will determine how the Court will function and grow in future years and represents the first comprehensive vision of the fully operational Court. This article looks at the process of creating the document and, referring to the experiences of other international and internationalized courts, analyzes the substantive debates that occurred on ensuring the independence of the Prosecutor in the process and ensuring adequate resources for victims, outreach, and defence.

The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 11 November 2013, interpreting its 1962 judgment in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, inspires a reconsideration of the role of interpretation proceedings pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute of the Court. In particular, it invites us to take a closer look at the role and scope of the principle of res judicata in public international law in general and as considered in the case law of the Court in particular. This contribution reveals the competing concepts of the principle in interpretation and consecutive original contentious proceedings, and promotes instead a uniform concept that avoids the conflict inherent in current approaches.

Section 1 introduces Article 60 of the ICJ Statute (section 1.1.) and thereinafter views interpretation proceedings before the Court in light of the Court's case law, in particular its 2013 interpretation judgment in the Temple case (section 1.2.). Section 2 constitutes the heart of the analysis and discusses what will be identified as the competing concepts of res judicata. Section 2.1. presents the functions, concepts, and case law of res judicata in public international law in general, whereas section 2.2. focuses specifically on the case law of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in this regard. Finally, section 2.3. concludes this study by setting out the approach that the author regards as appropriate to reconcile the competing concepts of res judicata.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child in November, 1989, bringing to a close ten years of debate and discussion over the merits of the project as well as the content of its main provisions. Although some representatives expressed misgivings about the content of several articles of the convention, it was adopted by a broad consensus among the member states of the United Nations. In fact, in less than one year, by September, 1990, the convention had been ratified by more than twenty countries, the threshold figure established by Article 49 of the convention, and it entered into force. This set in motion the process for the election of the ten-member Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the body that has been charged with implementing the convention, in February, 1991, and it is scheduled to begin functioning in the fall of 1991. As recently as March, 1991, the United Nations Secretary-General reported to the states parties that 71 states had either ratified or acceded to the convention and that almost 60 other states had signed it. By June, 1991, the ratification of the convention by Belgium brought the total of states parties to over 90.

The various Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have advanced potentially inconsistent definitions of the crime of persecution under Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute. The Trial Chamber in the Krnojelac case, in attempting to reconcile these different approaches, has undertaken a comprehensive analysis both of the actus reus and mens rea elements constituting this offence. In the context of the Tribunal's jurisprudence, this article analyses these elements and briefly discusses other issues related to the crime of persecution.

The ICJ interpreted Article 36(1) of its Statute – more specifically, the phrase ‘all cases which the parties refer to it’ – as permitting it to adopt the doctrine of forum prorogatum as a jurisdictional principle and to adapt this doctrine to the circumstances of international judicial process, as an informal way of founding its jurisdiction over the merits of a dispute. The resort to this doctrine has given rise to some concerns and has not received the general acceptance of states. The Certain Criminal Proceedings in France case marks the successful return of the doctrine to the ICJ and shows that the doctrine is a valuable tool for nationalists seeking to protect national interests and for internationalists seeking to promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

This article analyzes the 9,203 citations made by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its cases involving Sudan. To date, few empirical studies have assessed the citation practices of courts and even fewer of international courts. The data is rich. It reveals, for instance, the changing nature of the Court's citations over time, the disproportionate distribution of citations among chambers, the potential impact of party pleadings on citations, and the allocation of citations to previous rulings of the Court, other international tribunals and domestic courts. The article also explores possible explanations for the patterns that emerge and assesses what the patterns may mean for the Court. Unlike most other citation analyses, the study provides the additional benefit of having categorized the citations based on their function, distinguishing for instance between citations that the Court uses to help it decide legal and factual issues, and those it does not.

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands construed the state’s positive human rights obligations as requiring a 25 per cent reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. This article explores how judges can decide the level of state effort required to mitigate climate change. To date, judges have predominantly approached this issue by seeking to identify an elusive benchmark, either by deduction from global objectives or induction from state conduct. This article shows that the judicial assessment of a state’s requisite efforts inevitably relies on equity infra legem. Acknowledging this, judges could learn from the international courts’ experience with establishing clarity in the midst of vague legal rules.

Interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of international law (IL) and International Relations (IR) has illuminated the roles of politics in law, of law in politics, and of the shifting boundary between the two in various areas of international affairs. The boundary itself, however, has proven resilient. While critical approaches investigating the politics of international law have come to insist on the lasting significance of legality proper, IR approaches to legalization have returned to politics. Although the apparent limits to challenging the boundary between legality and politics are not new, we suggest that they are intimately related to another great divide, i.e., that between the state and the international. Together, these two cross-cutting lines have shaped the possibilities and constraints of articulating substantive positions ‘in’ (international) law and politics at least since the Interwar period. Reading these distinctions as intertwined ‘nested oppositions’, this article reconstructs the stylized but paradigmatic debates between Max Weber and Hans Kelsen over the nature of the state and between Hans Morgenthau and Hersch Lauterpacht over the nature of the international. We further illustrate how the same conceptual oppositions still enable and constrain current debates in IL and IR, discussing as examples the creation of states and the justiciability of international crimes. Crossing and contesting the boundaries ultimately reaffirms them as the matrix in which conflicts over states and the international are articulated as legal and political.

In 2018, the Dutch Government proposed to establish an independent international ombudsman, known as the International Ombuds for Humanitarian and Development Aid (IOHDA), to hold non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accountable for their safeguarding and accountability failures, notably the Oxfam GB sexual abuse scandal in Haiti (March 2018) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (April 2021). While establishing an international ombudsman would fill a regulatory and accountability gap in global governance, there are many legal and logistic challenges, some of which have been identified by the IOHDA proposal itself, that undermine the creation of this brand new body. Besides the legal and logistic challenges outlined in the proposal, this article argues that the IOHDA is unlikely to succeed because of three additional challenges. First, the IOHDA’s scope is too broad and misinterprets the ombudsman’s jurisdiction and traditional role. Second, the IOHDA neglects that existing ombudsman schemes present limitations in enacting accountability and does not learn any lessons from them. Third, the IOHDA lacks support from NGOs, a driving force, and the principal standard-setters for an international accountability mechanism, like the proposed ombudsman. This article provides a series of recommendations to mitigate these three challenges whilst identifying alternative routes to enact NGO accountability.

The Rwandan genocide remains one of the most horrific atrocities of the twentieth century, resulting in the death of an estimated 500–800,000 human beings, massacred over a 100-day period. In the fourteen years since the genocide, attempts at justice and reconciliation in Rwanda have involved a delicate interplay between national legal systems and the international legal order. This article examines three fora in which Rwandans have been tried for involvement in the genocide: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rwandan courts including Gacaca tribunals, and French attempts to exercise universal jurisdiction. Using Rwanda as a case study, the article illustrates the issues, concerns, and difficulties that arise when multiple jurisdictions assert a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of serious atrocity crimes. Beginning with a discussion of the political context, this article considers what the competing narratives and litigation in various fora have meant for the project of international and transnational criminal justice. Cases involving the commission of atrocities pose unique challenges for the international legal order. As the normative structure of international criminal law has arguably been strengthened, political constraints increasingly come to the fore. As illustrated by Rwanda, universal jurisdiction or other bases of jurisdiction may remain necessary vehicles for justice and reconciliation, or, at the very least, they may serve as a catalyst for change in Rwanda itself.

This article analyses the growing resistance to judgments of the International Court of Justice arising out of domestic law in Latin America, through a study of challenges to the authority of the Court’s judgments regarding territorial and maritime delimitation in the region. These challenges are based upon the ‘territory clauses’ found in many Latin American constitutions, which were used to set national boundaries following colonial independence. Territory clauses that once developed international law doctrines such as uti possidetis iuris are now being used against prevailing international law rules, in a process described in this article as ‘constitutional resistance’.

This article explains the nature of ‘territory clauses’ in Latin America, i.e., clauses that constitutionally define the national territory in reference to international law. It then describes the process of ‘constitutional resistance’, by which local authorities have used these clauses to oppose ICJ judgments, leading to various results, such as non-appearance in further proceedings, constitutionalizing exclusively favourable judgments, deferring the implementation of a judgment to the Constitutional Court or implementing only certain ICJ judgments, while creating legal barriers to the implementation of judgments that, in the State’s view, negatively affect their territory.

These challenges based on territory clauses are studied through prominent ICJ cases involving Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Colombia. The article also explores how the lack of a strong territory clause eased the implementation of the Peru v. Chile judgment, and how the recent non-appearance of Venezuela in its current ICJ proceedings with Guyana, is partly based on constitutional justifications.